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In the 1990s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) stopped treating 
power generation as a regulated monopoly and supported the development of competitive 
electricity markets. Competition has encouraged innovation and reduced costs, but the 
payment system FERC and grid operators developed has struggled to provide low-cost 
electricity without leaving itself vulnerable to market power abuses. In a payment system 
based on marginal costs, generators necessary for grid reliability cannot recover their fixed 
costs unless they charge high prices when supply is scarce. However, because these generators 
have market power, permitting them to recover their fixed costs leaves energy markets 
vulnerable to market manipulation. To mitigate market power abuses, every grid operator 
in the United States has introduced offer caps that limit revenues available in energy 
markets. Offer caps can prevent some generators from recovering their fixed costs, leading to 
a “missing money” problem as critical suppliers are forced out of business and potential new 
entrants cannot cover their start-up costs. Today, growing penetration of renewables is 
exacerbating the missing money problem. Regulators and grid operators are responding by 
administratively pricing certain resources and supporting specific units deemed too important 
to retire. These interventions lead to excess capacity and undermine competitive markets. As 
a result, current regulatory responses to the missing money problem recreate the inefficiencies 
that competitive markets were designed to solve, and they do so under questionable legal 
authority and at the expense of a clean energy grid. 
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Rather than quietly revive cost-of-service rate regulation, this Article argues that FERC 
should simplify reserve requirements, stop counteracting state clean energy programs, and 
support the development of competitive markets for services that support grid reliability. 
Specifically, FERC and grid operators need not administratively reprice resources or force 
load-serving entities (LSEs), which distribute electricity to consumers, to transact with 
specific generators. Instead, the Commission should support long-term resource procurement 
markets that would be built on top of today’s short-term energy markets. Wholesale markets 
would consist primarily of short-term energy dispatch and balancing markets. They would 
not be relied on to ensure that revenues are sufficient to maintain resource adequacy. If LSEs 
were permitted to determine for themselves how to comply with resource procurement 
requirements, they could balance renewable policies, flexibility needs, and reserve mandates. 
This approach would maintain reliability while respecting FERC’s jurisdictional limits. 
Most importantly, it would prevent the Commission from quietly reviving cost-of-service 
regulation in regions that ostensibly abandoned that market structure decades ago. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is so worried about 
cheap renewable energy sources that in December 2019, it ordered PJM, a 
regional transmission organization (RTO) that oversees electricity sales to 
sixty-ve million Americans,1 to prohibit renewables from submitting low 
bids in capacity markets.2 One expert projected that this intervention, along 
 
1 Who We Are, PJM, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx [https://perma.cc/
5KW2-58BQ] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
2 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 6 (June 29, 2018). Capacity markets refer 
to markets that compensate generators for being available to provide energy—not for actually 
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with a similar intervention in New England, could cost between $9.1 billion 
and $24.6 billion annually.3 FERC explained that this handout was necessary 
to ensure that energy markets remain “grounded in fundamental principles 
of supply and demand.”4 This is a curious justication. Basic economic theory 
teaches that markets are working when competition drives prices down.5 
FERC’s order turned this principle on its head. 
Similar concerns prompted FERC to bail out a large natural gas power 
plant in Massachusetts by allowing the company to recover over $400 million 
from ratepayers.6 ISO-NE, the grid operator that oversees electricity sales in 
New England, determined that its “reliability-centered framework [was] 
unable to ensure adequate fuel security.”7 This market failure, according to 
ISO-NE and a majority of FERC Commissioners, “demand[ed] near-term, 
out-of-market support until any long-term, market-based solutions that are 
identied as necessary can be implemented.”8 
FERC is not the only regulator concerned that renewables pose a threat 
to the power grid. In 2018, Energy Secretary Rick Perry said that renewable 
subsidies “threaten to undercut the performance of the grid well into the 
future.”9 On this basis, Perry’s Department of Energy (DOE) proposed a 
national system of subsidies for coal and nuclear power plants.10 The federal 
 
providing it. See Capacity Market (RPM), PJM LEARNING CTR., https://learn.pjm.com/three-
priorities/buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx [https://perma.cc/E6BS-SXNW] (last 
visited May 14, 2020). Modern capacity markets originated in 2006. See Devon Power LLC, 115 
FERC ¶ 61,340, slip op. at 1 (June 16, 2006) (accepting a proposal for a forward capacity market in 
New England); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 1-2 (Dec. 22, 2006) 
(approving a reliability pricing model in mid-Atlantic states to ensure that the region “has sucient 
generating capacity to meet its reliability obligations”). 
3 Protest of Clean Energy Advocates at 7, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 
(2018) (No. ER18-1314). Commissioner Glick calculated that the Order will increase capacity 
markets costs by at least $2.4 billion per year. Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Dec. 19, 2019) 
(Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 23. 
4 Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 3. 
5 See ADAM SMITH, 1 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 77 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Fund 1981) (1776) (“A dyer who has found the 
means of producing a particular colour with materials which cost only half the price of those 
commonly made use of, may, with good management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as long 
as he lives . . . .”). 
6 ISO New England Inc., 165 FERC ¶ 61,202, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 3, 2018); see also id. at 22 
(reporting one commenter’s estimate of the proposal’s $400 million cost). 
7 ISO New England Inc., 164 FERC ¶ 61,003 (July 2, 2018) (Chatterjee, Comm’r, concurring), 
slip op. at 1-2. 
8 Id. 
9 Jacques Leslie, Op-Ed: No, Rick Perry, California’s Renewable Energy Policies Aren’t Dangerous 
for the Grid, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
leslie-californias-resilient-grid-20170611-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZT2B-PWP3]. 
10 See Gavin Bade, Trump Administration Preparing 2-Year Coal, Nuke Bailout, UTIL. DIVE (June 
1, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/trump-administration-preparing-2-year-coal-nuke-bailout/
524788 [https://perma.cc/AX98-DX9B]. 
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intervention would have cost billions.11 DOE was concerned that “price 
suppression is occurring in [electricity] markets. . . . [I]n some regions, these 
low prices have put pressure on baseload units, particularly zero-carbon 
emissions nuclear generation.”12 Again, regulators worried that renewables 
and other low-cost resources were threatening to drive crucial generators out 
of business.  
While some of these regulatory interventions seem pretextual, they are 
also symptomatic of a long-term trend that will inevitably transform 
American electricity markets. For most of the twentieth century, regulators 
treated electricity as a natural monopoly.13 To ensure that suppliers satised 
consumer demand, regulators protected utilities from competition and 
permitted them to charge rates sucient to cover their costs. In exchange, 
generators agreed to provide nondiscriminatory access to electricity and cap 
prices.14 While this system provided reliable electricity,15 critics complained 
that it limited consumer choice, failed to promote innovation, rewarded 
utilities for overinvesting in supply, and reduced incentives to retire 
uneconomic generators.16 
 
11 See Emma Foerhinger Merchant, Report Projects DOE Coal, Nuclear Bailout Costs Could Top 
$34 Billion, GREENTECH MEDIA (July 20, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/
report-projects-coal-nuclear-bailout-costs-could-top-34-billion#gs.LWSPbxvh [https://perma.cc/
CJ23-WUFP] (“[T]he Trump administration’s coal and nuclear support plan could cost between $9.7 
billion and $17.2 billion annually.”). 
12 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REVIEW: TRANSFORMING THE 
NATION’S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: THE SECOND INSTALLMENT OF THE QER 4-9 (2017), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/les/2017/02/f34/Quadrennial%20Energy%20Review--Second%
20Installment%20%28Full%20Report%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RBN-KHF3]. 
13 See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (2019) (prescribing that “[t]he commission shall have 
sole and exclusive jurisdiction to promulgate rules and regulations for the allocation of natural or 
articial gas supply by a public utility”). Under the natural monopoly approach, utility commissions 
charged rates according to the following equation: R = Br + O, where R represents the utility’s total 
revenue requirements, B represents the rate base, r represents the permissible rate of return on 
investment, and O represents permissible operating expenses. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH 
P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 109 (3d ed. 2003). 
14  See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1501 (“[E]very public utility may have reasonable rules and 
regulations governing the conditions under which it shall be required to render service.”); Jersey 
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., concurring) (“The 
utility business represents a compact of sorts; a monopoly on service in a particular geographical 
area . . . is granted to the utility in exchange for a regime of intensive regulation, including price 
regulation, quite alien to the free market.”). See generally Mark A. Jamison, Regulation: Price Cap and 
Revenue Cap, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY 1245 (Barney 
L. Capehart ed., 2007) (describing the operation of “price caps”). 
15 See Paul Joskow, The Dicult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the U.S.  
5-8 (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://economics.mit.edu/les/1160 [https://perma.cc/
J9Y9-SJQA] (evaluating the performance of the regulated monopoly model in the United States 
during the twentieth century). 
16 See 1 ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 25-32, 53-54 (1970) (arguing that 
this regulatory approach inadequately incentivizes innovation and cost control). 
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In the 1990s, FERC began to encourage a “market-based” approach to 
promote competition and control costs.17 Under this “restructured” model,18 
an independent grid operator determines demand for electricity, solicits bids 
from generators, and clears enough bids to meet demand. The grid operator 
clears bids starting with the lowest bid but ultimately pays every generator 
the price bid by the highest clearing bidder to clear. Generators bid at their 
marginal cost of generation. If a generator bids below its marginal costs, it 
risks having to provide electricity even when it would lose money in doing 
so. An above-marginal-cost bid risks failing to clear when it would be 
protable for the generator to operate.19  
This system promotes competition and keeps short-run costs low, but it 
has struggled to maintain sucient reserves to satisfy demand for 
electricity.20 Generators that are dispatched infrequently or that operate on 
the margin cannot make a prot or recover their costs. These plants are known 
as “peaking plants” and generally operate when demand is high (generally on 
hot days in the summer or cold days in the winter).21 Without them, grid 
operators would not be able to meet peak demand. When regulators limit 
energy market clearing prices,22 which every grid operator in the United States 
does,23 they prevent these resources from fully recovering their costs, which 
 
17 See infra Section I.B; Section II.B. 
18 “Restructuring” refers to the “federal policies” designed to “introduce competition into 
electricity markets.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-987, ELEC. RESTRUCTURING: 
FERC COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO ANALYZE REGIONAL TRANSMISSION 
ORGANIZATIONS’ BENEFITS AND PERFORMANCE 1 (2008), https://www.ferc.gov/industries/
electric/indus-act/rto/gao-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST52-PHFV]. 
19 Generators are industrial facilities that produce electricity. Capital costs consist of the cost 
to build a generator and the xed costs of maintaining it each year. Marginal costs consist of ongoing 
operating costs and, in some cases, fuel purchases. See OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY DELIVERY AND 
ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/OE-0017, UNITED STATES ELECTRICITY 
INDUSTRY PRIMER 4-21 (2015), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/les/2015/12/f28/united-states-
electricity-industry-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5NF-R33S]. The literature on energy production 
also refers to marginal costs as variable and production costs. See SONIA AGGARWAL ET AL., 
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN FOR RAPID DECARBONIZATION 7 n.2 (2019), 
https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Wholesale-Electricity-Market-Design-
For-Rapid-Decarbonization.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6HF-7K3W] (explaining that these two terms 
“are often used interchangeably to describe real-time generator costs”). 
20 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC ¶ 61,079, slip op. at 2 (Apr. 20, 2006) (“[T]he 
Commission nds that as a result of a combination of factors, PJM’s existing capacity construct is 
unjust and unreasonable as a long-term capacity solution, because it fails to set prices adequate to 
ensure energy resources to meet its reliability responsibilities.”). 
21 Peaking Power, ENERGY EDUC., https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/Peaking_power 
[https://perma.cc/U5HQ-V2DZ] (last updated Sept. 3, 2018). 
22 Regulators have good reason to cap prices, and no regulator has expressed any interest in 
eliminating oer caps. As explained in Section III.C, oer caps limit market power, reduce volatility, 
and temper the challenges of demand inelasticity. 
23 See Order 831, Oer Caps in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations 
and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,770, 87,772 (Dec. 5, 2016) (codied at 18 C.F.R. 
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creates a need for administrative interventions to ensure full cost recovery and 
prevent these resources from retiring. This is the “missing money problem.”24 
The distinctive cost profile of renewables exacerbates the missing money 
problem. In a payment system based on marginal costs, generators recover their 
fixed costs in those periods when the clearing price exceeds their marginal cost 
of production.25 That system requires that the marginal bidder bid into the 
market at a level that exceeds zero with sufficient frequency for generators to 
recover their fixed costs and make a profit.26 When traditional fossil fuel 
generators set the clearing price, resource adequacy can be maintained through 
limited interventions that give peaking plants additional revenue. But this is 
not the case when renewables provide a large percentage of electricity. While 
zero-carbon emitting generators27 have substantial capital costs, their marginal 
costs are extremely low.28 They therefore bid into the market at, or at least near, 
 
pt. 35) (“All six Commission-jurisdictional RTOs/ISOs have at one time imposed a $1,000/MWh 
cap on incremental energy oers.”); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.505(g)(6)(B) (2020) (“The high 
system-wide oer cap [in ERCOT] will be $9,000 per MWh and $9,000 per MW per hour.”). 
24 See James Bushnell et al., Capacity Markets at a Crossroads 12 (Energy Inst. at Haas,  
Working Paper No. 278, 2017), https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/les/hepg/les/wp278updated.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D3B8-EAB9] (dening “the missing money problem” as “the set of complications 
in power markets that can depress revenues below that necessary to support sustainable investment 
in generation capacity.”). 
25 As one account explains, 
All other generators besides the marginal unit that are producing electricity at a given 
hour—the inframarginal generators—receive revenues in excess of their variable costs 
for that hour, since the price is above their cost. Generators must use this 
inframarginal rent to cover their xed costs, and revenues beyond that provide prot. 
The sustained lower electricity prices of the past several years have led to a signicant 
reduction in these inframarginal rents to the point where some generation types are 
no longer economically viable. 
Mort Webster, Wholesale Electricity Markets: The Times They Are a Changin’ (Again), GEN. ELECTRIC: 
TRANSFORM (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.ge.com/power/transform/article.transform.articles.2018.
jan.wholesale-electricity-markets [https://perma.cc/Q3BT-M6M2]. 
26 Cf. id. (“The sustained lower electricity prices of the past several years have led to a 
signicant reduction in these inframarginal rents to the point where some generation types are no 
longer economically viable.”). 
27 The phrase “zero-carbon emitting generators” refers not only to renewables such as solar 
and wind, but also to certain other generators that do not emit carbon. These include hydroelectric 
power generators, nuclear power generators, and fossil fuel generators that use carbon capture. See 
Lee Beck & Jennifer T. Gordon, The Devil’s in the Details: Policy Implications of ‘Clean’ vs. ‘Renewable’ 
Energy, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-devils-in-the-details-
policy-implications-of-clean-vs-renewable/550441 [https://perma.cc/2W65-ASP8]. 
28 See Gennadi Kazakevitch & Henry McMillan, Are Wind Farms Messing Up the Electricity 
Market?, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 20, 2016, 8:56 PM), http://theconversation.com/are-wind-
farms-messing-up-the-electricity-market-67244 [https://perma.cc/65AL-C6C2] (“The running 
(marginal) cost of wind generators is zero (because wind is free), unlike traditional thermal 
technology (which has to pay for coal and gas).”). 
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zero.29 As renewables provide an increasing share of total capacity, they 
suppress energy market clearing prices.30 Price suppression makes it difficult 
for all generators to cover their fixed costs and drives high-marginal-cost 
generators such as coal and nuclear power plants out of business.31 
Academics have worried about and debated the missing money problem 
for years.32 Recently, a group of energy economists showed that increasing 
volumes of renewables threaten to prevent wholesale electricity markets from 
providing sucient revenue for prospective entrants to cover their xed 
costs.33 Grid operators throughout the country have acknowledged that price 
suppression caused by renewables prevents energy markets from supporting 
resource adequacy.34 As a result, regulators have devised other mechanisms to 
maintain reserves.35 
This Article’s contribution is therefore not to diagnose the existence of 
the missing money problem. It is to (a) show that the problem results not 
from economic fundamentals, but from a regulatory apparatus that 
compensates generators based on the marginal costs of the marginal 
generator; (b) emphasize that renewables exacerbate the missing money 
problem; (c) explain how regulatory responses to this problem, which date 
 
29 See id. 
30 See RYAN WISER ET AL., IMPACTS OF VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY ON BULK  
POWER SYSTEM ASSETS, PRICING, AND COSTS 13 (2017), https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/les/
lbnl_anl_impacts_of_variable_renewable_energy_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4WP-GZSA] 
(“Wholesale electricity market prices will, especially before capacity equilibration, be lower as a 
greater share of low (or even negative)-marginal cost generation is deployed.”). 
31 See infra Section II.C. 
32 The phrase “missing money problem” was coined by Peter Cramton and Steven Stoft in a 
landmark article they coauthored in 2006. See Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, The Convergence of 
Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity with Special Attention to the CAISO’s Resource 
Adequacy Problem: A White Paper for the Electricity Oversight Board 3 (Apr. 25, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/CapacityMarketDesign.
CramtonStoft2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SEL-DSG8] (“[T]he central problem of resource 
adequacy is to restore the missing money that prevents adequate investment in generating capacity.”). 
33 See JOACHIM SEEL ET AL., IMPACTS OF HIGH VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY FUTURES 
ON WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES, AND ON ELECTRIC-SECTOR DECISION MAKING 35 
(2018), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/report_pdf_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
26WG-FGDQ] (nding increased volatility and a sharp decline in capacity under high renewable 
penetration in every United States market). 
34 See, e.g., ISO New England, The Importance of a Performance-Based Capacity Market to 
Ensure Reliability as the Grid Adapts to a Renewable Energy Future 1 (June 2015) (unpublished 
discussion paper), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/06/iso_ne_capacity_mkt_
discussion_paper_06_03_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2MC-YAJD] (“[R]enewable resources . . . put 
downward pressure on energy-market prices . . . . The capacity market will help balance the revenue 
needs for resources as the energy market provides fewer opportunities for resources to recover their 
xed costs.”). 
35 See, e.g., id. at 3 (reporting that increasing the number of wind and solar generators may “be 
expected to increase the price of reserves[] and the revenues of flexible, reserve-providing resources”). 
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back to at least 2006,36 are reviving the problems generally associated with 
rate regulation; (d) show that these interventions favor fossil fuel generators, 
counteract state clean energy policies, and hinder renewable development; 
(e) argue that recent regulatory responses illegally intrude on states’ authority 
over generation facilities; and (f) propose an alternative system that would 
avoid these problems. 
Price suppression in energy markets has induced regulators to intervene 
to make sure that the generators perceived to be critical to reliability are able 
to recover their costs.37 In exchange, these generators agree to provide 
services for a predetermined time period. These are the hallmarks of utility 
rate regulation, yet these arrangements are occurring in parts of the country 
that are thought to have abandoned this form of regulation decades ago. As in 
rate regulation, and for reasons discussed in Part IV, these administrative 
interventions prevent consumers from using resources with characteristics they 
prefer, counteract state renewable policies, favor incumbents, reduce incentives 
to innovate, and force consumers to pay billions for capacity they do not need.38 
In this way, the current response to the missing money problem undermines 
the principles of competition that regulators claim to be protecting.39 
These administrative interventions have stretched FERC’s jurisdictional 
authority past its breaking point. FERC has justified interventions to 
support fossil fuel generators by appealing to section 205 of the Federal Power 
 
36 See Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, slip op. at 24 (June 16, 2006) (“In analyzing the 
proposed LICAP mechanism, the Commission noted that a capacity market mechanism should both 
provide adequate revenues to appropriately compensate (and keep in service where needed for 
reliability) existing capacity resources and provide incentive for the development of new 
infrastructure in areas where it is most needed.”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 FERC ¶ 61,079, 
slip op. at 1-2 (Apr. 20, 2006) (accepting that “certain elements of a [proposed reliability pricing 
model], with some adjustment and clarication, may form the basis for a just and reasonable capacity 
market”). 
37 See infra Part IV. 
38 See infra Part IV. 
39 FERC’s justications for these interventions have shifted over time, though the 
Commission generally defends decisions to subsidize incumbent fossil fuel generators on the ground 
that such subsidies are necessary maintain market principles. It has, for example, claimed that 
interventions protect “investor condence” and market integrity. See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 163 FERC 
¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 3-6 & n.6 (critiquing the majority 
for failing to dene its “new standard, the ‘integrity’ of the market”); ISO New England, Inc., 162 
FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part), slip op. 
at 4-5 (questioning whether FERC is responsible for ensuring “investor condence” and, if so, 
whether FERC should support fossil fuel investors at the expense of renewables investors). More 
recently, the Commission has argued that administrative pricing “is necessary” to protect “the 
competitiveness of the PJM capacity market” and to counteract state policies that the Commission 
perceives to be “disruptive to competitive wholesale market outcomes.” Calpine Corp., 169 FERC 
¶ 61,239, slip op. at 5-6 (Dec. 19, 2019); see also Calpine Corp., 171 FERC ¶ 61,035, slip op. at 48 
(Apr. 16, 2020) (stating that administrative interventions “protect the integrity of federally-regulated 
markets against state policies”). 
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Act (FPA), which charges the Commission with ensuring that wholesale 
energy sales are “just and reasonable.”40 However, the FPA prohibits FERC 
from exercising jurisdiction over generation resources and gives that 
authority to the states.41 When the D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s authority 
to manage grid reliability, it clarified that FERC must leave room for “[s]tate 
and municipal authorities . . . to require retirement of existing generators, 
to limit new construction to more expensive, environmentally-friendly units, 
or to take any other action in their role as regulators of generation facilities 
without direct interference from the Commission.”42 Thus, FERC can create 
a market for reliability but cannot prevent states from determining their 
resource mixes. 
Yet FERC has begun to retain supply by bailing out individual generators 
and excluding renewables from capacity markets.43 In shielding generators 
from competition, FERC has not only recreated the problems of rate 
regulation in parts of the grid that are ostensibly competitive, but it has 
done so by intruding on regulatory authority that has traditionally belonged 
to the states.44 In this way, FERC has upset the careful federalist system 
Congress created when it limited the Commission’s authority to wholesale 
sales of electricity.45  
Rather than revive rate regulation,46 this Article argues that grid operators 
and regulators should simplify reserve requirements, stop counteracting state 
clean energy programs, and support the development of competitive markets 
for capacity. It articulates three principles that would support these goals 
while respecting the limits of FERC’s authority. 
 
40 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2018). 
41 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (stating that the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over 
facilities used for the generation of electric energy”). 
42 See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
43 See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 3 (Dec. 19, 2019) (directing PJM to 
administratively reprice state-subsidized resources); infra Part IV. 
44 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 214, 215-16 (1964) (stating that 
the FPA “[drew] a bright line . . . between state and federal [regulatory] jurisdiction” in which states 
have authority over retail rates and FERC has authority over wholesale rates). 
45 Wholesale sales are sales “of electric energy to any person for resale,” which means sales to 
a person or entity that will sell electricity to consumers. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(d). FERC has authority 
to make sure that wholesale rates are “just and reasonable,” but the FPA stipulates that states have 
authority over retail rates and are able to determine their own fuel supply. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); see 
also 16 U.S.C. 824(b)(1) (stating that the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities 
used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the 
transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce”); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. 
Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767-68 (2016) (describing FERC’s role in the federal system). 
46 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (“Regulation does 
not insure that the business shall produce net revenues.” (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas 
Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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First, grid operators and regulators should rely on competitive forces—
not administrative judgments—to determine the value of specic resources. 
Second, while grid operators can create reserve requirements, they should not 
force load-serving entities (LSEs)—the companies that purchase electricity 
from generators and distribute it to consumers—to procure reserves in any 
particular way or bail out specic generators.47 Third, rather than counteract 
state eorts to promote clean energy, central auctions should incorporate 
price signals generated by state decarbonization policies. Subsidies pervade 
the electricity sector. It is inexplicable that FERC and certain grid operators 
regard some state programs as posing a unique threat to the power grid when 
the energy sector has always been heavily subsidized and when, by one count, 
sixty-ve percent of the one trillion dollars the United States has spent 
supporting the energy sector since 1950 have gone to fossil fuels.48  
One possible approach is to shift resource procurement decisions for 
capacity to LSEs. These entities already must comply with energy market 
rules, capacity obligations, and state renewable mandates. If LSEs made 
resource procurement decisions for themselves—rather than purchase 
capacity from administratively determined auctions—they could balance 
these various obligations cost-eectively. This approach would encourage 
LSEs to enter long-term, bilateral contracts to meet fuel security and clean 
energy laws. Capacity markets would be optional such that LSEs could take 
advantage of fuel savings generated by a centralized auction but opt out of 
the capacity market by contracting bilaterally when doing so allows them to 
fulll their obligations at lower cost. The role of grid operators would 
contract. The wholesale market would consist of energy and balancing 
markets to ensure that electricity is provided at low cost, but it would not 
be the exclusive mechanism for ensuring resource adequacy. This would 
allow LSEs to balance their various regulatory obligations. FERC and the 
grid operators could determine reserve requirements, but LSEs could 
comply with these requirements by self-supplying with their own generators, 
 
47 FERC and grid operators retain authority to provide out-of-market support for critical 
suppliers by entering into “reliability-must-run” (RMR) contracts with such generators. These 
contracts entitle generators to recoup their costs and make a prot by charging ratepayers directly, 
without entering energy or capacity markets. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Operating Agreement 
of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. § 6.1 (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.pjm.com/directory/merged-
tariffs/oa.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MNA-JZ5H] (establishing certain procedures for “must-run” 
resources, which, “as a result of transmission constraints, the Oce of the Interconnection 
determines . . . must be run in order to maintain the reliability of service in the PJM Region”); see 
also Marcy Crane, Stakeholders: ISO-NE Reliability Agreement for Mystic Units ‘A New Frontier’, S&P 
GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (May 24, 2018), https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/
en/news-insights/trending/g7jolwarnwjgiva4syc5tw2 [https://perma.cc/T4R5-CGVL] (summarizing 
critiques of one such agreement). 
48 Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 6-7. 
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contracting bilaterally, or transacting on central markets overseen by the 
grid operators. An energy market, preferably one with high offer caps, 
would ensure that in any given moment, electricity is provided as 
inexpensively as possible. Two additional benefits are that this system is 
more consistent with FERC’s jurisdictional authority, and that it minimizes 
built-in subsidies to peaking plants.49 
This Article challenges prevailing views in the legal academy about the 
federal government’s unwillingness to address climate change. On one side 
are scholars who have criticized the federal government for failing to take 
more aggressive steps to reduce carbon emissions.50 On the other side are 
those who have identied, and commended, state experimentation that has 
ourished due to federal inaction.51 We agree with scholars critical of federal 
environmental policy, but for dierent reasons. The problem is not simply 
that the federal government has missed an opportunity to reduce carbon 
emissions. It is that other federal programs—in particular, policies designed 
to ensure reliable electricity—operate at cross-purposes with state clean 
energy programs. 
Moreover, while we agree with commentators who have celebrated state 
renewable policies, we do not share their optimism that federal inaction is 
encouraging states to develop creative solutions to climate change. Granted, 
states have stepped into the void left by the federal government and come up 
with innovative policies that promote low-carbon technologies,52 but this 
experimentation is at the mercy of federal energy regulations that can prevent 
state policies from driving a large-scale transition to renewables. 
 
49 Energy markets give natural gas a built-in hedge against gas price volatility. See infra 
Section IV.D. 
50 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 5 (2014) (“[D]ramatic technological, economic, and social changes [in the energy sector] . . . would 
seem to demand a legislative response.”); Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of 
Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (2018) (cautioning that integrating state climate 
policies with federal electricity markets could render decarbonization projects less transparent and 
more homogenous); see also Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2013) (acknowledging the possibility that new challenges could 
“exacerbate the well-documented” federal–state tensions in utility law). 
51 See, e.g., William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy 
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 816 (2016) (“[D]espite the messy and complex 
federal system, or maybe because of it, some states and [public utility commissions] are deploying 
new and innovative approaches to ratemaking as a means of promoting investment in low-carbon 
technologies and practices . . . .”); William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA 
L. REV. 1614, 1630-31, 1661-74 (2014) (discussing the rise of state action in the wake of federal 
deregulation of wholesale electricity). 
52 See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 
(2009) (explaining that although the “national government has failed to lead on climate change 
regulation,” states have been active in regulating carbon emissions). 
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These questions have enormous implications for the United States’ ability 
to integrate the level of renewables necessary to avoid the worst eects of 
climate change. The DOE’s proposed coal and nuclear power plant bailout 
was widely criticized for impeding state eorts to integrate higher volumes 
of renewables.53 What has gone largely unnoticed is that the interventions 
described in this Article possibly amount to a larger handout to fossil fuel 
companies. According to one estimate, recent reforms to PJM’s capacity 
market alone could cost ratepayers more than the proposed coal and nuclear 
bailout would have,54 and PJM provides electricity to only around sixty-ve 
million Americans.55 
The central question this Article takes up is whether it is legally and 
economically feasible to preserve competition in electricity markets while 
integrating higher volumes of renewables, or whether more radical reform is 
necessary.56 As this Article shows, the current structure for compensating 
generators may be ill equipped to the cost structure of renewables, but 
recent regulatory responses amount to a handout to favored fossil fuel 
generators. This Article argues that competitive electricity markets can 
accommodate state resource preferences and support grid reliability even 
with high levels of renewables, and they can do so without counteracting state 
energy programs. 
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I provides a brief history of 
American electricity markets. Part II describes the transition to a market-
based approach and explains how the current payment system creates a 
missing money problem. Part III explains how increased penetration of 
renewables exacerbates the missing money problem and describes regulatory 
responses. Part IV argues that these responses recreate the problems 
 
53 See, e.g., Je St. John, Trump Administration to Drop Its Emergency Coal, Nuclear Bailout Plan, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/trump-
administration-to-drop-its-emergency-coal-nuclear-bailout-plan#gs.rENsqZ0K [https://perma.cc/
VYL7-FLQC] (“[T]he plan has drawn opposition . . . from just about everyone outside the utilities 
and coal interests that stand to directly benet.”). 
54 Compare Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, supra note 3, at 7 (estimating that FERC’s 
proposed Minimum Oer Price Rule would cost between $9.6 and $24.6 billion), with METIN 
CELEBI ET AL., THE COST OF PREVENTING BASELOAD RETIREMENTS: A PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION OF THE DOE MEMORANDUM 2 (2018), https://info.aee.net/hubfs/Brattle_
AEE_Final_Embargoed_7.19.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/42M5-4YT6] (estimating that the cost of the 
Trump Administration’s proposed coal and nuclear bailout “would be between $9.7 and $17.2 billion 
per year”). 
55 Who We Are, supra note 1. 
56 See Boyd, supra note 51, at 1620 (“[A] revitalized notion of public utility . . . could play an 
important role in the eort to secure a low-carbon future.”). 
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associated with rate regulation. Part V argues that these interventions exceed 
FERC’s jurisdictional authority. Part VI considers reforms.57 
I. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
This Part provides a history of energy regulation from the nineteenth 
century until restructuring began in the 1990s. Over this period, the belief 
that electricity was a natural monopoly contributed to regulatory decisions to 
shield suppliers from competitive forces.58 This regulatory approach was 
successful at providing reliable electricity, but it left little incentive for 
generators to innovate and control costs. This Part presents a background on 
electricity regulation and highlights the shortcomings of cost-of-service 
regulation. Part IV argues that regulatory responses to the missing money 
problem are recreating the drawbacks associated with that approach. 
A. Early History of the Electricity Industry 
Whenever someone turns on her lights, a complex technological and 
regulatory apparatus allows electricity to ow instantaneously into her home. 
That apparatus is supported by three components: generation, transmission, 
and distribution.59 Generation is the process of converting fuels or renewable 
resources into electricity at central power stations.60 Transmission refers to 
the transportation of electricity across large distances at high voltages.61 The 
distribution system consists of low-voltage networks that circulate electricity 
to end-users.62 
For most of the industry’s 140-year history, vertically integrated utilities 
provided electricity to customers at regulated rates. This model extends back 
to the 1880s when the technological innovations of Thomas Edison, George 
Westinghouse, and others made widespread use of electricity possible.63 The 
 
57 This Article focuses on regulatory barriers to a clean energy grid. Technological constraints 
also prevent renewables from providing one hundred percent of American electricity. Note, however, 
that the system we propose compensates generators only for the services they provide. Thus, our 
proposal would ensure that resources needed for reliability—including fossil fuels—operate when 
they are needed. 
58 See KAHN, supra note 16, at 11 (listing “[t]he importance” of the utility industries, the view 
that these industries are “natural monopolies” and the belief that “competition simply does not work 
well” as the three basic economic justications for utility rate regulation). 
59 See Electricity Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
electricity/delivery-to-consumers.php [https://perma.cc/LZ4B-XE9R] (last updated Oct. 11, 2019). 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 32-33 (4th ed. 
2015) (quoting HAROLD L. PLATT, THE ELECTRIC CITY 66-78 (1991)); Elizabeth Nix, How Edison, 
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decision to regulate utilities was based on the economic view that the 
provision of electricity was a natural monopoly—that there were economies 
of scale such that long-run average costs declined as production increased.64 
This meant that the cost-minimizing arrangement for society was for a single 
large rm to meet all of a region’s electricity needs.65 
One of Edison’s lieutenants, Samuel Insull, designed the original utility 
business strategy while he was president of the Chicago Edison Company.66 
Insull pioneered and advocated for a regulatory approach based on two 
principles. First, electric power utilities should be vertically integrated.67 The 
utility should own the central power stations where electricity is generated, the 
wires used to transmit that electricity, and the meters which measure sale to 
customers.68 As Insull wrote in an 1898 speech to his industry colleagues, “the 
best service at the lowest possible price can only be obtained . . . by exclusive 
control of a given territory being placed in the hands of one undertaking.”69 
Second, electric power utilities should be established as regulated 
monopolies.70 In each region, the government would allow only one utility 
to operate.71 In exchange, the utility must serve all customers in the region 
on a nondiscriminatory basis and at regulated rates.72 Recognizing the need 
to prevent predatory pricing, Insull acknowledged that “exclusive franchises 
should be coupled with the conditions of public control requiring all charges 
 
Tesla and Westinghouse Battled to Electrify America, HISTORY (updated Oct. 24, 2019), https://
www.history.com/news/what-was-the-war-of-the-currents [https://perma.cc/NHB5-MKSA]. 
64 See Boyd, supra note 51, at 1638-39 (2014) (explaining that the utility industries shared 
characteristics that created what “economists since the late nineteenth century had referred to as 
‘natural monopoly’” and that “[r]ate regulation . . . provided an alternative means of regulating those 
sectors of the economy that were seemingly beyond the full reach of the antitrust laws”). Others 
have pointed out that rate regulation reduced the cost of capital and thus facilitated the development 
of capital-intensive costs projects that might otherwise struggle to fund their operations. See William 
J. Hausman & John L. Neufeld, The Market for Capital and the Origins of State Regulation of Electric 
Utilities in the United States, 62 J. ECON. HIST. 1050, 1069 (2002) (arguing that “a primary reason 
utility companies, with prominent leaders such as Samuel Insull leading the way, came to embrace 
regulation” was that it “reduced borrowing costs”). 
65 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 63, at 62-66 (explaining the economic theory underlying the 
model of a natural monopoly). 
66 Id. at 32-37 (quoting PLATT, supra note 63, at 66-91). 
67 See Samuel Insull, President, Nat’l Electric Light Ass’n, Address at the Twenty-First 
Convention of the National Electric Light Association (June 7, 1898), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL ELECTRIC LIGHT ASSOCIATION: TWENTY-FIRST CONVENTION 14, 26-27 (1898). 
68 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 63, at 62-63 (explaining why it is more ecient for one rm to 
bear all of these costs within one system). 
69 See Insull, supra note 67, at 27. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 See Horace M. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 
8 (1940), reprinted in 5 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 481, 488 (1973) (“Certainly many of 
the proponents of public utility regulation intended it to protect consumers against excessive charges 
and discriminations; all the early state laws bear witness to this intent.”). 
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for services xed by public bodies to be based on cost, plus a reasonable 
prot.”73 The utility was permitted to charge rates that would permit it to 
recover its costs and make a prot: by the end of the twentieth century, a 
return on equity of roughly six to ten percent.74 Both the federal government 
and the state governments played a role in rate-setting. FERC set rates for 
interstate transmission and wholesale electricity sales.75 State governments, 
through their public utility commissions (PUCs), set rates for distribution 
and retail electricity sales.76 The Federal Power Act of 1935 established these 
jurisdictional boundaries.77 
This arrangement—privately owned utilities operating a monopoly under 
public supervision and rate-setting—was the dominant paradigm for most of 
the electric power industry’s history.78 This form of regulation is known as 
“cost-of-service regulation” or “rate regulation.”79 Insull’s model persisted for 
much of the twentieth century.80 
 
73 Id. 
74 See Darryl Tietjen, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., Brieng for the NARUC/INE Partnership: 
Tariff Development I: The Basic Ratemaking Process (2017), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub.cfm?
id=538E730E-2354-D714-51A6-5B621A9534CB [https://perma.cc/5E98-RTYJ] (outlining the process 
and inputs for determining the ratemaking for the “Cost of Service” Regulation); see also 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308-12 (1989) (discussing the history of utility 
ratemaking); Rate of Return (ROR) (Actual and Authorized), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, https://
www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=12093 [https://perma.cc/ZY2T-Y9BJ] (last visited May 15, 
2020) (collecting the authorized rates of return for California utilities during the years 2006–2020, 
which range from 7.55% to 8.79%). 
75 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2018) (giving FERC jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric 
energy in interstate commerce” and “over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric 
energy”). 
76 EISEN ET AL., supra note 63, at 83 (“[R]etail sales of energy and power distribution and 
generation facilities are regulated by states.”); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b)(1) (limiting federal 
jurisdiction of energy sales to wholesale sales, leaving the regulation of retail sales of energy and 
power distribution and generation facilities to states). Wholly intrastate transmission also falls under 
state jurisdiction, but only exists in Texas, Alaska and Hawaii. See, e.g., ERCOT, FED. ENERGY REG. 
COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/ercot.asp [https://perma.cc/
HXD2-P65M] (last visited May 15, 2020) (“The transmission grid that the ERCOT independent 
system operator administers is located solely within the state of Texas and is not synchronously 
interconnected to the rest of the United States. The transmission of electric energy occurring wholly 
within ERCOT is not subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction under sections 203, 205, or 206 of 
the Federal Power Act.”). 
77 See Pub. L. No. 74-333, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 803, 847 (1935) (codied as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824(a) (2018)). 
78 See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
765, 767-70 (2008) (describing the historical roots of public supervision of the energy markets). 
79 See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The US Electricity Industry After 20 Years of 
Restructuring, 7 ANN. REV. ECON. 437, 438 (2015) (describing the pre-1990s system of “cost-of-
service regulation, in which utilities were eectively guaranteed the recovery of prudently incurred 
operating costs plus a regulated return on capital expenditures”). 
80 See PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS 
OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 11-13 (1983) (“[T]he overriding principle of state rate 
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B. Competition in Electricity Markets 
A number of political, technological, and theoretical changes in the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s undermined the natural monopoly model. This Section rst 
describes the scholarly critiques that provided the theoretical basis for 
introducing competition into power generation. As Part IV argues, those 
critiques have taken on renewed salience as FERC has assumed an 
increasingly interventionist role in determining which generators enter and 
exit the market. This Section also describes the political, technological, and 
legal developments that supported restructuring. 
1. Theoretical Challenges to the Natural Monopoly Model 
Developments in economic theory in the latter half of the twentieth 
century provided important intellectual support for restructuring. In the 
1960s, a deregulatory movement emerged to challenge the belief that 
generation should be regulated as a natural monopoly. These critiques 
emphasized that shielding corporations from competitive forces reduced 
innovation, weakened incentives to keep costs down, led to excess capacity, 
and limited consumer choice. 
a. High Prices and Excess Capacity 
In 1962, Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson provided a groundbreaking 
analysis of rate regulation.81 Now known as “gold plating”82 or the Averch–
Johnson eect,83 they formalized the intuition that regulated utilities make 
 
regulation is that utilities should be allowed to cover the cost, prudentially incurred, of providing 
service, including a fair rate of return on investment . . . . The diculties that this regulatory process 
seems to have in achieving these objectives . . . seems to be a primary motivation for recent proposals 
for structural and regulatory reform.”); Dieter Helm & Tim Jenkinson, Introducing Competition into 
Regulated Industries, in COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 1, 2 (Dieter Helm & Tim 
Jenkinson eds., 1998) (“The concept of supply competition has caught on in Europe and the 
USA . . . . In the USA . . . the 1992 Energy Act and the subsequent order 888 by [FERC] provided 
for the transition to a more competitive electricity supply market, at least at the wholesale level.”). 
81 See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). For important economic work building on their theory, see William 
J. Baumol & Alvin K. Klevorick, Input Choices and Rate-of-Return Regulation: An Overview of the 
Discussion, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 162 (1970); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Behavior of the Firm 
Subject to Stochastic Regulatory Review, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 57 (1974). 
82 See Michael West, ‘Gold Plating’ Rife, Assets in for a Hiding, AGE (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:42 PM), 
https://www.theage.com.au/business/gold-plating-rife-assets-in-for-a-hiding-20130131-2dmjg.html 
[https://perma.cc/4W4D-XWJN] (“[G]old plating is the excessive expenditure by electricity 
networks on poles and wires to increase their revenue.”). 
83 See W. Davis Dechert, Has the Averch-Johnson Eect Been Theoretically Justied?, 8 J. ECON. 
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1, 1 (1984) (describing “the Averch-Johnson eect,” in which “a monopoly 
subject to a rate of return (to capital) constraint would not use a cost-minimizing input mix, but 
rather it would overcapitalize”). 
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excessive capital investments to increase their prots.84 This behavior turns 
out to be a rational response to rate regulation. In a typical rate case, 
regulators determine the rm’s revenue requirement, which is based on the 
costs the rm incurs in providing services. So long as a utility can convince 
regulators that a capital investment is needed to maintain a reliable power 
grid—and utilities are generally better informed about their costs than 
regulators85—then the costs of the investment will fall on ratepayers.86 While 
regulators may try to determine whether a particular asset is necessary, once 
a rm receives regulatory approval to make a capital investment, it enjoys a 
right to recoup its costs plus a return by charging ratepayers.87  
This incentive structure encourages regulated utilities to build excess 
capacity even when they might achieve the same goals in less costly ways. A 
utility might, for example, create incentives for consumers to reduce their 
electricity consumption, but doing so will not increase—and might reduce—
the amount of capital the utility needs. As a result, these strategies lower the 
utility’s rate base and depress revenues. A utility will therefore prefer to 
increase its rate base despite the existence of more ecient alternatives. 
b. Innovation 
Equally problematic is that rate regulation makes firms hesitant to 
innovate.88 In ordinary markets, when a company’s business model is 
predicated on outperforming its competitors, it has an incentive to invest in 
research and development (R&D).89 Companies in technology-dependent 
 
84 See Averch & Johnson, supra note 81, at 1052-59. 
85 See Paul L. Joskow, The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return in a Formal Regulatory 
Hearing, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 632, 633-34 (1972) (detailing the diculties faced by public 
utilities commissions in ascertaining a rate of return without access to information about capital 
costs and the tradeos faced by an individual rm). 
86 See Catherine Wolfram, The Eciency of Electricity Generation in the United States After 
Restructuring, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 227, 235 (James M. 
Grin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005) (“[G]iven the input costs, rms choose the mix of inputs that 
minimizes the costs of producing a given level of output . . . . [F]uel adjustment clauses allow 
utilities to pass through to ratepayers all of their fuel costs, so they have little incentive to minimize 
the amount of fuel they burn to generate a given amount of electricity.”). 
87 See Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361, 363 (1898) (establishing that regulated industries have a 
right to “reasonable compensation” for costs); accord Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 
U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (“[T]he investor interest has a legitimate concern with the nancial integrity 
of the company whose rates are being regulated . . . . That return . . . should be sucient to assure 
condence in the nancial integrity of the enterprise.”). 
88 Cf. Wolfram, supra note 86, at 235 (“Firms facing more competition might move closer to 
the technological frontier by guring out how to generate the same amount of electricity with fewer 
inputs.”). 
89 See Toshihiro Matsumura, Noriaki Matsushima & Susumu Cato, Competitiveness and R&D 
Competition Revisited, 31 ECON. MODELLING 541, 546 (2013) (nding that rms in monopolistic and 
highly competitive markets spend more on R&D than rms in oligopolistic markets). 
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industries such as pharmaceuticals and computer manufacturing often spend 
ten to twelve percent of their total revenue on R&D.90 Even industries that 
depend less heavily on technological innovation spend on average between three 
and five percent of total revenues on R&D.91 Utilities, however, are unique. 
Most investor-owned energy utilities have historically spent far less than that.92 
Investor-owned utilities’ reluctance to spend on R&D can be understood 
to be at least in part a natural consequence of rate regulation. In a competitive 
market, a company that develops a new technology may capture market share 
from its competitors. A utility, however, faces little upside for innovating 
because it already controls its entire market and therefore cannot expand by 
developing new technologies that allow it to offer better service than its rivals.93 
In fact, utilities may even be punished for spending money on R&D. 
Utilities are often allowed to include only “prudent” investments in their rate 
base.94 If a regulator determines that a utility should not recover the costs of 
a research project, it can force the utility’s shareholders—rather than its 
ratepayers—to bear those costs.95 In this way, not only does rate regulation 
eliminate the potential benefits of R&D, but it introduces the additional risk 
of a regulator deciding that a particular project does not serve a useful purpose. 
 
90 See, e.g., RAYMOND M. WOLFE, NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. & ENG’G STATISTICS INFO BRIEF, 
BUSINESS R&D PERFORMED IN THE UNITED STATES REACHED $356 BILLION IN 2015, at 4 tbl.3 
(2017), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2017/nsf17320/nsf17320.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7HF-6ZMF] 
(finding these industries to have high levels of R&D expenditure relative to other industries in 2015). 
91 See id. (noting R&D expenditures for manufacturers and nonmanufacturers). 
92 See Marilyn Waite, Why US Utilities Should Invest in Innovation, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/why-us-utilities-should-invest-in-innovation/441114 [https://perma.cc/
89HD-JH9D] (“The research and development (R&D) budgets of U.S. electric utilities—both 
POUs and IOUs—tend to be slim, and in many cases near zero. Historically, the maximum that an 
electric utility in the United States would spend on R&D is 1% of its revenue—but . . . most investor-
owned utilities spend 0%.”). 
93 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-RCED-96-203, FEDERAL RESEARCH: 
CHANGES IN ELECTRICITY-RELATED R&D FUNDING 6 (1996), https://www.gao.gov/archive/
1996/rc96203.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8WW-KRSM] (nding that only 6 of 112 investor-owned 
utilities surveyed devoted 1% of revenues to R&D, which was the proportion recommended by the 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners). Note, though, that highly competitive 
market conditions can also lead to a decline in R&D spending in the electricity industry. See id. at 
7 (“Increased competition was cited as the primary reason for the biggest cutbacks to date by utilities 
in California, New York, and Florida . . . . [T]hey are under pressure to cut costs in order to be able 
to compete in a deregulated market.”). 
94 See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1989) (describing the development 
of the prudent investment theory). Cf. id. at 315-16 (holding that the Constitution does not require 
“a single theory of valuation” for utility rates). 
95 See id. at 315-16 (permitting PUCs flexibility to exclude certain costs from the utility’s rate base). 
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c. Consumer Choice 
Finally, rate regulation limits consumer choice. In competitive systems, a 
consumer can look for products with idiosyncratic qualities she prefers. For 
example, some coee drinkers purchase fair-trade coee and are willing to 
pay extra to support humane work conditions. In rate-regulated markets, 
regulators decide which products will be available to consumers.96 If a utility 
does not procure renewables, consumers may not be able to purchase clean 
energy. This problem is newly relevant as states and LSEs attempt to allow 
consumers to procure electricity from clean energy sources. As Part IV 
shows, capacity market interventions and cost-of-service agreements threaten 
to prevent renewable-friendly states from realizing their preference for zero-
carbon energy. 
These problems—that utilities overestimate costs, make excessive capital 
investments, refuse to innovate, and do not accommodate consumer 
preferences—are exacerbated if a regulated rm “captures” its regulators. 
Absent competition, rms will allocate resources that might have been spent 
trying to outperform their rivals currying regulatory favor.97 When a highly 
regulated industry works closely with its regulators over a long period of 
time, the industry will have ample opportunity to develop strong 
relationships with regulators.98 Insofar as a rm is able to convince regulators 
to be sympathetic to its interests, it will be easier for the rm to convince 
regulators to approve favorable rates. 
2. Political and Technological Changes 
The academic movement described in the previous subsection coincided 
with—and oered theoretical justication for99—legal, political, and 
 
96 See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 606-08 
(1969) (discussing rate categories and their eects on the availability of products such as subsidized 
railroad services). 
97 See Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 211-17 
(surveying literature on regulatory capture and summarizing the view that regulation encourages 
rms to allocate funds on lobbying). 
98 There is a voluminous literature analyzing the strategies utilities adopt to convince 
regulators to give more weight to their interests. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Laont & Jean Tirole, The 
Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 (1991) 
(applying principal-agent theory to show that regulatory capture will lead to inecient investment 
outcomes in regulated industries); Mathew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory 
Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721, 723 (1985) (describing how legislative delegation to administrative 
agencies can lead to indirect regulation). 
99 See Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a 
Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768, 1772-78 (2002) 
(book review) (summarizing the deregulatory movement and explaining how that movement 
supported policy choices that led to restructuring). 
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technological changes that led to the deregulation of electric power 
generation in much of the United States.100 
Technological developments that made designs for natural gas power 
plants cost-competitive in the 1980s were critical to the development of 
competitive markets.101 Because these facilities were smaller and less 
expensive than traditional coal and nuclear power plants, it was possible for 
small, non-utility players to build and operate them.102 However, delivery of 
electricity—the service of transmitting and distributing electricity from 
generators to end-users—continued to be seen as a natural monopoly because 
it was inecient to construct duplicate transmission lines.103 
An early step toward restructuring occurred in 1978 with the enactment 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).104 In an eort 
to reduce the United States’ reliance on imported oil,105 Congress passed 
PURPA in part to encourage domestic development of renewable and other 
nontraditional power plants.106 The law mandated that vertically integrated 
utilities allow renewable and cogeneration power plants107—called “qualifying 
facilities” (QFs)—to interconnect to the power grid. Utilities had to purchase 
electricity generated by the QFs at “avoided cost,” which is the amount it 
would cost for a utility to generate that electricity itself.108 The Act 
 
100 Note that most of the technological advances that supported restructuring occurred not 
because of research supported by the utilities, but by adapting technologies developed for other 
industries. See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 79, at 2-3 (identifying the “critical exogenous 
trend[]” during the deregulation period of adopting technology from other sectors, as aecting the 
“relationship between average and marginal cost in the industry”). 
101 See id. at 2. 
102 See GILBERT M. MASTERS, RENEWABLE AND EFFICIENT ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 
6-7 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the eects of this technological change in conjunction with regulatory 
changes that also facilitated the operation of “small, on-site generators”). 
103 See Spence, supra note 78, at 772. 
104 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codied as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
105 See Morris K. Udall, How Congress Planned to Solve the 1970s Energy Crisis, NEW REPUBLIC 
(June 16, 1973), https://newrepublic.com/article/118918/how-congress-planned-solve-1970s-energy-
crisis [https://perma.cc/96QX-GZCD] (noting that the United States paid $7 billion, a gure almost 
equal to the trade decit, for foreign oil in 1971). 
106 See id.; see also Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS (July 15, 2002), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/public-utility-regulatory-policy-act 
[https://perma.cc/85WM-25W4] (“PURPA has been the most eective single measure in promoting 
renewable energy.”) 
107 Cogeneration refers to the “combined sequential generation of electricity and thermal or 
electric energy.” Joel Bluestein & Marie Lihn, Historical Impacts and Future Trends in Industrial 
Cogeneration, in PROC. 1999 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN INDUSTRY 
479, 479 (1999), https://aceee.org/files/proceedings/1999/data/papers/SS99_Panel1_Paper41.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7SFZ-V295]. 
108  MASTERS, supra note 102, at 7. 
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demonstrated that utilities could transmit and distribute electricity purchased 
from independent producers. 
Three regulatory initiatives in the mid-1990s continued this deregulatory 
trend. First, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which expanded 
the number of independent facilities that could generate electricity.109 
Specically, the Act allowed “exempt wholesale generators,” which could be 
of any size and use any fuel, to connect to the grid and sell to utilities.110 The 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 led to the proliferation of independent power 
producers (IPPs) and exempt wholesale generators (EWGs), terms that refer 
to non-utility companies that build, own, and operate generators.111 IPPs were 
often newly developed natural gas power plants that sold their electricity to 
utilities.112 Unlike vertically integrated utilities, IPPs did not enjoy a 
guaranteed rate of return.113 
Shortly after the Act’s passage, FERC issued Orders 888 and 2000, which 
ordered utilities to separate generation and transmission functions and 
encouraged the formation of independent system operators (ISOs) and 
regional transmission organizations (RTOs).114 These nonprot entities, 
known as “grid operators,” manage transmission facilities.115 FERC wanted 
 
109 See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776, 2905-88 (repealed 
2005) (describing how exempt wholesale generators could sell electricity to utilities); see also 18 
C.F.R. § 366.1 (2019) (providing the current denition of “exempt wholesale generator”). 
110 See MASTERS, supra note 102, at 8. 
111 See id. at 6, 8. 
112 See id. at 8 (explaining that IPPs “are subject to dierent regulatory constraints than 
traditional utilities” and instead have “pre-negotiated contracts with customers in which the nancial 
conditions for the sale of electricity are specied by power purchase agreements”). 
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (2000) (repealed 2005). 
114 See generally Order 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (issued 
Dec. 20, 1999) (codied at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2019)); Order 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open-Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of 
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (issued Apr. 24, 
1996) (codied at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 (2019)). 
115 See Electric Power Markets, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/market-assessments/mkt-
electric/overview.asp [https://perma.cc/XP3G-EB5K] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (“Along with 
facilitating open-access to transmission, ISOs operate the transmission system independently of, 
and foster competition for electricity generation among, wholesale market participants.”). ISOs and 
RTOs serve similar functions. ISOs are the entities that were established after Order 888. RTOs 
were established in response to Order 2000. As one account of their creation explains: 
FERC rst created ISOs with Order 888, which established open-access interstate 
transmission policy. FERC later rened these concepts with Order 2000, which 
created RTOs more specically. Some market operators qualify as both an ISO and 
an RTO; the names currently in use typically reect the initial origin of the operators’ 
formation. (i.e., in response to Order 888 or Order 2000), rather than any particular 
legal or organizational function. 
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grid operators to control transmission lines in order to prevent transmission 
line owners from keeping IPPs from accessing the grid.116 
II. RESTRUCTURING AND THE MISSING MONEY PROBLEM 
The regulatory, technological, and theoretical developments described in 
the previous Part set the stage for a large-scale industry restructuring, which 
took place across a number of states in the late 1990s and early 2000s.117 
Once Order 888 required vertically integrated utilities to separate 
generation from transmission, a number of utilities created or joined 
competitive markets for electricity generation. Rather than pay power plants 
through rates set by regulators, compensation for generation in those regions 
with competitive markets occurs through a bidding process.118 A grid 
operator—an ISO or RTO—manages each market subject to FERC oversight. 
Seven competitive generation markets formed in the late 1990s.119 These 
 
Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional Electricity Market Reforms 
Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 39 YALE J. ON REG. BULLETIN 106, 109 n.16 (2019). For ease of 
understanding, we refer to grid operators as RTOs. 
116 MASTERS, supra note 102, at 8-9. 
117 See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 79, at 6 (discussing the shift in compensation for 
generation from a “cost-of-service regulation model” to a “market-based pricing model”). 
Restructuring focused on power generation. Reformers still viewed transmission as a natural 
monopoly. Distribution also remained subject to state rate regulation, though a number of states 
have also attempted, with varying degrees of success, to introduce competition into retail markets. 
See id. at 2, 6-7. 
118 See MATHEW J. MOREY, POWER MARKET AUCTION DESIGN: RULES AND LESSONS IN 
MARKET-BASED CONTROL FOR THE NEW ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 7-10 (2001), 
http://web.mit.edu/esd.126/www/MktsAuctions/EEI.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9PY-CEDX] (giving 
an overview of auction designs in U.S. regional power markets). 
119 Texas recognized the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) as the rst ISO in 
1996. History, ERCOT, http://www.ercot.com/about/profile/history [https://perma.cc/WM3K-4JZA] 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2020). PJM, based in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and surrounding 
states, became an ISO in 1997 and assumed RTO status in 2002. See PJM History, PJM, 
http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/pjm-history.aspx [https://perma.cc/L89Z-SPED] (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2020). The New England states created Independent System Operator in 1997. See 
Our History, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/history [https://perma.cc/
CC6R-CAAW]. The California Independent System Operator (CAISO) opened control centers in 
1998. See Understanding the ISO, CAISO, http://www.caiso.com/about/Pages/OurBusiness/
Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/9HY6-ADSW] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). A number of Midwest 
transmission companies created the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) in 1998 
and assumed RTO status in 2001. See Celebrating 15 Years of Regional Transmission Services, MISO, 
http://timeline.misomatters.org [https://perma.cc/68R2-9B6E] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). The New 
York Independent System Operator (NYISO) began operation in 1999. See POWER CONTROL 
CTR., N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INTRODUCTION TO THE NYISO 3 (2011), https://www.nyiso.com/
documents/20142/1392242/Introduction_to_the_NYISO.pdf/d027e637-20bf-2c9f-b3b6-43ce348a7595 
[https://perma.cc/7XWJ-SGHE]. Finally, several Great Plains states formed an RTO as the 
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) in 2004. See About Us, SOUTHWEST POWER POOL, https://www.spp.org/
about-us [https://perma.cc/GB62-QD9D] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
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markets are displayed in Figure 1. As of 2018, two thirds of electricity generated 
in North America originates in regions overseen by an ISO or an RTO.120 
 
Figure 1: ISOs and RTOs in the United States121 
 
Generators generally receive revenues from three dierent markets. The 
primary source of generator revenue is—or at least is supposed to be—the 
energy market.122 Generators use energy markets to make bids that are 
 
120 See Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 79, at 6-7. The Northwest and Southeast enjoyed low 
wholesale electricity prices in the mid-1990s and so did not feel the same pressure to restructure. 
See Electric Power Markets, supra note 115 (indicating that “[t]raditional wholesale electricity markets” 
still operate in these areas). 
121 Regional Transmission Organizations, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-
act/rto/elec-ovr-rto-map.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTR2-22LD] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
122 See, e.g., William W. Hogan, Market Design Practices: Which Ones Are Best?, 17 IEEE POWER 
& ENERGY MAG. 104, 104 (2019) (arguing that “organized wholesale” energy-only markets create 
an “ecient dispatch and pricing model” that “would have been all that [would] be needed to support 
operating and investment decisions”); see also Cramton & Stoft, supra note 32, at 18 (stating that 
energy-only markets with robust scarcity pricing, if feasible, are the “economic gold-standard for 
performance and investment-quality incentives”). This approach is clearly functioning in Texas. See 
POTOMAC ECON., 2018 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR THE ERCOT ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS 111 (2019), https://www.potomaceconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2018-
State-of-the-Market-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/92SH-6G8A] [hereinafter 2018 ERCOT STATE 
OF THE MARKET REPORT] (“In ERCOT’s energy-only market, the net revenues from the real-
time energy and ancillary services markets alone provide the economic signals that inform 
suppliers’ decisions to invest in new generation or retire existing generation.”). Even in markets 
like PJM in which the “capacity market plays the essential role of equilibrating the revenues 
necessary to incent competitive entry and exit of the resources needed for reliability,” energy 
markets continue to account for most of the costs paid for electricity. 2 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 
2018 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM: DETAILED ANALYSIS 42 (2019), https://
www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2018/2018-som-pjm-volume2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W67Y-C344] [hereinafter 2018 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT]; see 
 
        
Source: FERC
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cleared in a day-ahead market and in real time.123 In addition, all markets 
except Texas have some sort of resource adequacy requirement.124 As 
discussed in Section III.A, these requirements developed because the energy 
markets were not providing sucient revenues to support generators needed 
for reliability.125 Some grid operators, such as MISO and CAISO, allow LSEs 
to determine for themselves how to comply with resource adequacy 
requirements.126 ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM, by contrast, have developed 
centrally administered capacity markets in which they procure capacity on 
behalf of LSEs.127 Finally, ancillary services markets allow operators to 
 
also 2018 ERCOT STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra, at 9 (comparing price paid per 
megawatt-hour of electricity across RTOs). 
123 See Real-Time vs. Day-Ahead Pricing, AEP ENERGY (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.aepenergy.com/
2018/01/05/december-2017-edition [https://perma.cc/4XFD-BFBZ] (describing energy markets and 
explaining the dierence between the day-ahead and real-time energy markets). 
124 See SAMUEL NEWELL ET AL., BRATTLE GRP., ERCOT INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND 
RESOURCE ADEQUACY 11 (2012), https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/files/hepg/files/brattle_ercot_
resource_adequacy_review_-_2012-06-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB47-MZHY] (“ERCOT’s design 
as an energy-only market distinguishes it from all other regions in the U.S. Other U.S. markets 
maintain a minimum reserve margin through regulated planning, resource adequacy requirements, 
or capacity markets.”). ERCOT uses scarcity pricing, which can be understood as a form of resource 
adequacy requirement. See 2018 ERCOT STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 122, at 127 
(“In ERCOT, with no capacity payments available, the amount a generator may receive from energy 
pricing under shortage conditions must be large enough to provide the necessary incentives for new 
capacity additions. This will occur when energy prices are allowed to rise substantially . . . .”). 
ERCOT does, however, complement scarcity pricing by using “planned reserve margins to build in 
a buer of excess capacity to ensure reliability during peak usage periods.” Iulia Gheorghiu, Capacity 
Pricing Changes: How Each Power Market Plans to Account for Resource Adequacy, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/capacity-pricing-changes-how-each-power-market-
plans-to-account-for-resour/542449 [https://perma.cc/PY6A-C276]. 
125 See, e.g., Devon Power LLC, 115 FERC ¶ 61,340, slip op. at 24 (June 16, 2006) (“While the 
region has sucient capacity to meet reliability requirements today, reserve margins are barely 
adequate, and decits are predicted in the very near future.”); id. at 25 (stating that ISO-NE’s 
capacity market “will provide the revenues needed by generators to keep them in operation to 
preserve reliability”); see also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 4 (Dec. 
22, 2006) (approving PJM’s proposed capacity market because the market “is expected to provide 
greater incentives for new generation, transmission, and demand response, while also providing 
sucient revenues to retain existing resources that are needed”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 115 
FERC ¶ 61,079, slip op. at 1-6 (Apr. 20, 2006) (nding PJM’s previous proposed market rules unjust 
and unreasonable for failing to attract sucient investment to maintain resource adequacy). 
126 See, e.g., MISO, 2018/2019 PLANNING RESOURCE AUCTION RESULTS 3 (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://cdn.misoenergy.org/2018-19%20PRA%20Results173180.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SJK-SES8] 
(outlining some options available to LSEs to demonstrate Resource Adequacy); Resource Adequacy, 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/RA [https://perma.cc/6642-RQSE] (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2020) (“The CPUC adopted a Resource Adequacy (RA) policy framework . . . to 
ensure the reliability of electric service in California. . . . [T]he RA program . . . requir[es] that 
LSEs procure capacity so that capacity is available to the CAISO when and where needed.”). 
127 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-131, ELECTRICITY MARKETS: FOUR 
REGIONS USE CAPACITY MARKETS TO HELP ENSURE ADEQUATE RESOURCES, BUT FERC HAS 
NOT FULLY ASSESSED THEIR PERFORMANCE 16 & n.24 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/
688811.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z96A-684W] (“Midcontinent ISO designed its auction to procure a 
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procure various services that help smooth grid operation, including reserves 
and frequency regulation.128  
A. Energy Markets 
Today, generators derive most of their revenues from the energy 
market,129 though in some regions, capacity markets have begun to determine 
which generators enter and exit the market.130 The energy market matches 
available electricity resources to demand. The actual goods sold are 
megawatt-hours (MWh) of electrical energy.131 Each power plant regularly 
submits a bid (in dollars per megawatt-hour) to supply an amount of energy 
(in megawatt-hours) for a given time period. A plant’s bid represents the 
price at which the plant is willing to supply energy to the power grid.132 
Energy markets operate according to a principle called merit order 
dispatch. For every market period, grid operators collect bids from all 
available resources and order them from lowest cost to highest cost.133 Grid 
operators also observe total demand for each market period.134 Starting with 
the least expensive power plant, a grid operator clears resources until all 
 
specic amount of capacity commitments from power plants and other resources. The other three 
RTOs designed their auctions with an administratively dened, sloped demand curve that, 
combined with oers from owners of . . . resources, determines the specic amount and price of 
capacity commitments . . . .”). 
128 See REISHUS CONSULTING, LLC, ELECTRICITY ANCILLARY SERVICES PRIMER 5-15 
(2017), http://nescoe.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/AnxSvcPrimer_Sep2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KNJ4-VX3G] (describing the purpose of ancillary services and describing types of ancillary 
services products). 
129 See, e.g., PJM, ENERGY PRICE FORMATION AND VALUING FLEXIBILITY 2 g.1 (2017), 
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170615-energy-market-price-
formation.ashx [https://perma.cc/RD8K-8JBS] (showing that energy markets supply the majority 
of revenue in PJM but that capacity markets have taken on a larger role in recent years). 
130 Capacity markets now account for nearly a quarter of total revenues in some markets. See 
2018 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 122, at 16 (stating that capacity markets 
accounted for $10.3 billion of generator revenues in 2018, while total generator revenues amounted 
to $41.4 billion (subtracting transmission payments and administrative fees from total price), such 
that the capacity share is 24.9%). As of 2018, that number was nearly thirty percent in ISO-NE. See 
ISO NEW ENG., 2018 ANNUAL MARKETS REPORT 4-5 (2019), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-
assets/documents/2019/05/2018-annual-markets-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2AJ-XTXT]. 
131 Two of the main quantities measured in electricity are energy and power. Energy is the 
ability to do a useful task, such as boil a gallon of water or keep a room lit for an hour, and is 
measured in watt-hours (Wh), kilowatt-hours (kWh), and megawatt-hours (MWh). Power is the 
ow of energy over time and is measured in watts (W), kilowatts (kW), and megawatts (MW). For 
example, a 60-watt bulb requires 60 watts of power to provide light. If the bulb lights a room for an 
hour, it uses 60 watt-hours of energy. 
132 See Market for Electricity, PJM, http://learn.pjm.com/electricity-basics/market-for-
electricity.aspx [https://perma.cc/7QDA-JYA4] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
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demand can be met.135 Clearing—also known as dispatching—a resource 
entails directing that resource to supply power at its bid level for the entire 
period.136 The marginal generator is the last resource dispatched to meet 
demand in a period.137 Resources that submit bids that are more expensive 
than that of the marginal generator are directed not to supply power for that 
period.138 The market clearing price is set by the marginal generator’s bid.139 
All dispatched plants receive payments equal to the market clearing price (in 
dollars per megawatt-hour) multiplied by the amount of energy (in 
megawatt-hours) they supply during the market period.140 
Merit order dispatch incentivizes each generator to submit bids equal to 
its marginal costs.141 Marginal costs are the costs incurred in generating 
electricity after a power plant has been built and is ready for operation.142 
Generally, these costs include fuel costs, variable operations and maintenance 
(O&M) costs, and any emissions costs.143 They do not include the amortized 
construction costs for the plant. Nor do they include xed O&M costs, which 
are operating costs that do not depend on the amount of electricity generated, 
such as plant security and insurance.144 
Under this system, it is prot-maximizing for power plants to bid their 
marginal costs. A generator that bids at less than its marginal costs risks being 
dispatched when the market clearing price is insucient to cover its costs and 
operating at a loss. A generator bidding above marginal costs risks not being 
dispatched even when it would be protable for the plant to provide 
electricity at that price. 
Table 1 presents marginal costs for a range of resources and fuel types. 
Figure 2 is a representative view of the merit order on a U.S. power grid. As 
the graph shows, either an old natural gas power plant or a coal power plant 
 
135 See id. 
136 How Resources Are Selected and Prices Are Set in the Wholesale Energy Markets, ISO NEW 
ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/in-depth/how-resources-are-selected-and-prices-
are-set [https://perma.cc/A2RH-7JBA] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
137 See id. (discussing “how economic dispatch and the uniform clearing price work together” 
(capitalization altered)). 
138 Id. 
139 See id. (“The energy price to be paid to all resources meeting demand is set by the resource 
in the supply stack that would satisfy the next increment of energy needed if demand were to 
increase.”). 
140 Id.; see also Udi Helman, Distributed Energy Resources in the U.S. Wholesale Markets: Recent 
Trends, New Models, and Forecasts, in CONSUMER, PROSUMER, PROSUMAGER: HOW SERVICE 
INNOVATIONS WILL DISRUPT THE UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL 431, 454 (Fereidoon Siohansi ed., 
2019) (“Wholesale energy markets allow for generators and storage resources to obtain payments 
($/MWh) for all their energy (real power) production delivered to the bulk power system.”). 
141 How Resources Are Selected and Prices Are Set in the Wholesale Energy Markets, supra note 136. 
142 See id. at 12-13. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. 
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usually sets the market clearing price in periods of moderate demand. During 
periods of peak demand, a natural gas peaking plant usually sets the market 
clearing price.145 A power plant’s operating prot in a period is the dierence 
between the market clearing price and the plant’s marginal cost, multiplied 
by the megawatt hours generated in that period. 
 
Table 1: Representative Marginal Costs for Electric Power Generators146 
Generator Type Approximate Marginal Cost 
Wind $0 / MWh 
Solar $0 / MWh 
Hydroelectric $0 - $5 / MWh 
Nuclear $10 / MWh 
Coal  $15 - $25 / MWh 
Natural Gas Combined Cycle, New $25/ MWh 
Natural Gas Combined Cycle, Old $25 / MWh 
Natural Gas Peaking $35 - $45 / MWh 




145 See MASTERS, supra note 102, at 137, 144. 
146 LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 10.0, at 18-20 
(2016), https://www.lazard.com/media/438038/levelized-cost-of-energy-v100.pdf [https://perma.cc/
682J-AG8B]; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST 
OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017, at 7 (2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S7E-4MWQ]. 
Marginal cost for each generator type is calculated by adding together “Variable O&M” and the 
product of “Heat Rate” and “Fuel Price” divided by 1000. See LAZARD, supra, at 18-20 (using these 
labels). Values are approximate and rounded to the nearest $5, reecting that these values will vary 
geographically and over time. 
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Figure 2: Merit Order for a Representative U.S. Power Grid147 
 
Energy markets are eective at ensuring the preferential dispatch of the 
lowest marginal cost resources, as realized over a short time horizon. 
Whenever energy is needed, it will be procured at least cost because the 
market is structured so that the least expensive units are always dispatched 
before more expensive ones.148 
B. The Missing Money Problem 
According to economic theorists, energy markets theoretically should 
“provid[e] appropriate incentives to stimulate ‘adequate’ investment in new 
generating capacity at the right time, in the right places, and using the right 
 
147 Capacity share for each generator type is based on a rough average of capacity mixes across 
existing ISOs/RTOs. Marginal costs are based on Lazard and EIA estimates. See supra note 146. 
148 This is true of idealized energy markets. In practice, grid operators and FERC have 
developed rules that sometimes allow more expensive units—generally coal and nuclear—to be 
dispatched before lower cost units. See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, STAFF ANALYSIS OF 
UPLIFT IN RTO AND ISO MARKETS 1-2 (2014), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/sta-reports/2014/08-
13-14-uplift.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENQ7-AU87] (describing the role of uplift payments, which make 
whole “resources whose commitment and dispatch resulted in a shortfall,” on price formation); 
Energy Innovation: Policy and Technology, The Billion-Dollar Coal Bailout Nobody Is Talking About: 
Self-Committing in Power Markets, FORBES (May 28, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
energyinnovation/2019/05/28/the-billion-dollar-coal-bailout-nobody-is-talking-about-self-committing-
in-power-markets/#34c95d5471fc [https://perma.cc/Q9A4-GCNN] (interview by Mike O’Boyle 
with Joe Daniel, senior energy analyst, Union of Concerned Scientists) (explaining “self-
commitment,” a process in which “power plant owners can tell the market that the unit must remain 
on . . . . Barring an emergency, the operator can’t tell the unit to turn o even if there’s cheaper 
energy available on the market”). 
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technologies.”149 Because energy markets can provide inexpensive electricity 
while procuring resource adequacy, they theoretically could be the principal 
basis for determining which generators enter the market and which ones 
retire.150 To that end, energy markets create “important opportunities for cost 
savings . . . associated with long-run investments in generating capacity.”151 
In practice, however, regulatory interventions prevent energy prices from 
rising high enough to maintain resource adequacy. Specically, grid operators 
cap prices to prevent the market clearing price from rising above set levels.152 
In this way, the entities charged with regulating the grid introduce distortions 
that prevent energy markets from securing adequate reserves. Thus, while 
regulators claim that energy markets should—and do—determine which 
resources will be built and which will retire,153 they simultaneously recognize 
that the “energy market does not provide for sucient revenue to assure 
reliability given the constraints imposed by oer caps and mitigation, as well 
as the need to procure capacity above the current demand level.”154 
 
149 Paul L. Joskow, Competitive Electricity Markets and Investment in New Generating Capacity, in 
THE NEW ENERGY PARADIGM 76, 76 (Dieter Helm ed., 2007). 
150 See William W. Hogan, On an “Energy Only” Electricity Market Design for Resource 
Adequacy 2 (Sept. 23, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/
Hogan_Energy_Only_092305.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PA9-7HK7] (“[I]n some periods [in energy-
only markets] prices would rise above the variable operating costs of peaking units that were running 
at capacity and would reect scarcity under constrained capacity with the incremental value of 
demand dening the system opportunity cost.”); see also Bushnell et al., supra note 24, at 11 (“In a 
competitive market that satises several other conditions, rms will build new capacity as long as 
the cumulative scarcity rents exceed the cost of capacity. Free-entry would drive the scarcity rents 
to equal (on average) the cost of new capacity over time.”). 
151 Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector, 
11 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 125 (1997). Another important motivation was to mitigate abusive 
monopoly practices. See id. at 121 (“Most utilities have historically met their obligations to supply 
by owning and operating all of the facilities required to supply a complete ‘bundled’ electricity 
product to retail customers.”); id. at 125 (“The primary stimulus for reform of the U.S. electricity 
sector is the gap that exists in some parts of the United States between the implicit price of 
generation services embedded in regulated bundled electricity prices and the ‘unbundled’ price of 
generation services . . . .”). 
152 See Joskow, supra note 149, at 105 (“[FERC] has adopted a variety of general and locational 
price mitigation measures . . . . These mitigation measures includes general bid caps . . . applicable 
to all wholesale energy and operating reserve prices, location-specic bid caps . . . , and other bid-
mitigation and supply-obligation . . . measures.”); see also Cramton & Stoft, supra note 32, at 11 (“The 
missing-money problem is not that the market pays too little, but that it pays too little when we have 
the required level of reliability.”). 
153 See, e.g., PJM INTERCONNECTION, PROPOSED ENHANCEMENTS TO ENERGY PRICE 
FORMATION 1 (2017), https://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/
20171115-proposed-enhancements-to-energy-price-formation.ashx [https://perma.cc/U2VH-DFKE] 
(“PJM Interconnection’s wholesale energy market has driven ecient resource entry and exit, 
successfully managed the retirement of a signicant number of coal resources and their replacement 
primarily by natural gas resources, and maintained a reliable grid.”). 
154 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 59 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
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Concerns about the missing money problem have led to numerous 
regulatory interventions aimed at maintaining sucient supply.155 Part IV 
shows that these interventions have become so intrusive that energy markets 
no longer determine which resources enter and exit markets in large swaths 
of the country.156 This Section rst shows that energy markets could 
conceivably provide revenue adequacy and then shows that oer caps create 
a missing money problem that requires administrative interventions. 
1. Energy Markets Could Provide Resource Adequacy 
In order to ensure the reliable provision of electricity, supply must be able 
to meet “peak demand,” which refers to the few periods in the year when 
demand for electricity is highest.157 This usually occurs in July or August 
when people turn on their air conditioning, though in parts of the country 
with cold winters it occurs in the winter when people turn on their heat.158 
An important concern is how to incentivize the construction of the last 
generator needed to meet peak demand.159 In energy-only markets, a 
generator’s annual operating prot derives from the dierence between the 
market clearing price and the generator’s marginal cost.160 A generator runs 
and makes money only when the market clearing price is above its marginal 
 
155 See, e.g., 2018 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 122, at 49 (“Energy market 
revenues alone were not sucient to cover total costs in any scenario, which demonstrates the critical 
role of capacity market revenue in covering total costs.”); id. at 29 (“The PJM Capacity Market is 
explicitly designed to provide revenue adequacy and the resultant reliability.”). 
156 See infra Part IV; see also PJM INTERCONNECTION, supra note 153, at 7 n.5 (“Revenues 
from the energy and capacity markets were 74.3 percent and 22.9 percent, respectively, of the total 
generation revenue in 2015, and 71.1 percent and 26.6 percent, respectively, in 2016.”). 
157 See Jonathan Susser, Why Is Peak Demand a Concern for Utilities?, ADVANCED ENERGY (Mar. 
13, 2018), https://www.advancedenergy.org/2018/03/13/why-is-peak-demand-a-concern-for-
utilities [https://perma.cc/WTL8-KEJU] (“Peak demand is the time when consumer demand for 
electricity is at its highest; this can be by day, season or year. Peak periods tend to be in the morning 
during winter months (when lots of heating is occurring) and in the afternoon during summer 
months (lots of cooling).”). 
158 See id. (“When looking at an entire calendar year in North Carolina, peak demand occurs 
in the winter.”). 
159 See Gerard Reid, Renewables and the Missing Money Problem, ENERGY & CARBON (Apr. 21, 
2015), http://energyandcarbon.com/renewables-and-the-missing-money-problem [https://perma.cc/
3Q84-MC89] (“This ‘missing money problem’ comes about because the building of power stations 
requires signicant upfront capital expenditure which needs to be nanced through future revenues 
from power sales. With declining power prices and utilization rates . . . , there is little or no nancial 
incentive to build new capacity.” (emphasis omitted)). 
160 See NERA ECON. CONSULTING, ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM: ASSESSMENT OF A 
CAPACITY PAYMENT SYSTEM 26 (2011), https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/
archive2/PUB_ScottishPower_0311.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCN9-3TJP] (“Investors in new 
generation capacity recover their xed costs in this framework through the ‘inframarginal prot’ 
between the [system marginal cost] and their own marginal costs of production.”). 
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cost.161 It runs but makes no money when the clearing price equals its 
marginal cost, which occurs when it is the generator on the margin.162 And it 
does not run and makes no money when the clearing price is below its marginal 
cost.163 The difference between the clearing rate and an individual generator’s 
marginal cost comprises the generator’s operating profit for the market period. 
Annual operating profits in energy-only markets derive entirely from those 
periods in which the market clearing price exceeds a generator’s marginal cost. 
This prot is needed to cover the plant’s xed costs.164 
While generators bid their marginal costs under ordinary conditions, 
peaking plants, which bid only when demand is high, are theoretically able to 
submit above-marginal-cost bids.165 In most circumstances, a generator risks 
losing out on protable bids if it submits a bid above its marginal costs. 
Peaking plants, however, will be dispatched even if they submit bids well 
above their marginal costs. Because those generators are the last generators 
to be dispatched, they do not need to worry that they will be outbid because 
there are no generators available to outbid them.166 As a result, peaking plants 
can drive prices to levels that allow them to recover their xed costs and make 
a prot despite the fact that they are dispatched infrequently. 
 
161 See COLLIN CAIN & JONATHAN LESSER, BATES WHITE, A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO 
WHOLESALE ELECTRIC MARKETS 14-15 (2007), https://www.bateswhite.com/media/publication/
55_media.741.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU5R-8VLS] (“[G]enerators not only have to cover all of their 
variable costs, like fuel, but they must earn sucient revenues to pay their xed costs . . . . Investors 
will include all of these costs as an opportunity cost of doing business, and will not enter a market 
if they believe they will not be able to recover all of their costs . . . through market prices.”); see also 
Michael Hogan, Follow the Missing Money: Ensuring Reliability at Least Cost to Consumers in the 
Transition to a Low-Carbon Power System, 30 ELECTRICITY J. 55, 56 (2017) (“When supply margins 
are tight, the demand for energy and balancing services can drive marginal costs well above the 
variable cost of the last kWh sold in the forward market. This in turn reveals the true window of 
opportunity for consumers to play their role in balancing supply and demand.”). 
162 See CAIN & LESSER, supra note 161, at 13-14. 
163 See id. 
164 NERA ECON. CONSULTING, supra note 160, at 9. 
165 See MICHAEL MILLIGAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TECHNICAL 
REPORT NREL/TP-6A20-69076, MARGINAL COST PRICING IN A WORLD WITHOUT PERFECT 
COMPETITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTRICITY MARKETS WITH HIGH SHARES OF LOW 
MARGINAL COST RESOURCES 24-25 (2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/69076.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PVL3-B4E3]. 
166 See Peter Cramton, Electricity Market Design, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 589, 597 
(2017) (“In real time, market power becomes a more severe problem as the system operator has fewer 
options—resources are limited to those online and the ability of the resources to react is limited by 
ramp rates. Some method of mitigating market power is required.”). For a fascinating and 
provocative investigation into the role price formation plays in market design, with a particular focus 
on electricity markets, see William Boyd, Ways of Price Making and the Challenge of Market Governance 
in U.S. Energy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
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2. Market Manipulation 
A central challenge in electricity markets is that a system that relied 
entirely on energy markets could lead to market manipulation and excessive 
price volatility. To avoid these problems, every market regulator in the United 
States sets a ceiling on its energy market’s clearing price.167  
In the absence of these administrative constraints, generators may 
manipulate the market for their own benet. Imagine if a company owns two 
baseload generators and several peaking plants. The company might induce 
shortage conditions by closing one of its baseload generators for repairs. This 
could cause prices to skyrocket, allowing the company to collect high prices 
with its remaining baseload generator and its peaking plants. Alternatively, 
generators that know that their bids will determine the clearing price can 
simply drive the clearing price up by withholding supply or submitting 
excessively high bids.168 Peaking plants pose special problems because they 
will by denition have market power.169 They know that they do not face 
competition because they are the last units dispatched. As a result, they can 
raise prices beyond what would be necessary for them to recover their capital 
costs and make a reasonable prot.170 
 
167 See, e.g., Robbie Orvis & Mike O’Boyle, It’s Time to Rene How We Talk About Wholesale 
Markets, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/its-
time-to-rene-how-we-talk-about-wholesale-markets [https://perma.cc/44QR-4ZVB] (describing 
an action by FERC to “raise[] the price cap to $2,000 per megawatt-hour in all FERC-regulated 
markets” other than Texas, which already had a price cap of $9,000 per megawatt-hour). For an 
insightful article arguing that traditional approaches to market power abuses are ill suited to modern 
energy markets, see David B. Spence & Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy 
Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 132-33 (2012).  
168 See, e.g., Abuse of Power: How Manipulative Trading Undermined Energy Deregulation, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 5, 2002), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/abuse-of-
power-how-manipulative-trading-undermined-energy-deregulation [https://perma.cc/BWU5-
9EMX] [hereinafter Abuse of Power] (“[I]n the electricity industry, . . . generators with as little as a 
5% market share can send prices soaring by withholding supplies. Because electricity is a vital 
necessity with inelastic demand, and because it cannot be stored in substantial quantities, its price 
is extraordinarily volatile.”). 
169 See Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith & Bart J. Wilson, Controlling Market Power and 
Price Spikes in Electricity Networks: Demand-Side Bidding, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2998, 2999 
(2003) (“A rm is conventionally said to have market power when it can set a price greater than the 
marginal cost and still make positive sales.”). 
170 See Rassenti, Smith & Wilson, supra note 169, at 3002 (2003) (“Under the conditions of no 
demand-side bidding, . . . the distribution of ownership of a given set of generating assets can 
contribute markedly to the exercise of market power by well positioned generator owners in supply-
side auctions in which demand is fully revealed . . . : Only generators can behave strategically, and 
they do so to the disadvantage of buyers.”). This is one of only many strategies generators can adopt 
to exercise market power in the absence of oer caps. For a comprehensive description of how rms 
exercised market power in electricity markets during the California Energy Crisis, see Frank A. 
Wolak, Lessons from the California Energy Crisis, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION, supra note 86, at 
145, 154-62. 
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This type of market manipulation can itself cause reliability problems. In 
the early 2000s, California relied on energy markets to meet demand.171 
Aggressive market manipulation by generators on the margin contributed to 
dramatic price spikes.172 Large companies devised a number of strategies to 
induce scarcity and then provide electricity when prices skyrocketed.173 
These practices have been documented in the extensive literature on the 
California energy crisis.174 
A related problem with energy-only markets is that electricity demand is 
inelastic.175 In most markets, demand decreases when price increases. 
Electricity markets are dierent. When consumers want electricity, they want 
it immediately and, because retail rates are xed in advance, they know they 
will receive it at a predetermined price. This means that when demand is high 
and additional supply is accordingly scarce, the remaining suppliers can 
submit extremely high bids because there is little risk that consumers will 
stop using electricity.176 
Moreover, because of the signicant amount of time it takes to build new 
generators, even functional energy markets result in unpredictable swings in 
supply. After the market signals that new supply is needed, it may take years 
for new generators to nish construction and begin operating.177 Thus, even 
when prices encourage generators to enter the market, there may be periods 
 
171 See Wolak, supra note 170, at 148-50, 152-54 (discussing deregulation generally and the 
resulting energy market system in California). 
172 See id. at 163-64. 
173 See id. at 158-59 (summarizing evidence that “the substantially higher prices during the 
summer of 2000 were the result of the unilateral prot-maximizing actions of suppliers to the 
California energy markets”). 
174 See generally, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CAUSES AND LESSONS OF THE CALIFORNIA 
ELECTRICITY CRISIS (2001), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/107th-congress-2001-2002/
reports/californiaenergy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R96-5N3G]; Wolak, supra note 170, at 158-59; 
Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell & Frank Wolak, Diagnosing Market Power in California’s 
Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7868, 
2000); Paul Joskow, California’s Energy Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
8442, 2001); Abuse of Power, supra note 168. 
175 Inelastic demand means that demand for a product does not increase or decrease based on 
changes in price. People will buy the same amount of the product regardless of whether the price 
drops or increases. See Inelastic Demand, CORP. FINANCE INST., https://corporatenanceinstitute.com/
resources/knowledge/economics/inelastic-demand [https://perma.cc/RF5S-52K6]. 
176 See Joskow, supra note 15, at 29 (“Because electricity demand is very inelastic in the short 
run and electricity cannot be stored, individual suppliers may be able to move prices signicantly 
even in markets that are not very highly concentrated by traditional standards.”). 
177 See OMS Resource Adequacy Working Group, Resource Adequacy and Capacity Markets 
Principles 3 (Mar. 12, 2004), http://www.misostates.org/images/PositionStatements/OMSRAWG
PrinciplesasapprovedbyOMSBoard3-12-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY3T-UQ3H] (identifying 
“long lead times for new construction” as one reason that “electric supply shortages could occur”). 
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of resource inadequacy due to the fact that potential new suppliers cannot 
respond quickly to market opportunities.178 
3. Oer Caps Deter Market Manipulation 
Every regulator in the United States has adopted oer caps to avoid the 
problems described above.179 Oer caps remove incentives to manipulate 
prices and manufacture scarcity by reducing the revenues generators enjoy 
when supply is scarce.180 In doing so, they reduce a region’s vulnerability to 
market manipulation. Oer caps also reduce volatility by preventing prices 
from skyrocketing. 
4. Oer Caps Create a Missing Money Problem 
Although oer caps discourage market manipulation and reduce volatility, 
they can prevent electricity prices from rising high enough to support peaking 
plants and other generators that rely on high inframarginal rents.181 Peaking 
plants are essential to a well-functioning electric grid because they ensure 
that there is enough supply to meet demand.182 However, peaking plants 
struggle to make a prot or recoup their costs when regulators limit the prices 
 
178 See id. (“Electric supply can be considered inelastic over the short term because it can be 
dicult for markets to respond quickly to unexpected shortages. Absent adequate planning reserves, 
prolonged periods of volatile market prices are likely.”). 
179 Udi Helman, Benjamin F. Hobbs & Richard P. O’Neil, The Design of US Wholesale Energy 
and Ancillary Service Auction Markets: Theory and Practice, in COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, PERFORMANCE 179, 193-94 (Fereidoon P. Siohansi ed., 
2008) (discussing the eects of “supply oer caps,” which were adopted “for purposes of market 
power mitigation and the lack of demand bids”); see also 2017 IRC MARKETS COMM., ISO/RTO 
COUNCIL, MARKET DESIGN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2017), https://isorto.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/05/20170905_2017IRCMarketsCommitteeExecutiveSummaryFinal.pdf (describing oer caps 
in every RTO). 
180 See William W. Hogan, Electricity Scarcity Pricing Through Operating Reserves, ECON. 
ENERGY & ENVTL. POL’Y, Sept. 2013, at 65, 69 (“A problem with increasing oer caps arises in the 
tradeo for mitigating market power. A principal purpose of generator oer caps is to mitigate the 
exercise of market power through economic withholding.”); see also Wolak, supra note 170, at 155 
(describing the imposition of oer caps in CAISO’s energy and ancillary service markets in the 
summer of 1998, in response to skyrocketing bids from suppliers). 
181 See David Newbery, Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions  
and Interconnectors 3 (Energy Pol’y Research Grp., Working Paper No. 1508, 2015), https://
www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/1508_updated-July-20151.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2VMY-PYZP] (“If investment decisions could be solely guided by strictly commercial decisions and 
if markets were not subject to policy interventions or price caps, it is plausible that capacity adequacy 
could be delivered by prot-motivated generation investment without explicit policy guidance.”). 
182 Flexible Peaking Resource, ENERGY STORAGE ASS’N: ESA BLOG (Sept. 24, 2013), 
https://energystorage.org/exible-peaking-resource [https://perma.cc/U92W-SM8V]. 
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they can charge.183 In the few periods in which peaking plants are dispatched, 
their high bids always set the market clearing price. When oer caps constrain 
the price peaking plants and other generators bid, those units often do not 
make enough of a prot during shortage conditions to cover their xed 
costs.184 Without some other source of revenue, these peaking plants would 
retire and replacements would not be built.185 
C. Finding the Missing Money 
In the traditional utility model, concerns about reliability were addressed 
when the public utility commission approved a utility’s proposed rate.186 The 
utility would build generators that could provide electricity to meet spikes in 
demand.187 As the previous Section showed, in moving to a system in which 
generators are compensated based on their marginal costs and energy market 
prices are capped, regulators created a missing money problem. 
 
183 See Shmuel S. Oren, Capacity Payments and Supply Adequacy in Competitive Electricity Markets 
3, 5-6, VII SYMP. SPECIALISTS ELECTRIC OPERATIONAL & EXPANSION PLAN. (May 21-26, 2016), 
https://oren.ieor.berkeley.edu/workingp/sepope.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXK6-RRMG] (explaining 
the connection between oer caps and capacity market in markets around the world, including 
American RTOs). 
184 See id. at 2 (“The prevalence of regulatory intervention to suppress energy prices even 
when they reect legitimate scarcity rents justies the concern that indeed generators would not be 
able to cover their xed costs through energy sales alone.”). 
185 See Paul L. Joskow, Editorial, Symposium on ‘Capacity Markets’, ECON. ENERGY & 
ENVTL. POL’Y, Sept. 2013, at v, v (discussing the effects of the missing money problem on 
investment incentives). 
186 See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 322-23 (2017) (explaining that 
under the traditional form of public utility regulation in which price is set by a utility commission, 
“[t]ypically, commissions also provide some sort of incentive to utilities to maintain a certain level 
of service reliability, since utilities would otherwise be tempted to skimp on quality of service in 
order to cut costs and increase prots”); JANINE MIGDEN-OSTRANDER ET AL., REGULATORY 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, DECOUPLING CASE STUDIES: REVENUE REGULATION IMPLEMENTATION 
IN SIX STATES 4 (2014), http://www.puc.state.pa.us/pcdocs/1417846.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH69-
VATW] (“Utilities have embedded investment-related and labor costs (not sensitive to volume) 
included in their rates to support investments already made and necessary for good service, 
reliability, safety, and other utility services, which are adjusted during periodic rate cases.” (citation 
omitted)); see also DAN CROSS-CALL ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., AMERICA’S POWER PLAN 
& AEE INST., NAVIGATING UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL REFORM: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
REGULATORY DESIGN 11 (2018), https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/RMI_Navigating_
Utility_Business_Model_Reform_2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WCJ-89UJ] (“The conventional 
utility business model largely succeeded at delivering on historical responsibilities for aordability, 
safety, and reliability.”). 
187 See Is It Time to Deregulate All Electric Utilities?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2016, 10:01 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/is-it-time-to-deregulate-all-electric-utilities-1479092461 [https://perma.cc/
467D-5GCJ] (contribution from Andrew N. Kleit) (“Electricity for the most part can’t be stored, 
meaning supply must nearly match demand at all times or the grid could come under stress and 
crash . . . . [M]any supply-and-demand challenges could be solved if the cost of storing electricity 
was brought down to economical levels.”). 
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This Section describes the steps regulators have taken to deal with the 
missing money problem. Regulators have responded to the missing money 
problem either through scarcity pricing or resource adequacy requirements.188 
Scarcity pricing sets oer caps at high levels to ensure that energy markets 
provide enough revenue to maintain adequate reserves. Alternatively, 
regulators can rely on resource adequacy requirements. Such policies 
compensate generators for being available to provide electricity—not for 
actually providing it. 
1. Scarcity Pricing 
One way to procure sucient reserves is to let prices rise substantially 
when supply is scarce.189 Texas is the only state that relies primarily on 
scarcity pricing to maintain adequate reserves.190 ERCOT, the ISO that 
manages electricity in Texas, allows prices to reach $9000 per megawatt-hour 
when supply is low.191 There are four challenges with scarcity pricing, many of 
which parallel the challenges of energy-only markets described in Section II.B. 
a. Unpredictability 
A market that procures reserves through scarcity pricing allows market 
participants—rather than FERC or the grid operator—to determine when 
generators will enter and exit the market. ERCOT may feel that scarcity prices 
are high enough to encourage efficient entry. However, because ERCOT does 
not actually procure capacity, it has to assume that (a) prices will procure the 
right amount of load, and (b) generators will actually respond to price signals. 
Even if regulators are able to determine the correct scarcity price, there is 
delay between when the market signals that new load is necessary and when 
suppliers actually enter the market. That delay could undermine reliability in 
 
188 As this Section explains, resource adequacy requirements include both mandatory capacity 
markets and markets in which LSEs are required to maintain an administratively set level of reserves. 
189 See Gavin Bade, The Great Capacity Market Debate: Which Model Can Best Handle the Energy 
Transition?, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-great-capacity-
market-debate-which-model-can-best-handle-the-energy-tr/440657 [https://perma.cc/AX98-
DX9B] (“In Texas, regulators ensure reliability through . . . scarcity pricing, which allows real-time 
electricity prices to reach as high as $9000/MWh . . . . Instead of guaranteeing generation revenue 
through a capacity market, the promise of high prices is supposed to incentivize generators to build 
new plants and keep them ready to operate.”). 
190 See id. (“Of the wholesale electricity markets that serve two-thirds of the U.S. population, 
only two—[ERCOT] and [SPP]—do not have capacity markets.”). 
191 ERCOT, About the Operating Reserve Demand Curve and Wholesale Electric Prices 
(May 2014), https://hepg.hks.harvard.edu/files/hepg/files/ordcupdate-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W9AG-LVVY] (explaining that under ERCOT’s Operating Reserve Demand Curve, “wholesale 
prices in the real-time energy market will increase automatically as available operating reserves 
decrease,” up to the price of $9000 per megawatt-hour when reserves drop below 2000 megawatts). 
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the short run.192 If suppliers fail to respond quickly to price signals, even 
properly priced markets will fail to procure sucient supply. Regulatory risk-
aversion may thus induce regulators to give generators other sources of 
revenue in order to maintain a stable level of supply. 
A related challenge is that revenue uncertainty increases price volatility. 
Because regulators cannot predict weather patterns far in advance, they cannot 
determine how much money generators will make in a given time period.193 
b. Market Manipulation 
Another challenge with scarcity pricing is that it remains vulnerable to the 
abusive practices that vexed California in 2000 and 2001. Although offer caps 
limit the extent to which prices can increase, a system that relies exclusively 
on scarcity pricing still has to provide a substantial windfall to generators that 
sell electricity when supply is limited. In fact, ERCOT has seen extreme 
volatility in the amount of supply offered in June and July.194 These price 
swings have increased the amount of revenue that goes to generators that 
operate when supply is scarce, leading some to theorize that large companies 
are manipulating the market to manufacture scarcity conditions.195 
 
192 See Fernando J. de Sisternes & John E. Parsons, The Impact of Uncertainty on the Need and 
Design of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms in Low-Carbon Power Systems 4-7 (MIT Ctr. for Energy 
& Envtl. Policy, Working Paper No. 2016-004, 2016), http://ceepr.mit.edu/les/papers/2016-004.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MQB6-BYL4] (discussing sources of uncertainty in the operation of capacity 
markets, including “uncertainty about demand” and “uncertainty about . . . resource availability”). 
This concern has prompted analysts to express concern about Texas’ ability to meet peak demand. 
See News Release: ERCOT Expects Record Electric Use, Increased Chance of Energy Alerts, ERCOT (May 
8, 2019), http://www.ercot.com/news/releases/show/181248 [https://perma.cc/3VVB-662T]. 
193 As David Patton, market monitor for PJM and other RTOs, explained during a panel at 
the Energy Bar Association’s 2016 Annual Meeting: 
Shortage pricing is not like a capacity market where you’re going to get a level of 
revenue that might uctuate by 10 to 20% a year. With shortage pricing, you might get 
10 years of revenue in one year and then the other nine years the generators are going 
to think they’re going bankrupt . . . [because shortage prices] increase exponentially 
when you get unusually hot weather and unusually high loads or unusually poor 
generator performance.” 
Rich Heidorn Jr., Lawyers Take an Economics Class: Capacity Markets vs. Scarcity Pricing, RTO 
INSIDER (June 14, 2016), https://www.rtoinsider.com/capacity-markets-vs-scarcity-pricing-27702 
[https://perma.cc/Y3QP-RZWX]. 
194 See Is the ERCOT Market Being Manipulated?, TEXAS ELECTRICITY RATINGS: THE BLOG 
(June 29, 2012), https://www.texaselectricityratings.com/blog/2012/06/29/ercot-market-manipulated 
[https://perma.cc/2D9G-LCYB] (documenting how electricity prices surged from the typical $30-
$40 per unit to $3,000 per unit within a short period of time). 
195 See id. (speculating that ERCOT’s percent price swings in June 2012 were the result of 
market manipulation and observing that “ERCOT has been manipulated before”); see also L.M. 
Sixel, A May Price Spike Shows Vulnerability to Market Manipulation—and Cost to Consumers, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Aug. 2, 2019, 2:37 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/A-
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Moreover, in 2019, ERCOT’s reserves declined below nine percent 
despite the fact that the state aims to maintain approximately fourteen 
percent reserve capacity.196 This has led to speculation that Texas is vulnerable 
to market manipulation as companies that own both peaking and non-peaking 
plants will be able to create scarcity pricing conditions by withholding supply 
strategically in order to cause energy prices to increase.197 
c. Political Will 
The third and perhaps most important problem with scarcity pricing is 
that regulators do not seem to have the political will to commit to an 
electricity market in which price signals—rather than administrative reserve 
requirements—secure resource adequacy. Even if scarcity pricing could 
maintain adequate supply, and persuasive economic arguments indicate that 
it can,198 the fact that regulators are concerned about the problems 
enumerated above suggests that policymakers need to think about alternative 
ways to procure reserves. No state other than Texas relies on energy markets 
to procure supply.199 Other grid operators have determined that energy-
only markets allow unacceptable levels of volatility and fail to maintain 
sufficient reserves.200 
At the very least, the fact that most of the United States refuses to commit 
to scarcity pricing illustrates the need to think carefully about how to support 
other markets that can procure sucient supply while preserving competition 
 
May-price-spike-shows-vulnerability-of-power-14188257.php [https://perma.cc/Z2BT-RVNM] 
(“Power companies have exploited weaknesses in the design of Texas’ deregulated market almost 
from the day it began operating in 2002 and often done so with few consequences, reaping windfalls 
that have cost consumers, traders, industrial customers and retail power companies hundreds of 
millions of dollars.”). 
196 See News Release: ERCOT’s Reserve Margin Climbs 2% for Summer 2020, ERCOT (Dec. 5, 
2019), http://www.ercot.com/news/releases/show/195806 [https://perma.cc/2SE4-SGZT] (reporting 
an 8.6% reserve margin in Summer 2019); see also Ethan Howland, Texas PUC Orders Higher Scarcity 
Prices Amid Dropping Reserves, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.publicpower.org/
periodical/article/texas-puc-orders-higher-scarcity-prices-amid-dropping-reserves [https://perma.cc/
J2G7-2CRF] (discussing “ERCOT’s 13.75 percent minimum target”). 
197 See, e.g., Sixel, supra note 195 (“Lawmakers and regulators . . . have done little to harden the 
system against manipulation and, in some ways, provided incentives for companies to game the 
market. When it nds irregularities that push prices articially high, ERCOT rarely reprices 
transactions and orders power companies to give up the gains.”). 
198 See Hogan, supra note 150, at 6-23 (explaining how energy-only markets could provide 
resource adequacy and summarizing the economic literature). 
199 See Bade, supra note 189 (“Of the wholesale electricity markets . . . , only two—[ERCOT] 
and [SPP]—do not have capacity markets.”). 
200 For example, when PJM rst developed its capacity market, it did so because its “existing 
market rules . . . fail[ed] to set prices adequate to ensure sucient resources” and “create[d] 
signicant price volatility for electric supply.” PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip 
op. at 2-3 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
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and accommodating state renewable energy policies. A recent exchange 
between Harvard economist William Hogan and PJM executives illustrates 
this dynamic. After Hogan said that “[l]ife is too short to spend your time 
trying to perfect capacity markets,” PJM Market Monitor Joe Bowring 
responded, “it’s easy enough to say in a theoretical world that scarcity pricing 
should take care of everything. But we have yet to see that demonstrated in 
the real world.”201 While it is certainly possible that ERCOT will continue to 
rely on scarcity pricing, the unpredictability, threat of market manipulation, 
and widespread antipathy to energy-only markets means that it is important 
to consider alternative market designs. 
2. Resource Adequacy Requirements 
Resource adequacy requirements are a more common solution to the 
missing money problem. In addition to or instead of compensating generators 
for providing electricity, resource adequacy requirements compensate 
generators for being available to provide electricity.202 Given that every state 
besides Texas maintains reliability through a resource adequacy requirement, 
we expect capacity payments to increase in importance as energy market 
prices continue to decline. 
a. Reserve Obligations 
One type of resource adequacy requirement, which we endorse in Part VI 
and which is used to some extent in the Midwest and California, assigns 
reserve obligations to LSEs, which procure capacity for themselves but must 
meet administratively established reserve margins.203 The other option, 
 
201 Heidorn, supra note 193 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
202 See Bushnell et al., supra note 24, at 3 (“Outside of ERCOT, supply resources in other U.S. 
markets operated by [RTOs] can earn revenues for the provision of capacity, a product dened by 
the expected potential to supply energy.”). 
203 See Planning Resource Auction, MISO, https://www.misoenergy.org/planning/resource-
adequacy/#t=10&p=0&s=FileName&sd=desc [https://perma.cc/U2YM-YHKA] (last visited Feb. 11, 
2020) (“In the MISO region, customer-facing utilities are responsible for making sure they can 
meet customer needs.”). California’s system is similar to that of MISO. In California, the 
California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) imposes “resource adequacy” requirements on 
LSEs. See Resource Adequacy, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/RA 
[https://perma.cc/6642-RQSE] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (noting that the CPUC imposes resource 
adequacy obligations on all LSEs in the CPUC’s jurisdiction). MISO runs a centralized capacity 
auction, known as the planning resource auction, but also allows LSEs to meet the resource adequacy 
requirement by submitting a xed resource adequacy plan or through bilateral contracting. MISO, 
2019/2020 PLANNING RESOURCE AUCTION (PRA) RESULTS 3 (2019), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/
20190412_PRA_Results_Posting336165.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ5Q-65RQ] [hereinafter 2019/2020 
PRA RESULTS]. Unlike MISO, the CPUC does not run a centralized market. See id. However, the 
California grid operator, CAISO, is beginning to add elements of a capacity market through the 
Capacity Procurement Mechanism that would allow the ISO—rather than the LSEs—to procure 
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which is used in the East Coast markets, is a central capacity market, in which 
the RTO runs periodic auctions to acquire capacity on behalf of the LSEs. 
The RTO then allocates costs to the LSEs.204 
Under resource adequacy requirements without mandated capacity 
auctions, LSEs can self-supply, contract bilaterally, or purchase reserves 
through a central auction.205 LSEs that prefer to self-supply or purchase load 
by negotiating with independent power producers are free to do so.206 If a 
state requires that an LSE procure in-state natural gas or rely more heavily 
on zero-carbon sources, the LSE can nd supply that both satises the federal 
reserve mandate and meets its state’s needs. 
b. Capacity Markets 
The East Coast capacity markets are more intrusive than simple resource 
adequacy requirements.207 In these markets, existing generators and proposed 
 
capacity when needed. See Capacity Procurement Mechanism Replacement, CAISO, http://www.caiso.com/
informed/Pages/StakeholderProcesses/CompletedClosedStakeholderInitiatives/CapacityProcurem
entMechanismReplacement.aspx [https://perma.cc/HQ4J-666P] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) 
(describing a proposal that includes “a durable mechanism and market-based price for the ISO to 
procure capacity not designated for resource adequacy in order to meet reliability needs”). The 
Southwest Power Pool (SPP), which serves the Great Plains states, also has a resource adequacy 
requirement but no centrally administered market. See Resource Adequacy, SPP, 
https://www.spp.org/engineering/resource-adequacy [https://perma.cc/LWF4-V58X] (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2020) (stating that SPP achieves resource adequacy through the implementation of 
demand and supply adequacy requirements). 
204 See, e.g., CAPACITY MARKET OPERATIONS, PJM, PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY 
MARKET 16 (44th rev., effective Dec. 5, 2019), https://pjm.com/-/media/documents/manuals/
m18.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/6MYY-RXEU] [hereinafter PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY 
MARKET] (“Under RPM, each LSE that serves load in a PJM Zone during the Delivery Year shall 
be responsible for paying a Locational Reliability Charge equal to their Daily Unforced Capacity 
Obligation in the Zone multiplied by the Final Zonal Capacity Price applicable to that Zone.”). 
205 See 2019/2020 PRA RESULTS, supra note 203, at 3. 
206 See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,176, slip op. at 1-2 (Feb. 28, 
2018) (stating the LSEs in MISO can satisfy their resource adequacy obligations in any of four ways: 
“(1) purchase capacity through the Planning Resource Auction (Auction); (2) submit a Fixed 
Resource Adequacy Plan to demonstrate that it has designated capacity to meet all or a portion of 
its Reserve Requirement, (3) self-schedule capacity and bid it into the Auction at a price of zero, 
and/or (4) pay the Capacity Deciency Charge”); MISO, FERC Electric Tari, Module E-1, § 69A 
(35.0.0), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Module%20E-1108026.pdf (“LSEs will meet their [planning 
reserve margin requirement] by: (i) submitting a Fixed Resource Adequacy Plan; (ii) Self-
Scheduling [Zonal Resource Credits (ZRCs)]; (iii) purchasing ZRCs through the Planning Resource 
Auction process; and/or (iv) paying the Capacity Deciency Charge.”). 
207 These centralized capacity markets are not strictly mandatory and do not prevent 
utilities from procuring capacity through bilateral contracts. What distinguishes the East Coast 
capacity markets is that a regulator or grid operator requires LSEs to participate in a centrally 
administered capacity auction in which the regulator or grid operator determines the winning 
bids. See PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 16 (explaining that 
“[p]articipation by [LSEs] in the [Reliability Pricing Model] for load served in the PJM region is 
mandatory, except for those LSEs that have elected the Fixed Resource Requirement . . . Alternative”); 
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new generators submit bids (in dollars per megawatt-day) in which they oer 
to be available to supply power (in megawatts) for a commitment period in 
the future.208 Grid operators set up a merit order and clear enough power to 
cover the administratively determined demand curve.209 The marginal 
generator sets the market-clearing price for capacity. To meet its capacity 
obligation, a generator must bid into the energy market for the future 
commitment period even if that generator does not clear.210 LSEs are 
 
id. at 84-88 (discussing the circumstances in which buyers and sellers can enter into bilateral 
contracts for the sale and purchase of capacity); id. at 200-02 (explaining how LSEs can opt out 
of the Reliability Pricing Model through the Fixed Resource Requirement, which allows LSEs 
to self-supply capacity if they provide, among other things, at least four months notice and 
demonstrate that they have sufficient resources to meet the reserve requirement for five 
consecutive years). 
208 See Capacity Market (RPM), PJM LEARNING CTR., http://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/
buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx [https://perma.cc/88UE-EBXB] (last visited Feb. 
11, 2020) (noting that PJM’s capacity market requires power plants to procure enough resources to 
“meet predicted energy demand three years in the future”). PJM proposed its Reliability Pricing 
Model (RPM) in 2005 and implemented it in 2007. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC 
¶ 61,331, slip op. at 2-3 (Dec. 22, 2006) (describing the 2005 development of the RPM proposal); 
2 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2008 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM: 
DETAILED ANALYSIS 249-51 (2009), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_
of_the_Market/2008/2008-som-pjm-volume2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DVK-N6MJ] [hereinafter 
2008 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT] (describing the design and early implementation 
of the RPM). 
209 See, e.g., 2008 PJM STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 208, at 249 (“Under RPM, 
there is an administratively determined demand curve that dened scarcity pricing levels and that, 
with the supply curve derived from capacity oers, determined market prices in each [base residual 
auction].”); SAMUEL A. NEWELL ET AL., BRATTLE GRP., FOURTH REVIEW OF PJM’S VARIABLE 
RESOURCE REQUIREMENT CURVE 13 (2018), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-
notices/special-reports/2018/20180420-pjm-2018-variable-resource-requirement-curve-study.ashx?
la=en [https://perma.cc/M9YW-E66A] (summarizing the results of a study “to evaluate the 
parameters and shape of the administrative . . . curve used to produce capacity under [PJM’s] 
RPM”). The availability requirements vary between markets and across resource types. Cleared 
capacity resources do not have to be available at every minute of every day during their commitment 
period. See ISO New England Inc. Transmission, Markets, and Services Tariff § III(13)(1)(2)(2)(1)(1) 
(2019), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/regulatory/tari/sect_3/mr1_sec_13_14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M9HV-XZZ4] (allowing for monthly, seasonal, and annual periods and the 
transferring of obligations); see also CAPACITY MARKET OPERATIONS, PJM, PJM MANUAL 18: 
PJM CAPACITY MARKET 121-22 (39th rev., eective Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/documents/manuals/archive/m18/m18v39-capacity-market-12-21-2017.ashx [https://perma.cc/
JUQ3-DACF] (describing various exceptions—including “nuclear, coal, wind, hydro, solar, or 
landll gas facilities”—to Minimum Oer Price Rules (MOPR), which “ensure[] that certain 
planned Generation Capacity Resources are oered into RPM Auctions on a competitive basis”). 
210 See Bushnell et al., supra note 24, at 28 (“Resources with capacity that clears in a capacity 
market or is committed to meet an RA requirement have obligations to be available and perform in 
Day-Ahead and Real-Time energy markets.”). 
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compelled to purchase an amount of the acquired capacity proportional to 
their share of total load.211  
Capacity market payments allow peaking plants and other generators 
needed for reliability to cover their xed costs and make a prot. Payment 
for availability, not energy, solves the missing money problem. Mandatory 
capacity markets exist in PJM,212 NYISO,213 and ISO-NE.214 As the table 




211 See, e.g., PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 19, 25-26; N.Y. 
INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, MANUAL 4: INSTALLED CAPACITY MANUAL 22-23 (2020), https://
www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2923301/icap_mnl.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD9A-K83F]. 
212 See Capacity Market (RPM), PJM, http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/EAD5-HN87] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (noting that PJM’s RPM “ensures long-
term grid reliability by securing the appropriate amount of power supply resources needed to meet 
predicted energy demand in the future”). 
213 See Installed Capacity Market (ICAP), N.Y. ISO, https://www.nyiso.com/installed-
capacity-market [https://perma.cc/G976-75F4] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (noting that New York’s 
capacity market ensures “reliability of the bulk power system”). 
214 See Forward Capacity Market, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/
markets/forward-capacity-market [https://perma.cc/M9HV-XZZ4] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) 
(stating that New England’s Forward Capacity Market (FCM) “ensures that the New England 
power system will have sucient resources to meet the future demand for electricity”). 
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In regions that rely on mandatory capacity markets, the trend has been 
for these markets to make up an increasing share of generator revenue. PJM’s 
capacity market, for example, now provides four times more revenue than it 
did when it was developed in 2007 and twenty percent of total revenue for 
generators operating in the Mid-Atlantic.221 In ISO-NE, PJM, and NYISO, 
the three markets with mandatory capacity markets, between roughly twenty 
 
215 PJM, RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION FAQS 1 (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.pjm.com/-/
media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-base-residual-auction-faqs.ashx?la=en [https://
perma.cc/2RCM-WAYH]. 
216 PJM, 2020/2021 RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION RESULTS 6 (2017), https://pjm.com/-/
media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2021-2022/2021-2022-base-residual-auction-report.ashx?
la=en [https://perma.cc/M879-4D27]. 
217 Installed Capacity: View Strip Auction Summary, NYISO, http://icap.nyiso.com/ucap/public/
auc_view_strip_detail.do [https://perma.cc/PM8D-MA4E] (last visited June 2, 2020) (displaying 
results of two auctions per year, conducted thirty days prior to each period’s commencement). 
218 See id. (strip auction results from Winter 2015–16 to Summer 2020, accounting for lows and 
highs in each auction). Note that $1/kW-month * (12 months / 365 days) * (1000 kW / 1 MW) = 
$32.9/MW-day. 
219 About the FCM and Its Auctions, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-
operations/markets/forward-capacity-market/fcm-participation-guide/about-the-fcm-and-its-
auctions [https://perma.cc/CJ6C-DXSH] (last visited June 2, 2020).  
220 Markets: Results of the Annual Forward Capacity Auctions, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-
ne.com/about/key-stats/markets#fcaresults [https://perma.cc/Y7ME-W4MT] (last visited Feb. 11, 
2020). Note that $1/kW-month * (12 months / 365 days) * (1000 kW / 1 MW) = $32.9/MW-day.  
221 See PJM, Understanding the Dierence Between PJM’s Markets: Markets at a Glance 1 
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://pjm.com/-/media/about-pjm/newsroom/fact-sheets/understanding-the-dierence-
between-pjms-markets-fact-sheet.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/6FL7-F4BQ] (nding that capacity 
payments accounted for $11.89/MWh of the $59.96/MWh of wholesale electricity costs in PJM’s 
region); see also MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, Q3 2019 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR 
PJM: JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 291 (2019), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/
PJM_State_of_the_Market/2019/2019q3-som-pjm.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHL6-8QPD] (stating 
that RPM revenue increased from $2,486,310,208 in 2007 to $10,331,688,133 in 2018, though it was 
projected to decline to $8,734,613,179 in 2019). 
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percent (NYISO, PJM) and forty percent (ISO-NE) of wholesale electricity 
costs was due to capacity market payments.222 
III. RENEWABLES EXACERBATE THE MISSING MONEY PROBLEM 
The previous Part showed that offer caps have contributed to a missing money 
problem that has prompted regulators to find other sources of revenue to support 
resource adequacy. This Part explains why growing volumes of renewables 
increase the need for regulatory interventions to support resource adequacy. 
It is worth making clear at the outset that it is theoretically possible for 
energy-only markets to provide resource adequacy even with high levels of 
renewables. If regulators were comfortable with extreme price swings and 
power producers could make investment decisions with perfect foresight, 
energy market prices could conceivably rise high enough to provide sucient 
compensation for peaking plants and other generators that support grid 
reliability.223 The purpose of this Part is therefore not to show that there is 
no scenario in which energy markets could accommodate higher levels of 
renewables. It is rather to show that by suppressing energy market prices, 
renewables exacerbate the features of the grid that have already led regulators 
to intervene in electricity markets. 
Perhaps more importantly, regulators and grid operators believe that the 
missing money problem will increase as renewable penetration grows, and 
they are already taking intervening steps to provide other sources of revenue 
for generators perceived to be necessary to reliability. According to ISO-NE, 
“[a]dditional renewables are expected to decrease wholesale electric energy 
prices, which will result in increased capacity prices to ensure resource 
adequacy.”224 Other grid operators have echoed this view.225 Thus, despite the 
ability of theoretical economists to model a system in which energy-only 
markets procure resource adequacy in a high-renewable world, academics and 
policymakers need to consider alternative approaches that preserve 
competitive dynamics while integrating clean energy resources. 
A. Declining Clearing Prices Are Transforming Electricity Markets 
The combination of increasingly competitive renewables, state clean 
energy policies, and inexpensive natural gas has already transformed the 
 
222 See 2018 ERCOT STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT, supra note 122, at 9. 
223 See Hogan, supra note 150, at 1-3 (showing that if oer caps were removed and demand was 
responsive to supply, then the market might provide sucient revenue during scarcity conditions to 
support necessary supply). 
224 See ISO New England, supra note 34, at 1. 
225 See infra Section IV.C. 
1226 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1181 
United States’ resource mix and reduced the contribution of energy markets 
to generator revenue.226 As natural gas and renewables have become less 
expensive,227 they have begun to make up a larger percentage of the power 
grid.228 Lower natural gas prices translate to lower marginal costs for natural 
gas power plants. This reduces the market-clearing price as the marginal 
generator is usually a natural gas power plant. 
Renewable generators have marginal costs close to zero, such that the 
entry of these resources shifts the supply curve to the right. This shift causes 
prices to decline because a lower marginal cost generator sets the clearing 
price.229 Figure 3 demonstrates these two eects. 
 
Figure 3: Price Depression Eects of Cheap Natural Gas and Renewables230 
 
 
226 The rise of renewable power has begun to suppress energy market prices. The cost of wind 
turbines fell seventy percent between 2009 and 2019, and the cost of solar panels fell eighty-nine 
percent. See LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 13.0, at 7 
(2019), https://www.lazard.com/media/451086/lazards-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-130-vf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5UEN-GNG5]. Renewables (excluding hydroelectric) expanded from 3.1  
percent of total generation in 2009 to 9.9 percent in 2018. See Electric Power Annual, Table 3.1.A, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_03_01_a.html 
[https://perma.cc/GS3S-GYNR] (sum of “Solar” and “Renewable Sources Excluding Hydroelectric 
and Solar” divided by “Total Generation at Utility-Scale Facilities”). 
227 See LAZARD, supra note 226, at 7; Coley Girouard, The Numbers Are in and Renewables Are 
Winning on Price Alone, ADVANCED ENERGY PERSP. (Dec. 5, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://blog.aee.net/
the-numbers-are-in-and-renewables-are-winning-on-price-alone [https://perma.cc/74LX-4SUT]. 
228 See Short-Term Energy Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/electricity.php [https://perma.cc/73JC-TKL5] (tracking 
United States electricity generation by source between 2014 and 2019). 
229 See SEEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 3-4 gs. 1-2 (showing this eect with graphs). 
230 Data for Figure 3 came from LAZARD, supra note 146; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
supra note 146. 
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As Figure 4 shows, increased use of natural gas and renewables has already 
caused energy market prices to decline signicantly. Energy market prices 
peaked in 2008 and fell more than fty percent in the ensuing decade.231 In 
2006, energy prices averaged approximately $80 per megawatt-hour. Prices 
increased to $160 per megawatt-hour in 2008 and have steadily declined to 
about $35 per megawatt-hour. 
 
Figure 4: Monthly Average Wholesale Electricity  
Prices in Select U.S. Markets, 2006–2017232 
 
Lower energy market prices have begun to challenge the ability of some 
generators, especially coal and nuclear power plants, to cover their xed 
costs.233 Since 2010, declining prices have forced roughly a third (by capacity) 
 
231 The data for Figure 4 came from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Historical 
Wholesale Market Data for the years 2006–2017. See Wholesale Electricity and Natural Gas Market 
Data, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/wholesale 
[https://perma.cc/37LE-NQCM]. Specically, energy market prices have fallen 66 percent in 
CAISO, 64 percent in ISO-NE, 62 percent in PJM, and 52 percent in MISO. See id. Figures reported 
are monthly averages weighted by sales volume and adjusted for inflation. In the years leading up to 
2008, energy prices creeped up from around $60 per megawatt-hour to above $100 per megawatt-hour. 
With the discovery of abundant shale gas in 2008, prices fell to around $50 per megawatt-hour. See id. 
There have been occasional price spikes since then, most notably in response to the 2014 polar vortex, 
but prices have generally remained in the $30-$50 per megawatt-hour range. See id. 
232 Wholesale Electricity and Natural Gas Market Data, supra note 231; see also supra note 231.  
233 Coal and nuclear power plants in regulated regions, such as the Northwest and Southeast, 
are also aected, though the price signal is muted by utility and commission decisionmaking. As 
generation in these regions remains subject to utility rate regulation, the retirement decision for 
these power plants is subject to public utility commission ratemaking rather than market forces. For 
more detail on the geographically dierentiated history of restructuring, see supra Part II. 
1228 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1181 
of the then-active coal power plant fleet to retire.234 To date, the major driver 
of these lower energy market prices and resulting plant closures has been 
inexpensive natural gas. According to a Lawrence Berkeley National Lab 
report: 
[T]he primary driver of the decline in average wholesale electricity prices 
between 2008 and 2016 in ERCOT and CAISO is the decline in natural gas 
prices. We nd that growth in [variable renewable energy] generation 
contributed less than 5% to the overall price decline, whereas natural gas price 
reductions contributed 85-90% of the overall decline in wholesale electricity 
prices in these markets.235 
As detailed below, the growing penetration of renewables is expected to 
reinforce and continue this price suppression trend. 
Price suppression has also begun to reduce the role of energy markets in 
much of the United States. According to FERC and the grid operators, 
increased volumes of renewables and declining gas prices have increased the 
importance of capacity markets in many parts of the United States.236 In ISO-
NE, for example, capacity markets were responsible for slightly more than 
10.5% of wholesale electricity costs in 2008 but had ballooned to over thirty-
ve percent of wholesale electricity costs in 2018.237 ISO-NE explained that 
“[t]he region should expect to see the annual energy-market value continue 
to decline over time as renewable resources drive down energy-market 
prices.”238 The grid operator believes that capacity markets will provide the 
 
234 Between 2010 and 2019, 102 gigawatts out of the then-operating 317 gigawatts of the coal 
power plant eet have retired, or 32.2% of the total. See U.S. Coal-Fired Power Plants Continue to 
Retire, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/fossil-
fuels/coal/u-s-coal-fired-power-plants-continue-to-retire [https://perma.cc/C7PM-JWPT]. An 
additional seventeen gigawatts have announced retirement. Id. For context, a gigawatt is roughly 
enough to meet the instantaneous demand of one million homes at once. See CAL. ISO, CALIFORNIA 
ISO GLOSSARY, https://www.energy.ca.gov/resources/energy-glossary [https://perma.cc/7XCS-
5M9U] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). The installed capacity of all U.S. generators was 1177 gigawatts 
in 2016. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2016, at 71 tbl.4.4 (rev. 2018), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/pdf/03482016.pdf [https://perma.cc/84WZ-7U6V]. 
235 WISER ET AL., supra note 30, at 23. 
236 See infra Section III.C; infra Table 3. 
237 See Key Grids and Market Stats: Markets, ISO NEW ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/about/
key-stats/markets [https://perma.cc/KDG4-3KM7] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (showing a 
visualization estimating these proportions); see also CONSUMER LIAISON GRP. COORDINATING 
COMM. & ISO NEW ENG., 2018 REPORT OF THE CONSUMER LIAISON GROUP 34 tbl.7-1 (2019), 
https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2019/03/2018_report_of_the_consumer_liaison_
group_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM53-JHB2] (reporting the underlying data). 
238 Key Grids and Market Stats: Markets, supra note 237. 
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revenue shortfall.239 As long as FERC and grid operators feel that these units 
are necessary for reliability, they will continue to allow the capacity clearing 
price to rise. Figure 5 illustrates the increasing percentage electricity market 
payments that are due to capacity markets.240 
 
Figure 5: Percentage of Revenue from Capacity, Energy,  
and Ancillary Services Markets (ISO-NE)241 
 
Declining energy market prices have also forced some plants that used to 
receive most revenues from energy markets to become newly reliant on 
capacity market payments. In PJM, for example, seventy-nine percent of 
nuclear power plants recovered their costs from energy and ancillary services 
markets in 2013 and one hundred percent recovered their costs from those 
 
239 See id. (“[A]s energy-market revenues decrease over time, the prices in the capacity and 
ancillary markets will likely rise to cover the costs for resources that rely solely on market revenue . . . and 
are needed to balance renewable resources and provide energy security, particularly in winter.”). 
240 Id. 
241 To calculate these numbers, we took that data from ISO-NE’s internal market monitor’s 
yearly reports. We divided revenues from each market (capacity, energy, and ancillary services) by 
the sum of the revenues that came from those markets (capacity + energy + ancillary services). The 
market monitor reports also include regional network load costs. We excluded those payments 
because they cover transmission facilities and administrative costs and thus are not payments to 
generators. We also excluded net commitment period compensation revenues (NCPC). NCPC do 
not t neatly into any of the markets because they are payments to units that follow the instructions 
of the grid operator, often as a result of transmission security concerns. NCPC payments were very 
low throughout the period. Over the past decade, a larger and larger percentage of ISO-NE revenue 
has come from capacity markets. According to ISO-NE’s internal market monitor, capacity markets 
accounted for less than eleven percent of generator revenue in 2014 and now account for nearly forty 
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markets in 2014.242 By 2017, only twenty-one percent of nuclear plants 
recovered their costs from energy and ancillary services markets.243 The result 
was to increase the importance of capacity payments for nuclear power plants. 
B. Long-Term Prospects for Energy Markets 
Energy prices will continue to decline as renewable penetration increases. 
A number of states have developed ambitious clean energy targets that call 
for renewables to take on a larger share of total power generation.244 
California, for example, recently adopted a bill that calls for fty percent of 
the state’s electricity to be powered from zero-carbon sources by 2025, sixty 
percent by 2030, and one hundred percent by 2045.245 New York has set a goal 
of producing only carbon-free electricity by 2040.246 Many of these states 
have renewable portfolio standard (RPS) mandates. Moreover, many states 
in the Midwest have deployed substantial renewable capacity without RPS 
mandates or other forms of state support.247 Because these states do not 
subsidize renewables, the only explanation for this trend is that renewable 
energy sources have become cost-competitive. 
A number of studies have analyzed the causes of declining energy prices. 
A recent report published by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
 
242 2 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2017 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM: 
DETAILED ANALYSIS 330 tbl.7-30 (2018), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_
State_of_the_Market/2017/2017-som-pjm-volume2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYK7-ARXR]. 
243 Id. 
244 See Spencer Fields, 100 Percent Renewable Targets, ENERGYSAGE (May 2, 2019), 
https://news.energysage.com/states-with-100-renewable-targets [https://perma.cc/9GHX-EYB7] 
(identifying which states have 100 percent clean or renewable energy targets, either passed as statutes 
or announced in executive orders, organized by source of authority and their target compliance dates). 
245 See Camila Domonoske, California Sets Goal of 100 Percent Clean Electric Power by 2045, NPR 
(Sept. 10, 2018, 9:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646373423/california-sets-goal-of-100-
percent-renewable-electric-power-by-2045 [https://perma.cc/VL7H-9EQL] (describing the future 
impact of California’s ambitious plan of relying entirely on zero-emission resources, as the fth-
largest economy in the world). 
246 See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66-P*2 (McKinney 2019) (charging New York’s Public Service 
Commission with establishing a program to require that “by the year two thousand forty . . . the 
statewide electrical demand system will be zero emissions”); Emma Foehringer Merchant, NY 
Governor Wants Zero-Carbon Electricity by 2040, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/new-york-names-100-carbon-neutral-electricity-as-
priority [https://perma.cc/G6QG-HE42] (citing survey results that 81 percent of registered voters 
“strongly” or “somewhat” supported the plan to move to 100 percent renewable energy); see also State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/ED33-
UW4S] (providing an overview of similar efforts taken by legislatures across the United States). 
247 See GALEN BARBOSE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., U.S. 
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: 2019 ANNUAL STATUS UPDATE 16 (2019), https://eta-
publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/rps_annual_status_update-2019_edition.pdf (showing that 
renewable-energy growth “far-outpaced RPS needs” in the Midwest in the period 2000–2018). 
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found that achieving a renewable penetration level of forty percent—a 
relatively modest level of renewable penetration compared to a number of 
states’ energy goals—would likely increase the number of hours with very low 
energy prices by nearly twenty percent in some markets.248 This level of 
renewables could lead to the retirement of fourteen percent of Texas’s “rm 
capacity,” which is capacity that is guaranteed to deliver electricity even under 
adverse conditions.249 The report found that NYISO would experience a 
thirty-seven and thirty-nine percent decline in average energy prices under a 
forty-percent-renewables, or “high VRE,” scenario.250 
Another group of energy economists reached a similar result about the 
eects of renewables on price suppression and volatility.251 A study conducted 
by the National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) stated that “regions with 
enough generating units with low or zero marginal costs at a given time will 
tend toward locational marginal prices of approximately zero.”252 Based on 
this nding, NREL concluded that “[t]he prevalence of near-zero locational 
marginal prices implies that markets for multiple services in addition to the 
 
248 See SEEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 1-2, 35 (nding that low-marginal-price hours would 
increase by up to nineteen percent in ERCOT, in a modeled scenario with more than forty percent 
renewable penetration). 
249 See id. at 17 (reaching this result under the assumptions of a modeled high-wind scenario); 
see also Energy Terms: Firm Power, ENERGY ME, http://www.energy.me/energy-terms/rm-power 
[http://www.energy.me/energy-terms/rm-power] (last visited May 15, 2020) (dening rm capacity 
or “rm power”). 
250 SEEL ET AL., supra note 33, at 21-22. 
251 It is worth noting that the missing money problem is not the only reason renewables will 
exacerbate price volatility. The fact that renewables are intermittent resources—they operate only 
when the sun is shining and the wind is blowing—means that periods of abundant supply will lead 
to scarcity when the sun stops shining and the wind stops blowing. The need to compensate 
generators that can quickly increase supply during periods of scarcity exacerbates price volatility. 
Michael Milligan et al., Wholesale Electricity Market Design with Increasing Levels of Renewable 
Generation: Revenue Suciency and Long-Term Reliability, 29 ELECTRICITY J. 26, 32-33 (2016). 
Numerous economic studies support these conclusions. See AARON BLOOM ET AL., NAT’L 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TECHNICAL REPORT NREL/TP-6A20-64472, EASTERN 
RENEWABLE GENERATION INTEGRATION STUDY 155 (2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/
64472.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QQF-NJ52] (“In futures with high amounts of wind and [photovoltaic 
energy], system and plant operators will need to focus their attention on dierent times of day and 
could expect to cycle or ramp their resources more frequently. If . . . structures are not in place to 
incentivize this exibility, resources may exit the market . . . .”); DAVID J. MAGGIO, IMPACTS OF 
WIND-POWERED GENERATION RESOURCE INTEGRATION ON PRICES IN THE ERCOT NODAL 
MARKET 2-3 (2012) (presented at the 2012 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Power 
and Energy Society General Meeting), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6344611 [https://perma.cc/
KWP8-FXZA] (calculating the added cost of greater reliance on ERCOT’s ancillary services as the 
proportion of wind-powered generation resources in ERCOT’s total system energy increases and 
forecast error increases as a result); Milligan et al., supra, at 32 (“New electricity market entrants 
with very low variable costs create revenue suciency challenges for marginal units.”). 
252 NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 1 RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY FUTURES STUDY: 
EXPLORATION OF HIGH-PENETRATION ELECTRICITY FUTURES 4-11 (2012), https://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy12osti/52409-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6CU-Y285]. 
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energy market would likely be needed to reduce revenue risk and to provide 
nancial incentive to generators for producing renewable energy and 
ensuring reliability.”253 Given that most states have already intervened to 
limit volatility and reduce price spikes, and that grid operators have expressly 
stated that they expect renewables to increase the need for capacity markets, 
it stands to reason that many states will become increasingly reliant on 
capacity payments and potentially outright bailouts. 
These analyses may not predict with pinpoint accuracy how extensively 
energy prices will decline as renewables make up an increasing share of total 
electricity production. Because we expect regulators to intervene to ensure 
resource adequacy, we do not expect prices to follow these patterns 
precisely.254 The point is simply that price suppression driven by renewables 
has a dramatic eect on energy market revenues. A world with high levels of 
renewables translates into lower wholesale energy prices, which reduces 
revenues available to all generators. If regulators continue to rely on a 
payment system based around energy market prices with relatively low oer 
caps, generator revenues will become more volatile and operating prots for 
many generators will continue to decline. This threatens the investment 
incentives of all resources and creates pressure for regulators to turn to other 
sources of revenue. Unless oer caps increase signicantly, which regulators 
seem reluctant to allow, then FERC and grid operators will rely more heavily 
on capacity payments and subsidies that support critical generators. 
FERC and economists sometimes liken energy markets to some sort of 
idealized competitive process that exists free from regulatory interference,255 
but it should by now be apparent that any “threat” posed by renewables is a 
regulatory failure—not an economic failure. FERC and grid operators have 
developed a payment system in which unit commitment and economic 
dispatch depend on the marginal costs of the marginal bidder, and they have 
implemented oer caps that make it dicult for generators to recover costs 
when supply is scarce. The economic challenges posed by high volumes of 
renewables thus result from the series of regulatory and legislative 
interventions that have occurred since FERC deregulated energy markets. 
 
253 Id. 
254 As discussed in the next Part, regulators are stepping in prospectively to prevent price 
suppression and support units needed for grid reliability. 
255 See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 19, 2019) (claiming that 
certain subsidies “threaten the competitiveness of the capacity market administered by PJM 
Interconnection”); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 32 (Dec. 22, 2006) 
(“In a competitive market, all suppliers will be paid the same price.”). 
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C. Regulatory Views of the Missing Money Problem 
Perhaps the most important reason to consider alternative payment 
systems is that the regulators charged with overseeing electricity markets 
believe that renewables suppress energy market prices and increase volatility. 
For example, David Patton, whose rm Potomac Economics acts as the 
Internal Market Monitor256 for MISO, ISO-NE, NYISO, and ERCOT,257 
has described the importance of capacity payments in a high-renewables 
electric power grid: “Unless you’re willing to price shortages at 
$200,000/MWh, you’re not going to meet your planning requirements with 
the energy market alone.”258 Numerous grid operators have acknowledged 
that increasing volumes of renewables will render energy markets a less 
important source of generator revenue. Table 3 compiles quotes to this eect. 
 
Table 3: Grid Operator Statements About the Eect of  
Renewables on Wholesale Electricity Prices 
ISO / RTO Concern About Renewables 
PJM “The investments required for environmental compliance 
have resulted in higher oers in the Capacity Market, and 
when units do not clear, in the retirement of units. Federal 
and state renewable energy mandates and associated 
incentives have resulted in the construction of substantial 
amounts of renewable capacity in the PJM footprint, 
especially wind and solar powered resources. Renewable 
energy credit (REC) markets created by state programs 




256 Internal Market Monitors in wholesale electricity markets are independent organizations 
that submit periodic reports about electricity markets. See Internal Market Monitor, ISO NEW 
ENG., https://www.iso-ne.com/markets-operations/market-monitoring-mitigation/internal-
monitor [https://perma.cc/JA4Y-P8D6] (last visited May 15, 2020). 
257 See POTOMAC ECON., https://www.potomaceconomics.com [https://perma.cc/KZ8Z-
S8CY] (last visited May 15, 2020) (under heading “RTO Market Monitoring”). 
258 Heidorn, supra note 193. 
259 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, Q2 2016 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM: 
JANUARY THROUGH JUNE 281 (2016), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_
of_the_Market/2016/2016q2-som-pjm.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFF4-NHMF]; see also PJM 
INTERCONNECTION, PJM’S EVOLVING RESOURCE MIX AND SYSTEM RELIABILITY 15 (2017), 
https://www.pjm.com/~/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170330-pjms-evolving-
resource-mix-and-system-reliability.ash [https://perma.cc/44K6-5P72] (“Should the actual, 
future fuel mix evolve such that the potential exists for the quantity of generator reliability attributes 
to fall below that which is necessary to maintain reliable grid operations, then operations, market 
incentives and regulatory structures may need to shift to provide incentives to ensure adequate levels 
of these attributes are maintained.”). 
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ISO-NE “Additional renewables are expected to decrease wholesale 
electric energy prices, which will result in increased 
capacity prices to ensure resource adequacy.”260 
 
“The region should expect to see capacity prices increase 
over time as renewable resources reduce energy prices, 
making developers of new resources and owners of existing 
resources more reliant on capacity market revenues.”261 
 
“[I]nitiatives by the New England states to develop more 
renewables and clean-energy resources are posing 
challenges to competitive pricing in the markets, which 
could ultimately weaken resource adequacy—that is, the 
assurance that the region has enough resources to meet 
demand. Further, the markets don’t always show the true 
costs of inadequate fuel security.”262 
 
NYISO “The centralized grid exists as a dependable mainstay, yet 
faces unprecedented growth and evolution as large-scale 
renewables and distributed energy resources connect and 
place new demands on grid functionality.”263 
 
 
260 ISO New England, The Importance of Performance-Based Capacity Market to Ensure 
Reliability as the Grid Adapts to a Renewable Energy Future (June 3, 2015) (unpublished discussion 
paper at 1), https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/06/iso_ne_capacity_mkt_discussion_
paper_06_03_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2MC-YAJD] (describing how the shift in revenue from 
the energy to capacity market will put nancial pressure on energy market-dependent resources). 
261 ISO NEW ENG., 2018 REGIONAL ELECTRICITY OUTLOOK 18 (2018), https://www.iso-
ne.com/static-assets/documents/2018/02/2018_reo.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY8J-YX8E]. 
262 ISO New England, State of the Grid: 2018: Remarks and Slides 4 (Feb. 27, 2018), https://
www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2018/02/02272018_pr_remarks_state-of-the-grid.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PUR7-PM26] (remarks by Gordon van Welie, President and CEO of ISO New England). 
263 N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, POWER TRENDS: NEW YORK’S EVOLVING ELECTRIC 
GRID 2017, at 8 (2017), https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/2223020/2017-Power-Trends.pdf/
7baea2ba-cdca-93a6-2e45-4d948383ccbd [https://perma.cc/9AEF-YSBF]; see also id. (“Limited 
transfer capability from upstate to downstate means that this tale of two grids is also a tale of two 
markets—where the expansion of clean energy resources is unable to reach downstate load centers, 
suppressing upstate wholesale prices to the point where the economic viability of generation needed 
for reliability is jeopardized.”); id. at 37 (“Lower natural gas prices have effectively driven down 
wholesale power prices for all generators, regardless of whether they are using natural gas, coal, 
nuclear power or renewable resources to generate their electricity.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Moody’s: Fall in Natural Gas Prices May Lead to Large-Scale Plant Retirement, SNL ENERGY 
(Apr. 8, 2016))); N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INTEGRATING PUBLIC POLICY: A WHOLESALE 
MARKET ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF 50% RENEWABLE GENERATION 10 (2017), 
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/1404721/2017%20Market%20Assessment%20with%2050%20
percent%20Renewables%20Report.pdf/9780266a-f5e2-6049-f4f0-105322a2be92 [https://perma.cc/
JRZ5-83R7] (finding that “a significant entry of renewable resources will cause the NYISO to 
increase the megawatts of Installed Capacity required to meet its resource adequacy criteria”). 
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MISO “Renewables like wind and solar have low incremental 
operating costs but variable output subject to the real-time 
availability of wind and sun. Zero fuel cost and incentives 
from state and federal entities incent these resources to 
generate as much as possible at low and sometimes even 
negative prices. These low costs can impact the energy 
market revenues paid to all resources by reducing LMPs. 
Operationally, other resources ramp to adjust to changes to 
variable renewable energy production to meet net load.”264 
 
CAISO “[H]igh levels of hydroelectric and renewable generation 
add lower cost supply, depressing monthly and hourly 
average wholesale electricity prices due to their relatively 
low cost. Conversely, low levels of hydroelectric and 
renewable generation raise costs as higher-cost natural gas 
generation is necessary to meet demand.”265 
 
SPP “As more renewables are added to the system, there have been 
an increasing incidence of negative prices . . . and higher real-
time price volatility . . . . Lower on-line capacity levels may 
be a consequence as market participants and market operators 
adjust to these changes in market conditions.”266 
 
“In the SPP market where there is an abundance of 
capacity and signicant levels of renewable resources, 
negative prices can occur when renewable resources need 
to be backed down in order for traditional resources to 
meet their scheduled generation.”267 
 
 
264 MISO, RESOURCE AVAILABILITY AND NEED 22 (2018), https://cdn.misoenergy.org/
20180405%20RSC%20Item%2007%20RAN%20Issues%20Statement%20White%20Paper164746.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C2FW-JPR9]. 
265 DEP’T OF MARKET MONITORING, CAL. ISO, Q2 2018 REPORT ON MARKET ISSUES AND 
PERFORMANCE 3 (2018), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/2018SecondQuarterReportonMarket
IssuesandPerformance.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR5N-PPU3]. In comments about an RMR agreement 
in California, a fossil fuel industry group made this point as well: “These problems will continue as 
greater penetration of renewable resources diminishes resource opportunities to receive RA contracts 
and reduces resource utilization and opportunities to earn margins to cover going forward costs to 
remain operational.” Comments of the Electric Power Supply Association at 7 n.14, CXA La Paloma, 
LLC, No. EL18-177-000 (F.E.R.C. Aug. 24, 2018), https://epsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/
EPSA-Comments-La-Paloma-Complaint-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T3R-KPVU]. 
266 MARKET MONITORING UNIT, SW. POWER POOL, STATE OF THE MARKET 2017, at 69-70 
(2018), https://www.spp.org/documents/57928/spp_mmu_asom_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8RX-5Z3C]. 
267 Id. at 103. 
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What is notable about these statements is not that they show that energy 
markets will fail to adequately compensate renewables. It is that the entities that 
monitor and regulate electricity markets believe that intermittent renewables 
exacerbate the missing money problem and have determined that capacity 
payments and other administrative interventions are the appropriate solutions. 
While this Article is critical of the specic strategies grid operators have 
used to maintain resource adequacy, regulators are correct that renewables 
will suppress energy market prices and increase price volatility. To trust energy 
markets to support resource adequacy in a high-renewables world, regulators 
would have to raise offer caps significantly.268 This would further increase 
volatility and heighten the incentives and consequences of market manipulation. 
IV. RATE REGULATION REDUX 
The previous Part showed that price suppression driven by renewables 
will exacerbate the missing money problem, increase price volatility, and 
suppress energy market prices. This Part shows that regulatory responses to 
the missing money problem are recreating the ineciencies that plagued 
utility rate regulation. Specically, this Part analyzes capacity market rules, 
Minimum Oer Price Rules (MOPRs), and reliability-must-run (RMR) 
contracts. Like cost-of-service regulation,269 capacity markets and MOPRs 
lead to excess capacity and increase prices beyond what is necessary to 
maintain reliable service. RMR contracts go a step further and reimpose cost-
of-service regulation in parts of the grid that claim to have restructured. All 
of these regulatory interventions favor fossil fuel generators and counteract 
state clean energy policies. 
A. Mandatory Capacity Markets 
While mandatory capacity markets might appear to be a sensible response 
to the missing money problem, in reality they favor incumbents, lead to 
overcapacity, and raise electricity prices for consumers. PJM, for example, set 
a reserve target of 16.1 percent for summer 2018, but operated with a 32.8 
percent reserve margin.270 That is more than twice as much capacity as the 
 
268 See Jenny Riesz, Joel Gilmore & Iain MacGill, Assessing the Viability of Energy-Only Markets 
with 100% Renewables: An Australian National Electricity Market Case Study, ECON. ENERGY & 
ENVTL. POL’Y, Mar. 2016, at 105, 121 tbl.1, 122 (estimating that the market oer cap in the Australian 
National Electricity Market would have to increase to $60,000-80,000 per megawatt-hour to provide 
sucient aggregate revenues to cover costs in a system relying on 100% renewable energy sources). 
269 See supra Section I.A. 
270 Stephanie Tsao & Richard Martin, Overpowered: PJM Market Rules Drive an Era of 
Oversupply, S&P GLOBAL: MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/
marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/54111666 [https://perma.cc/9U6B-
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grid operator claims is needed for reliability.271 PJM has in this way ensured 
that generators with 11,000 megawatts of unnecessary capacity will remain in 
the market for at least three additional years.272 As one advocate explained, 
“[t]hat is roughly equivalent to an extra twenty-two coal or gas power plants 
(at 500 megawatts each) or eleven extra nuclear power plants (at 1,000 
megawatts each).273 ISO-New England’s capacity markets are similarly 
bloated.274 Altogether, redundant capacity is costing consumers in ISO-NE, 
NYISO, and PJM over a billion dollars a year.275 
Regulators could reduce some of the issues plaguing capacity markets by 
improving market design. Other challenges, however, are foundational. That 
is why capacity markets are a second-best option that should be rejected in 
favor of scarcity pricing or less intrusive resource adequacy requirements. This 
Section first critiques specific capacity market rules. It then discusses the 
fundamental features of capacity markets that would render them problematic 
even if FERC eliminated the rules that discriminate against renewables. 
1. Discriminatory Capacity Market Rules 
A core problem with capacity markets is that regulators—rather than 
market participants—determine the value attached to resources. Grid 
operators identify resources that provide essential services and introduce 
regulatory barriers that prevent other resources from increasing their own 
revenues, even when they are able to provide the services needed to support 
reliability. In doing so, regulators shield incumbents from competitive forces. 
 
TM6W]. That number is expected to balloon to forty-ve percent by 2021. See id.; see also PJM, 
2020/2021 RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION RESULTS 1 (2018), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/
markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/2020-2021-base-residual-auction-report.ashx [https://perma.cc/
3S7H-JA7E] (summarizing the results of PJM’s 2017 auction). The reason PJM’s auction for 2017 
secured capacity for 2020/2021 is that the grid operator runs capacity auctions three years in advance. 
See PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 18 (“The Base Residual Auction 
is held during the month of May three (3) years prior to the start of the Delivery Year.”), 
271 See PJM, supra note 270, at 1 (stating that the target reserve margin for the same period 
was 16.6%). 
272 See id. (stating that at 165,109.2 megawatts produced, PJM’s RPM cleared its target reserve 
level by 6.7%, or the equivalent of about 11,000 megawatts). 
273 Jennifer Chen, Got Clean Energy? Not So Much from PJM’s Latest Auction, NAT. RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL (May 23, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/jennifer-chen/got-clean-energy-not-much-
pjms-latest-auction [https://perma.cc/MRN9-EJ7E]. 
274 See ISO New-England, 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, slip op. at 38 (Mar. 9, 2018) (describing the 
risk of price suppression in the context of an environment with overcapacity). 
275 See ROB GRAMLICH & MICHAEL GOGGIN, SUSTAINABLE FERC PROJECT, TOO MUCH 
OF THE WRONG THING: THE NEED FOR CAPACITY MARKET REPLACEMENT OR REFORM  
6-7 (2019), https://gridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2019/11/too-much-of-the-wrong-thing-the-
need-for-capacity-market-replacement-or-reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV6C-74CM] (“PSO, 
ISO-NE, and NYISO have large excess reserve margins . . . . A rough estimate of the cost of this 
excess capacity is around $1.4 billion per year across the three markets . . . .”). 
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These rules tend to be justied as necessary for reliability but are often 
overbroad or unrelated to the Commission’s goals. 
a. Performance Duration Requirements 
Performance duration requirements have put energy storage resources, 
such as batteries, at an economic disadvantage in many capacity markets.276 
These requirements might be justied if they were related to a legitimate 
regulatory goal, though we would prefer that utilities that have an incentive 
to keep costs down—not administrative bodies—determine the value of these 
resources. Duration requirements are usually justied as necessary to ensure 
that capacity units are available during peak demand.277 The problem with 
overly long duration requirements is that peak demand usually lasts only 
three or four hours, yet some regions stipulate that batteries cannot 
participate fully in capacity markets unless they can store electricity for ten 
hours.278 Yet batteries that can store electricity for four hours provide 
signicant capacity benets and reduce peak load.279 They should therefore 
be compensated for providing capacity. 
 
276 See Je St. John, Taking Aim at PJM’s 10-Hour Duration Capacity Rule for Energy Storage, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (July 22, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/taking-aim-at-
pjms-10-hour-duration-capacity-rule-for-energy-storage [https://perma.cc/7EN5-9L9X] (critiquing 
PJM’s ten-hour performance duration requirement for batteries operating in its capacity market). 
277 See, e.g., ROB GRAMLICH, MICHAEL GOGGIN & JASON BURWEN, ENABLING 
VERSATILITY: ALLOWING HYBRID RESOURCES TO DELIVER THEIR FULL VALUE TO 
CUSTOMERS 22 (2019), https://gridprogress.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/enabling-versatility-
allowing-hybrid-resources-to-deliver-their-full-value-to-customers.pdf [https://perma.cc/FCA8-
S69K] (“The need for duration is a function of how long peak conditions last.”); St. John, supra note 
276 (describing advocates’ argument against PJM’s ten-hour duration requirement, which relies on 
the fact that demand peaks “can presently be met by ecient dispatch of shorter-duration storage, 
given the current mix of supply resources”). 
278 See, e.g., St. John, supra note 276 (describing PJM’s ten-hour requirement); see also SYS. 
PLANNING DEP’T, PJM, PJM MANUAL 21: RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINATION  
OF GENERATING CAPABILITY 24-25 (14th rev., effective Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.pjm.com/~/
media/documents/manuals/m21.ashx [https://perma.cc/P5EK-2XCL] (“All or any part of a unit’s 
capability that can be sustained for a number of hours of continuous operation commensurate with 
PJM load requirements, specied as 10 hours, shall be considered as unlimited energy capability.”). 
279 See KEVIN CARDEN ET AL., ASTRAPÉ CONSULTING, CAPACITY VALUE OF ENERGY 
STORAGE IN PJM 2 (2019), https://www.astrape.com/astrape-capacity-value-of-energy-storage-in-
pjm [https://perma.cc/QGZ4-XB94] (“The results of our analysis demonstrate that with energy 
storage deployments up to 4,000 MW, 4 hours of duration allows those resources to provide full 
capacity value . . . . With energy storage deployments up to 8,000 MW, 6 hours of duration allows 
those resources to provide full capacity value . . . .”). 
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b. Seasonal Commitment Periods 
A similar problem is that in many markets, resources are eligible for 
capacity payments only if they can perform year-round.280 Wind and solar 
produce more electricity at certain times of day and at certain times of the 
year.281 To reect the fact that they are less reliable than other generators, 
grid operators reduce the capacity factor of these “Intermittent Resources” to 
reect the average capacity they provide over the course of the entire year.282 
As with performance duration requirements, administrators justify these 
regulations on the ground that they serve a legitimate goal—in this case, 
ensuring that capacity is available when needed. 
Grid operators could provide the same level of reliability at lower cost by 
bifurcating capacity markets into summer and winter periods and developing 
separate performance requirements based on season.283 Peak demand tends 
to be higher in the summer, which also happens to be when solar arrays are 
able to operate at higher capacity.284 A seasonal commitment period would 
allow expensive resources such as coal-red power plants to reduce their own 
costs by taking seasonal outages when demand for electricity declines.285 
Generators that are needed at only certain times of the year would be able to 
mothball—to deactivate for a period of time—and turn on when they are 
needed.286 Seasonal commitment periods could provide the same level of 
reliability as year-round commitment periods while lowering costs and 
eliminating unnecessary capacity.287  
 
280 See PJM MANUAL 18: PJM CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 18 (discussing planned 
commitments in the unit of “Delivery Year[s]” and requiring “a constant load obligation” during 
that period). 
281 See id. at 115 (noting seasonal variation in the generation capacity of renewable resources 
such as wind, solar, landll gas, and hydroelectric power). 
282 See, e.g., id. at 115-16 (describing PJM’s test for calculating the expected output of 
“Intermittent Resources . . . such as wind, solar, . . . and other renewable resources” by measuring 
how many megawatts these resources produce during dened periods in the summer and winter). 
283 See, e.g., id. 
284 See Robert Walton, Solar, Eciency Drive Declining Peak Load in ISO New England, UTIL. 
DIVE (May 9, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/solar-eciency-drive-declining-peak-load-
in-iso-new-england/523209 [https://perma.cc/5WFC-FJPY] (explaining that the use of solar energy 
will help to slow the annual increase in demand for energy during the summer). 
285 See SAM NEWELL ET AL., BRATTLE GRP., OPPORTUNITIES TO MORE EFFICIENTLY 
MEET SEASONAL CAPACITY NEEDS IN PJM 11-12 (2018), http://files.brattle.com/files/13723_
opportunities_to_more_eciently_meet_seasonal_capacity_needs_in_pjm.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M4P5-HUKQ] (describing how a seasonal approach that, for example, would give higher capacity 
ratings to wind energy in the winter and solar energy in the summer, would enable producers to 
better match demand). 
286 See id. at 12 n.22 (proposing giving “[a]nnual resources . . . the option to oer at a dierent 
price to clear based on a 6-month summer-only or winter-only capacity obligation,” which “would 
allow for a seasonal export or mothballing arrangement”). 
287 Id. at 8-16. 
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According to one advocacy group, the failure to “address variations in 
seasonal peak loads . . . creates an ineciency—the market sends signals for 
investment in year-round capacity even though the existing year-round 
capacity combined with seasonal resources might be able to meet the demand 
at all times during the year.”288 In PJM, a seasonal capacity market could 
create an estimated $100 to $600 million per year in societal benets.289 
c. Discounting Renewables 
Another problem with capacity market rules is that wind and solar 
generators receive lower capacity ratings than conventional generators. 
Again, the rationale for these rules, that intermittent resources are less 
reliable than other resources, is a sensible response to a genuine reliability 
concern. Grid operators, however, rely on crude and unsophisticated 
valuation techniques that excessively discount renewables. A PJM renewable 
integration study showed that methods for calculating capacity used in 
dierent grid operators resulted in dramatically dierent capacity factors for 
the same resources.290 PJM, for example, proposed in 2018 to reduce wind’s 
capacity value from thirteen percent to around eight percent of “nameplate 
capacity” based on its calculation of median output during critical hours.291 
More sophisticated analyses calculate a generator’s capacity factor by 
establishing the probability that an individual resource will be available when 
it is actually needed.292 Using this method, PJM found that it could 
substantially increase the capacity factor of wind and solar.293 
Not only do the rules described in this Section undercompensate clean 
energy and storage resources for services that they provide to the grid, but 
they also lead to excess capacity and high prices. Some clean energy and 
storage resources will enter the market despite being excluded from capacity 
 
288 SYLWIA BIALEK & BURCIN UNEL, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY & ELEC. POLICY 
INSIGHTS, CAPACITY MARKETS AND EXTERNALITIES: AVOIDING UNNECESSARY AND 
PROBLEMATIC REFORMS 20 (2018), https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Capacity_
Markets_and_Externalities_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRQ6-5LUP]. 
289 NEWELL ET AL., supra note 285, at 15. 
290 EXETER ASSOCS., INC. & GE ENERGY, PJM RENEWABLE INTEGRATION STUDY, TASK 
REPORT: REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE INTEGRATION OF WIND 
AND SOLAR GENERATION 120-34 (2012), https://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/
subcommittees/irs/postings/pris-task3b-best-practices-from-other-markets-final-report.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/C9FE-NJ6N] (surveying how dierent RTOs and utilities’ methodologies for 
calculating capacity result in dierent capacity factors). 
291 See MICHAEL GOGGIN ET AL., GRID STRATEGIES LLC, CUSTOMER FOCUSED AND 
CLEAN: POWER MARKETS FOR THE FUTURE 27 (2018), https://windsolaralliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/WSA_Market_Reform_report_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3T3-PKC3]. 
292 See id. at 27-28 (describing the use of such studies by PJM and MISO, which resulted in 
wind capacity values of 15-20% and solar capacity values of 55-65%). 
293 Id. 
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markets.294 The owners of these resources may conclude that they can cover 
their costs entirely through long-term bilateral contracts, that they can 
recover costs from energy markets, or that state subsidies make up for 
unfavorable capacity market policies. Because such resources provide 
electricity during peak demand, they support resource adequacy.295 However, 
the capacity markets additionally incentivize non-clean energy or storage 
resources to provide the same resource adequacy. In this way, mandatory 
capacity markets forces the procurement of redundant resources beyond the 
level necessary for a reliable supply of electricity. The added cost for this waste 
falls on consumers.296 
The rules described above are not a comprehensive list of capacity market 
rules that make it dicult for new resources to compete with incumbents, 
and other parts of electricity markets also exhibit a bias against renewables.297 
They do, however, show that capacity markets rely on administrative 
decisions to determine the value of resources. FERC and the grid operators 
identify a critical characteristic but, rather than support a market that would 
compensate any generator that could provide that service, they ensure that 
such generators receive revenues sucient to recover their costs regardless of 
whether or not they are actually needed. Like cost-of-service regulation, these 
rules shield incumbent generators from competition and retain resources 
even when cheaper alternatives are available to take their place. 
 
294 See Christina Simeone, Understanding the Challenges of Integrating Seasonal Resources into 
PJM’s Wholesale Capacity Market, KLEINMAN CTR. FOR ENERGY POL’Y (June 20, 2016), https://
kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/policy-digests/understanding-challenges-integrating-seasonal-resources-
pjm%E2%80%99s-wholesale-capacity [https://perma.cc/E7TV-GSGZ] (explaining that in the 2018/2019 
and 2019/2020 Base Result Auctions, only 80% of total market resources are eligible under the PJM 
Capacity Performance Requirement, which determines which resources qualify for capacity payments). 
295 See id. (“It is expected that the [Capacity Payment Requirement “pay-for-performance” 
model] will incent generators to secure fuel supplies, add dual-fuel capabilities, help protect 
operations in extreme weather events, and will largely provide economic benets to resources that 
are available year round.”). 
296 See Iulia Gheorghiu, PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE Pay $1.4B Annually for Excess Capacity, UTIL. 
DIVE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-nyiso-and-iso-ne-pay-14b-annually-
for-excess-capacity-report/567798 [https://perma.cc/Z723-H4TW] (“MOPR costs for consumers 
across PJM, New York and New England are projected to add up to $45 billion over the next 
decade.”); see also Todd S. Aagaard & Andrew N. Kleit, The Complexity Dilemma in Policy Market 
Design, 30 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 57 (2019) (arguing “that FERC has become lost in its 
complexity, apparently unable to see how the details of its [capacity] market design have 
undermined some of the core premises of its market”). 
297 See, e.g., Joshua C. Macey, Zombie Energy Laws, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1079-80 (2020); 
Jacob Mays et al., Asymmetric Risk and Fuel Neutrality in Capacity Markets 15-24 (U.S. Ass’n for 
Energy Econ., Working Paper No. 19-385, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3330932 [https://perma.cc/M3HW-B5K4] (showing that capacity markets favor natural gas); 
Jerey Tomich, Battle Reignites Over $2.5B Midwest Transmission Line, E&E NEWS (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061847775 [https://perma.cc/9WDE-CKX8] (describing disputes 
about siting authority that impeded wind development). 
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2. Structural Challenges with Capacity Markets 
On a more fundamental level, capacity markets are problematic because 
they overcompensate outdated resources and do not actually procure the 
resources needed to meet demand. FERC seems to treat capacity markets as 
a stand-in for reliability. There are two problems with this approach. First, 
because capacity is only one of a number of qualities needed to support a 
reliable power grid, the failure of capacity markets to actually compensate 
resources needed for reliability leads to additional interventions, which are 
described in Sections IV.B and IV.C. Second, capacity markets protect 
incumbents by requiring uneconomic incumbent generators to continue to 
operate even when less expensive units become available. Capacity markets 
thus procure generation with the wrong attributes (they do not reward 
exible generators, for example298), likely procure the incorrect amount of 
resources, and rely on questionable eligibility requirements to determine 
which resources are allowed to participate. 
a. Capacity Is Not Reliability 
Capacity markets often predict demand three years in advance and retain 
enough supply to meet that demand,299 yet they fail to suciently distinguish 
between dierent types of capacity.300 Grid reliability can be threatened for 
many reasons. Sudden spikes in demand require generators to increase supply 
quickly.301 Generators located in certain areas may be especially valuable 
because they reduce congestion on transmission lines.302 Not all supply 
procured in capacity markets will provide these services, and capacity markets 
 
298 Jacob Mays has critiqued capacity payments for undercompensating exible generators and 
overcompensating generators that do not oer exible services. Jacob Mays, Missing Incentives for 
Flexibility in Wholesale Electricity Markets 7-9 (U.S. Ass’n for Energy Econ. Working Paper No. 20-453, 
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3623962 [https://perma.cc/62WN-Y7WB]. 
299 See, e.g., Capacity Market (RPM), supra note 208 (stating that by conducting procurement 
years in advance, PJM ensures “long-term grid reliability”). 
300 See id. (defining capacity generally as “a commitment of resources to deliver when needed”). 
301 See, e.g., Joshua Rhodes, Texas Electric Grid Sets New System-Wide All-Time Peak Demand 
Record, Twice, FORBES (Jul. 19, 2018, 1:37 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuarhodes/2018/07/
19/texas-electric-grid-sets-new-system-wide-all-time-peak-demand-record-twice/#7e7d06b31521 
[https://perma.cc/4WD6-2TQ6] (documenting an incident in which the electric grid in Texas set 
two hourly peak demand records back-to-back on a single day in July 2018, creating a demand for 
over 72,000 megawatts of electricity for the rst time). 
302 PJM does separate its capacity market into subregions and generators that provide capacity 
in resource-constrained areas receive greater capacity payments. See PJM MANUAL 18: PJM 
CAPACITY MARKET, supra note 204, at 23-26. Still, because these payments are administratively 
determined and remain stable over a three-year period, generators that received a premium for 
reducing congestion will be compensated for doing so even after they stop providing that service. 
See id. at 110 (“The Base Residual Auction is held during the month of May three (3) years prior to 
the start of the Delivery Year.”). 
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will therefore overcompensate inexible units because they provide the same 
level of compensation to inexible generators as to exible ones.303 
By contrast, when energy markets provide a large percentage of revenue, 
prices increase to reward needed services.304 A generator that can quickly 
supply more electricity to meet a spike in demand or reduce transmission 
congestion will collect revenues from energy markets for providing those 
services.305 However, when generators are retained years in advance in 
capacity auctions, they receive compensation for providing a single service 
that is necessary but not sucient to support a reliable grid. As energy 
markets provide a smaller share of total revenue, their ability to reward 
exible units diminishes. When critical generators retire, regulators intervene 
in the ways described in Sections IV.B and IV.C. 
b. Uneconomic Incumbent Generators 
A related concern is that mandatory capacity markets delay the retirement 
of uneconomic generation. By procuring generation years in advance and 
imposing barriers to exit for generators that clear capacity auctions, mandatory 
capacity auctions lead to excess capacity and high prices.306 That is in part 
because resources may enter the market—and provide capacity—even when 
they did not clear the capacity auction. Since the resources that did clear the 
capacity auction have committed to operating in that period, and since the 
capacity auction did not account for the resources that did not clear the capacity 
auction, mandatory capacity markets will tend to procure excess capacity. 
In recent years, the price of natural gas and renewables has declined 
signicantly.307 However, because generators commit to operate three years 
 
303 See GRAMLICH & GOGGIN, supra note 275, at 11-12 (“[T]he crude denition of capacity 
does not distinguish between exible and inexible resources, and many fossil and nuclear resources 
that receive large capacity payments provide little to no exibility.”). 
304 See GOGGIN ET AL., supra note 291, at 12 (explaining that while energy sales currently 
produce the most revenue in wholesale electricity markets, increased use of renewables will have an 
overall eect of reducing energy prices). 
305 See id. (“Frequency regulation and reactive power are among the most valuable 
reliability services.”). 
306 See PJM Capacity Prices Nearly Double in Most Territories, ENERGYWATCH (June 12, 2018), 
https://energywatch-inc.com/pjm-capacity-prices-nearly-double [https://perma.cc/AZT5-CDAG] 
(identifying the reception of fewer bids from newer resources as one reason for higher capacity 
prices in the PJM region). 
307 See LAZARD, supra note 226, at 7 (showing that the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for 
solar photovoltaic energy fell from $359 per megawatt-hour in 2009 to $40 per megawatt-hour in 
2019, that the LCOE for wind fell from $135 per megawatt-hour in 2009 to $41 per megawatt-hour 
in 2019, and the LCOE of combined cycle gas fell from $83 per megawatt-hour in 2009 to $56 per 
megawatt-hour in 2019). 
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in the future,308 ratepayers were stuck paying for uneconomic capacity.309 For 
example, natural resources have entered markets that have too much capacity, 
and they have done so at rates that exceed the rate at which generators have 
left the market.310 The fact that markets that rely on capacity markets 
continue to procure additional electricity even when there is no need to do so 
suggests a market failure. Nonetheless, generators that cleared capacity 
markets agreed to operate until their capacity commitment ended, despite the 
fact that bloated reserve margins indicates that they were no longer needed 
to support regional capacity goals.311 
This dynamic resembles traditional cost-of-service regulation. In both 
systems, regulators identify the generators that are needed to meet future 
demand and guarantee those generators revenues sufficient to cover their costs. 
In exchange, the generators agree to provide service for a certain period of time. 
Like cost-of-service regulation, the regulatory interventions shield incumbent 
generators from competition, lead to excess capacity, and increase prices. 
B. From Capacity Markets to Fossil Fuel Protectionism 
As the previous Section showed, mandatory capacity markets fail to 
actually procure exible resources needed for reliability. Regulators have 
responded by intervening to maintain resource adequacy, but with the eect 
of ineciently and unnecessarily protecting fossil fuel generators. 
Specically, in 2018, two grid operators—ISO-NE and PJM—took aggressive 
steps to further bolster fossil fuel generators. In both cases, FERC felt that 
an administrative intervention was necessary to protect “investor condence” 
or the “market’s integrity.”312 It is not clear that these regulatory interventions 
are even necessary. If these interventions are pretextual and not necessary to 
maintain reliability, they reveal a willingness to expand administrative pricing 
and shift further away from competitive markets to paper over capacity 
 
308 See GOGGIN ET AL., supra note 291, at 27 (stating that procurement three years in advance 
can fail to map onto actual demand). 
309 This phenomenon of mismatch between procurement and demand levels has been 
particularly acute in the PJM market. Id. 
310 See GRAMLICH & GOGGIN, supra note 275, at 7-10. 
311 See id. at 6-7. 
312 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 65 (June 29, 2018) (justifying its holding 
that PJM’s existing tari was unduly discriminatory by stating that the PJM plan risked the creation 
of price distortions which “compromise the capacity market’s integrity”); ISO New England, Inc., 
162 FERC ¶ 61,205, slip op. at 9 (Mar. 9, 2018) (“Ultimately, the purpose of basing capacity market 
constructs on these principles is to produce a level of investor condence that is sucient to ensure 
resource adequacy at just and reasonable rates.”). But see Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (Glick, 
Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 4 n.6 (criticizing FERC for focusing on “investor condence” as the 
critical issue in its earlier order on ISO-NE’s proposal and then shifting, without explanation or 
serious mention of “investor condence,” to a new market “integrity” standard in its order on PJM). 
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market aws. And to the extent that they respond to any revenue adequacy 
problem, they do so only because FERC and grid operators fear that existing 
market designs cannot accommodate state subsidies without jeopardizing the 
nancial stability of resources actually needed for a reliable power grid. 
As this Section shows, concern that capacity markets do not actually 
secure reliability has driven FERC and grid operators to make it dicult for 
renewable resources to access capacity markets. FERC has argued that it is 
necessary to impose barriers to entry that limit renewables’ ability to 
participate in capacity markets in order to correct the distortions caused by 
state renewable subsidies.313 The Commission seems to be concerned that 
state subsidies undermine the Commission’s idealized view of capacity 
markets,314 though as the previous Section showed, capacity markets 
themselves are rife with administrative decisions about the relative value of 
dierent resources. It is dicult to understand how state subsidies create 
“nancial stresses” and “compromise the ultimate goal of the capacity market 
to provide investor condence to attract new entry and assure resource 
adequacy”315 in a manner that is dierent from capacity market pricing 
decisions that themselves determine winners and losers. 
The implication is that FERC, ISO-NE, and PJM do not trust capacity 
markets to procure the services needed for reliability. If capacity markets fail 
to procure resources that can ease congestion in transmission lines or that 
provide needed exibility services, those failures will become more 
pronounced as renewables provide a greater share of electricity—and they 
 
313 See Cullenward & Welton, supra note 115, at 108 n.6 (noting that the Second and Seventh 
Circuits have accepted FERC’S position that the Commission can “impose punitive wholesale 
electricity market designs”). These views are supported by FERC’s assertion that capacity markets 
“have become untenably threatened by out-of-market payments provided or required by certain 
states for the purpose of supporting the entry or continued operation of preferred generation 
resources that may not otherwise be able to succeed in a competitive wholesale capacity market.” See 
Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 3. 
314 PJM has stated: 
As a consequence of steadily declining energy prices, certain coal and nuclear units in 
PJM have become economically challenged . . . . Many state policymakers have, 
therefore, either acted or are considering the possibility of acting to provide subsidies 
to nuclear and coal resources to ensure they remain in operation. If not mitigated, 
PJM shares the view of the [Independent Market Monitor] in the 2017 State of the 
Market Report that subsidies are contagious and could spread. In eect, subsidies tend 
to suppress market prices and broaden the nancial stresses that triggered subsidies 
in the rst place. If subsidies do become more widespread, they could compromise the 
ultimate goal of the capacity market to provide investor condence to attract new 
entry and assure resource adequacy. 
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will do so regardless of whether renewables benet from state subsidies. The 
MOPRs described in this Section and the RMR agreements described in the 
next Section can thus be partly understood as poorly designed interventions 
to raise revenues for specic resources deemed critical to the grid. A superior 
solution would rely on competitive procurement mechanisms—not economic 
protectionism—to retain critical services. 
1. ISO-NE 
In early 2018, ISO-NE proposed, and FERC approved, a two-stage 
capacity auction designed to ensure resource adequacy.316 In the rst stage, 
state-supported renewables317 must submit bids at an administratively 
determined price.318 This is the “minimum oer price” known as the 
MOPR.319 Even if renewables could operate protably if they submitted 
lower bids, the MOPR prohibits state-supported renewable resources from 
making low bids that would suppress capacity market prices. The MOPR will 
likely prevent state-sponsored resources from clearing the rst stage of ISO-
NE’s capacity auction.320 
Resources that clear the rst stage of the capacity auction can declare that 
they would be willing to retire if compensated for doing so.321 At that point, 
renewables can purchase these resources’ capacity commitments. To do so, 
they must be willing to buy out the generators that are willing to retire.322 
This requirement forces renewables that would have been willing to provide 
low-cost electricity to buy out outdated fossil fuel generators. This, in turn, 
discourages the entry of renewables and subsidizes incumbents. If a fossil fuel 
generator is able to provide capacity at the same rate as the renewable, the 
fossil fuel generator will clear the auction because it is able to enter during 
the rst stage. 
This market design also makes it easier for new fossil fuel generators to 
enter the market than renewables. Under ISO-NE’s new capacity market 
rules, generators can be pushed out of the market in one of two ways. First, 
a renewable generator can purchase capacity from an older generator in the 
 
316 ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, slip op. at 2. 
317 ISO-NE’s tari says that a “Sponsored Policy Resource” is any zero-carbon resource that 
receives “an out-of-market revenue source.” Id. at 3 n.6 (quoting ISO New England’s proposed 
Tariff § I.2.2). 
318 Id. at 2-3. 
319 Id. 
320 Partial Protest and Comments of the Massachusetts Attorney General at 2, ISO New 
England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (No. ER18-619-000) (“The practical eect of [the rule] is 
that sponsored policy resources have a strong likelihood of not clearing in the FCM . . . .”). 
321 Transmittal Letter at 5-6, ISO New England, Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (No. ER18-
619-000) [hereinafter “ISO-NE Transmittal Letter”]. 
322 See Cullenward & Welton, supra note 115, at 114 (explaining this mechanism). 
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second stage of the auction at a price named by the retiring generator. 
Alternatively, a generator not subject to the MOPR—in other words, a fossil 
fuel or nuclear generator—can submit a bid in the rst stage of the capacity 
auction. If that bid clears, the new fossil fuel generator eliminates the need 
for the old coal-red power plant, which means that the old generator does 
not clear the auction and will retire. In that case, there may be no opportunity 
for renewables to receive revenues from capacity markets because the new 
generator may refuse to participate in the second stage of the auction. Thus, 
not only does the MOPR provide a handout to inecient fossil fuel 
generators, but it also distorts markets, discourages the entry of renewables, 
and redistributes revenue from renewables to fossil fuel generators. 
ISO-NE’s MOPR also leads to excess capacity. Renewables may 
ultimately enter the market even if they cannot participate in capacity 
auctions. They may do so because they feel that they will recover their costs 
from energy markets, or because they have secured long-term bilateral 
contracts that provide them with sufficient revenues despite the fact that 
they will not be compensated for providing capacity. In such cases, ISO-NE 
will procure surfeit supply because it does not factor the renewables that did 
not participate in capacity auctions into its load projections.323 Of course, 
doing so further increases rates as consumers are forced to pay for resources 
they do not need.324 
2. PJM 
PJM has also tried to reform capacity markets to prevent renewables from 
suppressing generator revenues. PJM stakeholders failed to agree on a 
capacity market structure.325 As a result, PJM led two alternative proposals 
with FERC in April 2018.326 
Under PJM’s preferred option, “Capacity Repricing,” the market operator 
would have run the market one time with “subsidized resource[s]” included 
at their self-determined bid price, to gure out which resources receive 
 
323  See GRAMLICH & GOGGIN, supra note 275, at 10 (“MOPR . . . causes consumers to pay 
for redundant capacity—customers rst pay for the construction of resources through state policy, 
but when that is unable to clear the capacity market due to the MOPR, customers are forced to buy 
an equivalent amount of capacity that does clear in the capacity market.”). 
324  Id. 
325 See Capacity Repricing or in the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal: Tari Revisions to 
Address Impacts of State Public Policies on the PJM Capacity Market at 17, PJM Interconnection, 
L.L.C., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2019) (No. ER18-1314-000) (reporting that stakeholders were divided 
between two alternatives, resulting in neither alternative receiving the two-thirds vote the measure 
it required for endorsement). 
326  See id. at 17-18 & n.40; see also id. at 5-6 (providing an overview of the two alternatives and 
the process by which PJM submitted them for FERC review). 
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capacity obligations.327 PJM would then run the auction a second time but 
would exclude all resources that did not clear the rst time. Any resource that 
received a state subsidy would be “repriced to a competitive level” in the 
second auction.328 This approach would increase prices but would arguably 
undo the price suppression caused by state subsidies. Every generator that 
cleared the rst auction would be paid the higher clearing rate that resulted 
from the second auction.329 
Alternatively, PJM proposed extending its “minimum oer price rule 
extension” (“MOPR-Ex”)—which had previously required some resources to 
submit mandated minimum bids—to state-supported resources, but also 
providing an exception to resources needed specically to meet state 
renewable portfolio standards.330 Under this proposal, covered renewables 
would clear the capacity market only if they were cost-competitive with other 
resource types after factoring out any state support.331 
FERC rejected both of PJM’s proposals and, after a year-long delay, 
ordered PJM to expand its MOPR, eectively setting an administrative price 
on all resources that receive state subsidies.332 When it rejected PJM’s 
proposal, the Commission determined that the “Capacity Repricing” option 
overcompensated renewables because it would allow them to “receive the same 
clearing price as competitive resources” even though those resources “would 
then further benefit from the higher price set in stage two of the auction.”333 
This proposal, the Commission explained, would “increase prices for load, 
and then pay this higher price as a windfall to the very same resources that 
initially caused the price suppression PJM is attempting to correct.”334 
FERC found that the MOPR-Ex proposal would also lead to unjust and 
unreasonable rates.335 Fatal to the MOPR-Ex was that it permitted “disparate 
treatment between resources receiving out-of-market support through RPS 
programs and other state-supported resources.”336 
 
327  Id. at 42. 
328  Id. at 42-43. 
329  Id. at 42-43, 51. 
330  Id. at 43; see also id. at 15 (describing both of PJM’s proposals as creating certain “non-
actionable” subsidies). 
331 See id. at 43. 
332 Jeff St. John, FERC Orders PJM to Restrict State-Backed Renewables in Its Capacity Market, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ferc-
orders-pjm-to-restrict-state-backed-renewables-in-capacity-market [https://perma.cc/GMY7-
VUZT]. 
333 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 30 (June 29, 2018). 
334 Id. 
335 See id. at 47 (“PJM has not met its section 205 burden to show that MOPR-Ex is just and 
reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.”). 
336 Id. 
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The Commission ultimately determined that “out-of-market payments 
provided . . . by states . . . threaten the competitiveness of the capacity market 
administered by PJM.”337 FERC therefore directed PJM to “extend[] the 
MOPR to include both new and existing resources, internal and external, that 
receive, or are entitled to receive, certain out-of-market payments.”338 Such 
an expansive MOPR, the Commission reasoned, is necessary “to mitigate the 
impact of State Subsidies on the capacity market.”339 FERC’s denition of 
“[s]tate [s]ubsidy,” its term for the subsidies subject to the MOPR, could 
encompass most resources that participate in PJM auctions. Commissioner 
Glick wrote that the “sweeping denition of subsidy” is so broad that it “will 
potentially subject much, if not most, of the PJM capacity market to a 
minimum oer price rule.”340 FERC’s concern about price suppression 
caused by state subsidies thus induced the Commission to impose a system 
of administrative pricing on a market that is already subject to strict 
regulatory oversight.341 
According to analysts, the purpose of capacity markets is to procure 
sucient supply at low cost.342 The Commission’s Order is ostensibly based 
on concern that state subsidies “threaten the competitiveness of the capacity 
market administered by PJM,” and so it ordered PJM to replace a market that 
was already subject to a high degree of regulatory control with a system in 
which administrators armatively select which resources clear capacity 
auctions (and thus which resources enter and exit the market).343 
 
337 Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 2 (Dec. 19, 2019). 
338 Id. at 3. 
339 Id. at 66. 
340 Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 1. The full 
denition of “material subsidy” seems to cover any resource that receives any sort of state support: 
PJM proposes to dene a “Material Subsidy” to include: “(1) material payments, 
concessions, rebates, or subsidies as a result of any state-governmental action 
connected to the procurement of electricity or other attribute from an existing 
Capacity Resource, or the construction, development, or operation, (including but not 
limited to support that has the eect of allowing the unit to clear in any [PJM capacity 
auction]) of a Capacity Resource, or (2) other material support or payments obtained 
in any state-sponsored or state-mandated processes, connected to the procurement of 
electricity or other attribute from an existing Capacity Resource, or the construction, 
development, or operation, (including but not limited to support that has the eect of 
allowing the unit to clear in any [PJM capacity auction]), of the Capacity Resource.” 
Id. at 28-29 (quoting Initial Submission of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at 19-20). 
341 Id. at 32-33; see also supra Section IV.B (discussing capacity markets). 
342 See 1 MONITORING ANALYTICS, LLC, 2018 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR PJM: 
INTRODUCTION 1 (2019), https://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/
2018/2018-som-pjm-volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3CM-NZ9W]. 
343 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 4 (“We arm our initial nding that ‘[a]n 
expanded MOPR with few or no exceptions, should protect PJM’s capacity market from the price-
suppressive eects of resources receiving out-of-market support by ensuring that such resources are 
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If grid operators were allowed to incorporate renewables into capacity 
auctions, they would procure the correct amount of supply at lower cost than 
they do now. There is no reason that capacity markets are unable to 
accommodate state subsidies. If state subsidized resources participated in 
capacity markets and suppressed prices, they might drive some incumbent 
suppliers out of the market. In the event that the participation of these 
subsidized resources led to an inadequate supply of resources, capacity prices 
would rise to incentivize new entry.344 Thus, while FERC has declared that 
price suppression undermines market “integrity,” the Commission has failed 
to explain how the indeterminate and undened goal of market integrity 
relates to the actual goal of maintaining sucient load.345  
Financial analysts have estimated that these MOPRs will cost billions 
annually.346 FERC itself has acknowledged that capacity market reforms will 
raise prices for consumers and lead to excess capacity.347 It has defended these 
 
not able to oer below a competitive price.’” (quoting Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. 
at 69 (June 29, 2018))). 
344 See BIALEK & UNEL, supra note 288, at 18 (“[E]ven if externality payments reduce capacity 
prices in the short term, capacity markets are designed to adjust to that change and keep prices at a 
level necessary to ensure resource adequacy.”). 
345 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 22 (“The June 2018 Order thus found 
PJM’s existing MOPR provisions unjust and unreasonable and unduly discriminatory because 
they failed to protect the ‘integrity of competition in the wholesale capacity market against 
unreasonable price distortions and cost shifts . . . .’”); see also Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 
(Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 4 n.6 (suggesting that the Commission has failed to dene 
“‘integrity’ of the market”). 
346 Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, supra note 3, at 7; Adavit of Michael Goggin, Grid 
Strategies LLC, at ¶ 3 (May 7, 2018) (included in Appendix B to Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, 
supra note 3); MICHAEL GOGGIN & ROB GRAMLICH, CONSUMER IMPACTS OF FERC 
INTERFERENCE WITH STATE POLICIES 2 (2019), https://gridprogress.les.wordpress.com/2019/
08/consumer-impacts-of-ferc-interference-with-state-policies-an-analysis-of-the-pjm-region.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VQL-632P] (“We estimate the total cost of the MOPR to PJM consumers could 
reach $5.7 billion per year, a 60% increase in cost compared to the current capacity market.”); 
Memorandum from Monitoring Analytics to PJM Market Participants (Sept. 17, 2019), 
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/Market_Messages/Messages/IMM_Response_to_Gr
id_Strategies_Report_201909217.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6XF-P793 ] (disagreeing with the specic 
number reached in the Goggin and Gramlich report’s analysis but nding that an earlier MOPR 
proposal could cost billions). Commissioner Glick estimated that PJM’s MOPR would cost at least 
$2.4 billion a year. Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 23. 
347 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 23 (“As to arguments that an expanded 
MOPR will . . . increase costs to consumers, courts have directly addressed this point, holding that 
states ‘are free to make their own decisions regarding how to satisfy their capacity needs, but they 
“will appropriately bear the costs of [those] decisions,” . . . including possibly having to pay twice 
for capacity.’” (quoting N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 96-97 (3d Cir. 2014) (alterations 
in original))); see also Request for Rehearing of Clean Energy Advocates at 1, ISO New England 
Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (2018) (No. ER18-619-000) (arguing that “[t]he predictable result” of ISO-
NE’s adoption of a CASPR mechanism, which clean energy advocates attributed to “FERC’s 
decision to close its eyes,” is that “thousands of megawatts of clean energy will be barred from 
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reforms, however, by claiming that price suppression undermines investor 
condence, and that it is necessary to charge consumers high prices for 
capacity they do not need to mitigate investor squeamishness.348 Incidentally, 
this is the same justification that public utility commissions rely on for setting 
regulated rates.349 An administrative intervention to bolster investor 
confidence is, however, anathema to the idea of competitive markets. 
When utilities were regulated as natural monopolies, investor condence 
was a means to maintaining reliable electricity by ensuring a return on 
investments in utilities’ rate base. But the rate regulation system does not 
ensure the optimal procurement of the lowest cost resources. Today, PJM and 
ISO-NE have excess fossil fuel capacity.350 Immunizing the shareholders of 
these fossil fuel generators certainly prevents those generators from retiring 
and ensures the returns on investment for those shareholders. But in doing 
so, it sacrices the core imperative of a competitive market, subjugating the 
interests of consumers and new generators to the interests of the incumbent 
generators. If FERC really is concerned about reliability, all it has to do is 
permit capacity prices to rise, in which case the markets would procure 
sucient supply. 
PJM notes that advocates of its MOPR-Ex proposal “hope that it will 
work to dis-incent states from providing subsidies in the rst instance”351 by 
making it prohibitively expensive for states to meet their energy goals—likely 
increasing the costs of state renewable policies by hundreds of millions of 
dollars.352 PJM even acknowledged at one point that FERC’s proposed 
MOPR could leave states with “no practical option to pursue generation-
related public policy goals through subsidy.”353 Some stakeholders thus 
 
accessing the ISO-NE capacity market, and the region’s customers will be forced to spend vast sums 
to buy an equivalent amount of redundant capacity”). 
348 See, e.g., Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at 64-65 (holding PJM’s Tari to be 
“unjust and unreasonable and unduly discriminatory” for failing to protect the capacity market from 
price distortions, which undermine investors’ ability to predict how their investments will perform). 
349 Fed Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603, 605 (1944) (“[The] return . . . should 
be sucient to assure condence in the nancial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its 
credit and to attract capital . . . . Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain 
its nancial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed 
certainly cannot be condemned as invalid.”). 
350 Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236, slip op. at at 57-58; Iulia Gheorghiu, PJM, NYISO and 
ISO-NE Pay $1.4B Annually for Excess Capacity: Report, UTIL. DIVE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://
www.utilitydive.com/news/pjm-nyiso-and-iso-ne-pay-14b-annually-for-excess-capacity-report/
567798 [https://perma.cc/HUB4-3QRS]. 
351 Capacity Repricing or in the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal, supra note 325, at 56 n.138. 
352 See Protest of Clean Energy Advocates, supra note 3, at 1 (explaining that both of PJM’s 
proposals, including the MOPR-Ex, would “saddle consumers with billions in extra costs . . .”). 
353 Initial Submission of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. at 6, Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239 
(2019) (Nos. EL16-49-000, ER18-1314-000, -001, EL18-178-000). 
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explicitly view PJM’s MOPR not as a way of ensuring grid reliability, but as 
a device to make it too expensive for states to pursue clean energy policies.354 
C. Reliability-Must-Run Agreements 
While FERC’s decision to limit or exclude renewables from capacity 
markets implicitly raises many of the same problems as rate regulation, in 
some instances FERC and the grid operators have gone further and explicitly 
restored rate regulation for certain generating units. In order to retain critical 
generating units, FERC has insisted that grid operators develop a process for 
designating generators “reliability-must-run” (RMR) units.355 Unlike 
capacity auctions, these RMR policies do not even invoke the specter of 
competition but are rather explicitly designed to respond to market failures. 
Although RMR agreements have existed for years,356 these contracts 
received heightened scrutiny in December of 2018 after ISO-NE used an 
RMR agreement to bail out a large gas plant.357 On December 20, 2018, 
FERC voted to approve cost recovery for Exelon’s Mystic Generating 
Station.358 This order gave the natural gas power plant ratepayer-nanced 
contracts through May 2024.359 Despite the fact that New England has 
restructured its electricity market, ISO-NE determined that the plant was 
essential for grid reliability because it supports the Everett liqueed natural 
gas facility, which is a critical source of fuel for the region.360 It therefore 
agreed to allow the facility to recover its costs.361 
FERC’s approval of the Mystic cost-of-service agreement was especially 
surprising in light of the fact that Massachusetts, one of the states that would 
 
354 Capacity Repricing or in the Alternative MOPR-Ex Proposal, supra note 325, at 56 n.138. 
355 See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 150 FERC ¶ 61,116, slip op. at 1-3 (Feb. 19, 2015) (directing 
NYISO to develop RMR agreements); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, slip op. 
at 17 (May 6, 2004) (directing PJM to “develop a policy which would provide a reasonable 
opportunity for recovery of going forward costs,” which could include RMR contracts or capacity 
payments); see also Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 138 FERC ¶ 61,112, slip op. at 1-2 (Feb. 16, 2012) 
(acknowledging CAISO’s history of reliability controls). 
356 See News Release: About the Reliability-Must-Run Agreement for Greens Bayou Unit 5, ERCOT 
(June 3, 2016), http://www.ercot.com/news/releases/show/98507 [https://perma.cc/WGP3-TAEZ] 
(“Since 2002, ERCOT has executed 73 other RMR agreements, of which 69 have been for the 
purpose of transmission stability.”) These agreements have generally been intended to stabilize 
the grid. Id. 
357 See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC ¶ 61,267, slip op. at 2, 12 (Dec. 20, 2018) 
(approving cost-of-service agreements between ISO-NE and Mystic, with the eect that “Mystic 8 
and 9 will be operating for two years on a reliability must-run (RMR) basis”). 
358 Id. at 2. 
359 Id. at 6-8. 
360 Id. at 4-6. 
361 See id. at 17-19 (approving the cost-of-service agreement but expressing concern about the 
methodology used to calculate Mystic’s return on equity). 
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ostensibly experience resource adequacy challenges if the plant retired—
submitted evidence questioning whether the plant was needed to maintain 
reliability in the region.362 
The Mystic cost-of-service agreement is a departure from previous 
reliability-must-run agreements because ISO-NE justified the agreement using 
concerns about fuel security and resource adequacy rather than transmission 
constraints.363 It is worth noting, though, that ratepayers have been supporting 
generators through RMR agreements since the early 2000s.364 
While grid operators do not always disclose the cost of RMR agreements, 
they appear to cost hundreds of millions of dollars annually. In addition to 
the Mystic bailout, FERC recently approved a cost-of-service agreement for 
a California gas plant that put tens of millions of dollars of costs onto 
ratepayers.365 MISO and PJM both report numerous multimillion-dollar 
RMR agreements through 2024, though the lack of standardized reporting 
practices makes it dicult to obtain data on the actual costs of each RMR 
agreement.366 Texas used an RMR agreement to bail out a natural gas power 
plant near Houston.367  
FERC, moreover, seems prepared to extend RMR agreements. While one 
may be tempted to dismiss the Mystic agreement as a one-o, FERC recently 
approved a CAISO tari ling that gives the ISO authority to enter into an 
 
362 See ISO New England Inc., 165 FERC ¶ 61,202, slip op. at 7 (Dec. 3, 2018) (summarizing 
a ling of the Massachusetts Attorney General). 
363 See Sonal Patel, FERC Thwarts ISO-NE’s Attempt To Keep Mystic Gas Units Online, POWER 
MAG. (July 5, 2018), https://www.powermag.com/ferc-thwarts-iso-nes-attempt-to-keep-mystic-gas-
units-online [https://perma.cc/HZ2B-56JM] (“The tari waiver . . . is unprecedented because it 
eectively seeks to retain resources for reliability risks related to region-wide fuel security.”). 
364 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MKT. OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMM’N, 2004 STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT 88 (2005), https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/
Files/20050615093455-06-15-05-som2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/T77M-YUTH] (“In 2004, New 
England load-serving entities (LSEs) paid $165 million to cover the fixed costs of generators 
under RMR contracts.”). 
365 See Letter Order, Metcalf Energy Ctr., LLC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,073 (Apr. 30, 2018) (No. 
ER18-240-001) (approving a settlement agreement that establishes the terms of the cost-of-service 
agreement); Joint Explanatory Statement, Metcalf Energy Ctr., LLC (Mar. 22, 2018) (No. ER18-
240-001) (summarizing the terms of the settlement); Jason Fordney, Metcalf Reliability-Must-Run 
Draws Scrutiny, RTO INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.rtoinsider.com/caiso-metcalf-
substation-reliability-must-run-agreements-62919 [https://perma.cc/XJV7-8W69]. 
366 See Michael Giberson, Integrating Reliability-Must-Run Practices into Wholesale Electricity 
Prices 7 (R Street Policy Study No. 114, Oct. 2017), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/10/114.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQN4-72Y4] (critiquing those markets for failing to disclose 
important data). 
367 See Reliability Must-Run Agreement of NRG Texas Power LLC and Electricity Reliability 
Council of Texas, Inc., Ex. 1 at 2 (June 2, 2016), http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/89476/
Reliability_Must_Run_Agreement___NRG_Texas_Power_LLC_and_ERCOT___Eective_Date_
06_01_2016__Fully_Executed___003_.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UQR-MZG5] (executing an RMR 
agreement). 
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RMR agreement “to address any reliability need.”368 Commissioner Glick 
warned that FERC thereby gave CAISO “near-carte blanche discretion to 
enter into out-of-market contracts without review by the Commission” and 
authorized an “end-run around the Commission-approved market 
structures.”369 Commissioner Chatterjee has suggested that a mechanism 
similar to RMR agreements be used to support nancially distressed coal-
red power plants.370 
It is entirely possible that every one of the units subject to the RMR 
agreements described above is necessary for grid reliability. FERC, however, 
need not rely on RMR contracts to retain these units. FERC and the grid 
operators wrongly assume that they should bail out the shareholders and 
creditors of every generator needed for reliability. If a critical generating unit 
claims that it will retire unless FERC approves a cost-of-service contract, 
state regulators should oversee an auction in which parties submit bids to 
purchase the assets. The entity that agreed to provide the services at least cost 
would be able to do so.371 In this way, essential generators would not be able 
to strong-arm regulators into passing the company’s market risk from 
investors to ratepayers. 
Fifteen years ago, an analyst proposed that FERC develop this process 
when PJM inaugurated its capacity market.372 FERC rejected the proposal 
because it did “not treat all capacity suppliers equally.”373 The Commission 
justified this decision by claiming that “[i]n a competitive market, all 
suppliers will be paid the same price.”374 FERC felt that a unitary capacity 
payment better approximated a real market.375 Yet this system’s failure to 
retain the resources FERC needs has forced intrusive interventions that 
pay some suppliers more than others. These interventions would be 
unnecessary if FERC recognized that capacity markets do not procure the 
services the grid needs, and that it is important to support markets for these 
other qualities. 
 
368 Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 168 FERC ¶ 61,199, slip op. at 3, 5 (Sept. 27, 2019). 
369 Id. (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. at 1, 3. 
370 Gavin Bade, Chatterjee: Sympathy for Coal ‘Doesn’t Factor in’ to Baseload Support Plan, UTIL. 
DIVE (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/chatterjee-sympathy-for-coal-doesnt-
factor-in-to-baseload-support-plan/511449 [https://perma.cc/W5QS-GV3X]. 
371 For one example, see R. Moreno et al., Auction Approaches of Long-Term Contracts to 
Ensure Generation Investment in Electricity Markets: Lessons from the Brazilian and Chilean 
Experiences, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 5758, 5761-63 (2010). 
372 See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 107 FERC ¶ 61,112, slip op. at 27-28 (May 6, 2004). 
373 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 117 FERC ¶ 61,331, slip op. at 32 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
374 Id. 
375 See id. (determining that a capacity market with a downward sloping demand curve “better 
approximates a market”). 
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D. The Slippery Slope to Reregulating Generation 
If policymakers continue to maintain reliability by subsidizing individual 
generators and excluding disfavored resources from important markets, they 
will quickly reregulate all power generation. The interventions described 
above create a positive feedback loop. One set of uncompetitive generators 
receives a subsidy, which suppresses energy market prices. Suppressed prices 
render another set of generators uncompetitive. Those generators then appeal 
to policymakers for an additional subsidy and the cycle continues. 
This dynamic has begun to play out in several markets. The proliferation 
of low-marginal-cost natural gas plants and zero-marginal-cost renewable 
power has made many nuclear power plants uncompetitive.376 In response, 
nuclear power plants have emphasized their zero-carbon and reliability 
attributes.377 Rather than permit these plants to go out of business, several states 
have responded by agreeing to subsidize nuclear facilities.378 New York’s 
program alone is expected to cost $500 million,379 an Illinois program is projected 
to cost $235 million,380 and a New Jersey program could cost $300 million.381 
 
376 Brian Mann, Unable to Compete on Price, Nuclear Power on the Decline in the U.S., NPR (Apr. 
7, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/07/473379564/unable-to-compete-on-price-nuclear-power-
on-the-decline-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/PR74-JH73]. 
377 See, e.g., How Can Nuclear Combat Climate Change?, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://www.
world-nuclear.org/nuclear-essentials/how-can-nuclear-combat-climate-change.aspx [https://perma.cc/
57SF-SL6F] (last visited June 2, 2020) (“Decarbonising the electricity supply, whilst providing 
aordable and reliable electricity to a growing global population, must be central to any climate 
change strategy. Nuclear energy has shown that it has the potential to be the catalyst for delivering 
sustainable energy transitions . . . .”); Nuclear, EXELON, https://www.exeloncorp.com/companies/
exelon-generation/nuclear [https://perma.cc/77RQ-WR5D] (last visited June 2, 2020) (“Nuclear 
power dominates in clean energy and also reliability.”); Nuclear Provides Carbon-Free Energy 24/7, 
NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., https://www.nei.org/fundamentals/nuclear-provides-carbon-free-energy 
[https://perma.cc/56HA-BKT7] (last visited June 2, 2020) (“Nuclear energy contributes clean, 
reliable electricity to a diverse energy system.”). 
378 For an overview of zero emissions credits, which are state nuclear subsidies, see Five States 
Have Implemented Programs to Assist Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 7, 
2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41534 [https://perma.cc/N9WB-SS7A]. 
379 Patrick McGeehan, New York State Aiding Nuclear Plants with Millions in Subsidies, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/nyregion/new-york-state-aiding-nuclear-
plants-with-millions-in-subsidies.html [https://perma.cc/Z5FM-KRG3]. 
380 Peter Maloney, Updated: Illinois Gov. Rauner Signs Exelon Nuclear Legislation, UTIL. DIVE 
(Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/updated-illinois-gov-rauner-signs-exelon-nuclear-
legislation/431803 [https://perma.cc/4HV2-3W8S]. 
381 Scott DiSavino, New Jersey Governor Signs Nuclear Power Subsidy Bill into Law, REUTERS 
(May 23, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-jersey-pseg-exelon-nuclear/new-jersey-governor-
signs-nuclear-power-subsidy-bill-into-law-idUSKCN1IO2RL [https://perma.cc/6U3T-42CL]. 
These are overt subsidies. The number would be larger if one included regulatory evasion. See, e.g., 
Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal Company Insolvency and the Erosion of 
Federal Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 879, 910-35 (2019) (showing that coal companies have used bankruptcy 
to evade regulatory obligations). 
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This support allows nuclear power plants to submit low bids in both 
energy markets and capacity markets. That, in turn, further suppresses 
clearing prices and threatens the economic viability of coal and natural power 
gas plants. Coal representatives have responded by arguing that they are 
essential to reliability because they can store onsite coal that can be used when 
other resources are unavailable.382 This is the argument the DOE embraced 
when it proposed bailing out coal and nuclear power plants.383 Natural gas 
power plants may argue that their fast-ramping characteristics—the ability to 
respond quickly to a spike in demand or loss of supply—make them essential 
for a high-renewables grid. State or federal policymakers may be convinced 
and grant support to these generators. The Mystic bailout suggests that 
FERC has already begun to shield natural gas power plants perceived to be 
critical to reliability. 
What emerges is a situation in which regulatory favor—not market forces—
determines which resources are viable. As soon as a regulator concludes that a 
certain resource provides a critical service, it introduces a subsidy to support 
that resource. The subsidy suppresses energy and capacity prices, which further 
decreases the revenues other resources enjoy. That, in turn, increases the need 
for additional administrative interventions. PJM recently expressed concern 
about this phenomenon when it said that “the spread of rent-seeking activities 
could tear apart the essential fabric of regional coordination in planning 
gravitating toward integrated resource planning.”384 
As noted in Section III.B, renewables are expected to provide a signicant 
share of electricity in many areas in the near future.385 If natural gas begins 
to receive state support—if, for example, RMR agreements become more 
common—then close to one hundred percent of overall generation would be 
receiving out-of-market support. Alternatively, if capacity markets continue 
to become a vehicle to support natural gas and coal power plants, then the 
entire industry will already be sustained to a signicant degree through 
individual subsidies designed to protect particular resources. 
 
382 E.g., Kathiann M. Kowalski, Coal Industry Group Revives Reliability Argument to Ohio 
Lawmakers, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 5, 2020), https://energynews.us/2020/02/05/midwest/
coal-industry-group-revives-reliability-argument-to-ohio-lawmakers [https://perma.cc/N3BC-JXGL]. 
383 Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, Trump Wants to Bail Out Coal and Nuclear Power. Here’s 
Why That Will Be Hard., N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018, 12:32 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/06/13/climate/coal-nuclear-bailout.html [https://perma.cc/5MD8-84HW] (“The 
administration has argued that the loss of coal and nuclear plants, which can run around the clock, 
would make America’s electric grid less reliable.”). 
384 PJM INTERCONNECTION, RESPONSE TO THE 2017 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT 11 
(2018), https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/state-of-the-market/20180511-pjms-response-
to-the-2017-state-of-the-market-report.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/3EHN-7X69]. 
385 See supra Section III.B. 
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If this trend continues, electricity markets would no longer dictate energy 
prices. They would simply reect regulatory preferences about which 
resources should stay in business. Rather than compete to provide 
inexpensive electricity, generators would compete for regulatory favor. The 
result closely resembles utility rate regulation. Part VI proposes alternative 
payments systems that would more eciently procure electricity. First, 
though, it is worth considering the legality of recent FERC interventions 
that support fossil fuel generators and counteract state clean energy policies. 
V. STATES AND THE FPA 
In addition to the economic problems discussed above, interventions to 
prop up fossil fuel generators are stretching FERC’s jurisdiction to its limits. 
The legal basis for FERC’s authority to oversee grid reliability is Section 205 
of the Federal Power Act (FPA), which requires the Commission to ensure 
that wholesale rates are “just and reasonable.”386 The FPA is clear that the 
Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the 
generation of electric energy.”387 That authority is reserved for the states.388 
In our view, the only way to resolve the tension between FERC’s 
authority over wholesale electricity prices and states’ authority over 
generating units is to clarify that FERC has authority to regulate reliability 
pursuant to its authority to regulate practices “aecting . . . rates,”389 but that 
federal jurisdiction over wholesale energy rates ceases when it prohibits states 
from regulating generation units. FERC regulations can increase the costs of 
state policies, but FERC cannot prevent states from acting to realize 
preferences for certain resources. Courts reviewing FERC reliability orders 
should consider whether the net eect of FERC policies is to prevent states 
from exercising that authority. 
A. Federalism in the FPA 
While FERC has begun to claim that it has plenary authority to ensure 
grid reliability, courts have unanimously embraced our view. When the Third 
Circuit upheld the Commission’s decision to develop a MOPR, the court did 
so not because the MOPR was necessary to support reliability, but because it 
was necessary to make sure wholesale energy prices—not capacity prices—
 
386 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2018); Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 
480-81 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
387 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
388 See id. § 824(a), (b)(1). For an extended analysis of the FPA’s federalist system, see Matthew 
R. Christiansen & Joshua C. Macey, Long Live the Federal Power Act’s Bright Line, 134 HARV. L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
389 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). 
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remained just and reasonable.390 The Commission was concerned with buyer-
side market power. Specifically, it worried that utilities that owned 
transmission lines were manipulating energy markets by submitting articially 
low bids in capacity markets.391 Owners of transmission lines are required to 
purchase a certain amount of supply from capacity markets.392 By submitting 
very low capacity bids, they purposefully suppressed capacity prices, thereby 
reducing the amount of money they were forced to spend to purchase 
capacity.393 Capacity markets and MOPRs were therefore justied to prevent 
manipulative behavior.394 The Third Circuit determined that FERC has 
jurisdiction to adopt MOPRs not because the Commission has plenary 
jurisdiction over markets for reliability, but because market manipulation in 
capacity markets is a “practice[] . . . ‘aecting’ rates.”395 
The courts that have reviewed capacity markets have been careful to point 
out that FERC should not weaponize its jurisdiction over markets for 
reliability to commandeer states’ authority over generation resources. In a 
case nding that FERC can oversee capacity markets, the D.C. Circuit 
claried that this authority cannot conict with states’ authority over 
generation facilities.396 As the court explained, while “the Commission may 
directly establish prices for capacity,” they cannot thereby prevent states from 
regulating generation facilities.397 The court went on to clarify that “[s]tate 
and municipal authorities retain the right to forbid new entrants from 
providing new capacity, to require retirement of existing generators, to limit 
new construction to more expensive, environmentally friendly units, or to 
take any other action in their role as regulators of generation facilities without 
direct interference from the Commission.”398 That nding was embraced by 
the Supreme Court in 2016.399 
 
390 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utilities v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 96 (3d Cir. 2014). 
391 Id. at 84-85; see also Richard B. Miller, Neil H. Butterklee & Margaret Comes, “Buyer-Side” 
Mitigation in Organized Capacity Markets: Time for a Change?, 33 ENERGY L.J. 449, 459-60 (2012) 
(explaining that buyer-side mitigation was originally designed to prevent market power abuses). 
392 N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 85. 
393 See id. (“When . . . LSEs buy more capacity than they oer into the auction, they have an 
incentive to keep auction prices as low as possible . . . . Such oers crowd out other capacity that is 
priced at a higher, cost-based rate, and thus result in a lower overall clearing price.”). 
394 See id. (“To counteract that manipulation of the market, the MOPR seeks to identify 
uneconomic oers and ‘mitigate’ them by raising them to a price that more accurately approximates 
their net costs.”). 
395 Id. at 95-98. 
396 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
397 Id. at 481, 482. 
398 Id. at 481. 
399 See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016) (“States, of course, 
may regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws incidentally aect 
areas within FERC’s domain.”); FERC. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 775 (2016) 
(stating that FERC cannot “issue[] a regulation compelling every consumer to buy a certain amount 
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It is therefore perplexing that FERC has seemingly embraced an 
interpretation of the FPA that prevents states from exercising jurisdiction 
over their generation facilities—despite repeated admonitions of the courts 
that FERC’s jurisdiction over capacity markets must further the Commission’s 
goal of ensuring “just and reasonable” rates and accommodate state authority 
over generation.400 The interventions described in Part IV may be bad policy, 
but individually they may not excessively interfere with states’ authority over 
generation.401 Altogether, though, these policies counteract state renewable 
policies. Insofar as they prevent states from realizing their resource preferences, 
they are in tension with D.C. Circuit precedent establishing that states retain 
authority to determine which generators enter and exit the market.402 
B. Recovering the FPA’s Federalist Vision 
To be sure, in the interventions described in the previous Parts, the 
Commission has claimed to recognize the need to respect the FPA’s federalist 
vision.403 It is therefore surprising that FERC has taken such bold steps to 
counteract state policy decisions.404 When FERC ordered PJM to revise its 
MOPR, FERC cited its “statutory obligation, and exclusive jurisdiction, to 
ensure that wholesale capacity rates in the multi-state regional market are just 
and reasonable,” and explained that the intervention was necessary to 
preserve “a capacity market that relies on competitive auctions to set just and 
reasonable rates.”405 Yet as Part IV showed, the steps FERC has taken to 
accomplish these goals have had precisely the opposite result. 
FERC has justied capacity market interventions by saying that these 
interventions are necessary to maintain “investor condence” and “market 
 
of electricity on the retail market” because such a rule would “specif[y] terms of sale at retail—which 
is a job for the States alone”). 
400 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018). Todd Aagaard and Andrew Kleit have argued that certain 
MOPR reforms ordered by FERC violate the FPA and Administrative Procedure Act. See Todd S. 
Aagaard & Andrew N. Kleit, A Road Paved with Good Intentions?: FERC’s Illegal War on State 
Electricity Subsidies, 33 ELECTRICITY J., June 2020, at 1, 3-4 (2020). 
401 Whether the rules are just and reasonable is another question. The fact that many of the 
rules described in Part IV have no conceivable justication may give rise to other legal challenges. 
The focus of this Article, however, is whether FERC actions suggest a power grab by the 
Commission. To that end, we focus on the federalism issue and bracket other legal challenges as 
outside the scope of this paper. 
402 Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
403 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 6 (Dec. 19, 2019) (“Nor does this order 
prevent states from making decisions about preferred generation resources: resources that states 
choose to support, and whose oers may fail to clear the capacity market under the revised MOPR 
. . . will still be permitted to sell energy and ancillary services in the relevant PJM markets.”). 
404 Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (“The Commission . . . shall not have jurisdiction . . . over 
facilities used for the generation of electric energy . . . .”). 
405 Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 4, 6. 
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integrity.”406 But both New England and PJM have much more capacity than 
they need to provide reliable electricity.407 Given those circumstances, 
capacity markets should not give investors confidence that they will recover 
their costs. Doing so recreates the problems of cost-of-service regulation by 
guaranteeing shareholders a return on investment and shielding them from 
market risk. If these markets find themselves with insufficient resources, prices 
would rise regardless of whether some resources receive support from states.408 
FERC could be borrowing these terms from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), which is the agency charged with protecting investor 
condence and market integrity.409 FERC is, however, using these terms in a 
very dierent way. The SEC conceives of the goal of investor condence as 
a procedural right. On its view, “[t]he laws and rules that govern the securities 
industry in the United States derive from a simple and straightforward 
concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should 
have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and 
so long as they hold it.”410 Investor condence is therefore ordinarily used to 
make sure that insiders do not have an unfair advantage over ordinary market 
participants—not to interfere with market signals created by legitimate state 
and federal policy decisions.411 
 
406 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. 
at 5-6 (observing that the majority order never denes market “integrity”); ISO New England Inc., 
162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part), slip 
op. at 4-5 (questioning the aim of “investor condence”). 
407 See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2018 SUMMER RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 20 
(2018), https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_SRA_05252018_
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4BC-VQD4] (nding that ISO-NE has more than sucient capacity 
reserve margins that protect against reliability concerns); Iulia Gheorghiu, PJM, NYISO and ISO-NE Pay 
$1.4B Annually for Excess Capacity: Report, UTIL. DIVE (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/pjm-nyiso-and-iso-ne-pay-14b-annually-for-excess-capacity-report/567798 [https://perma.cc/
J4WH-WNPH] (calculating the wasted expenditures that result from excess capacity procurement 
in the ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM markets); ISO-NE Transmittal Letter, supra note 321, at 11 
(“[T]he region now has signicant excess capacity . . . .”). Reserve margins represent the extra 
generation capacity available above and beyond the forecasted peak capacity demand in a given year 
and reference margins are the levels needed to ensure resource adequacy. NERC’s Summer Reliability 
Assessment Highlights Seasonal Electric Reliability Issues, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36592 [https://perma.cc/YD49-5E5Y]. 
408 See BIALEK & UNEL, supra note 288, at 18 (explaining that capacity markets will 
“automatically adjust[]” in the event of an actual resource adequacy challenge). 
409 See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Article/
whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/5UR3-T3PF] (last visited Feb. 11, 2020) (“The mission of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and ecient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”). 
410 Id. 
411 See id. (describing how “investor condence” is intended to create a level playing eld for 
market participants). 
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Unlike the SEC, FERC has begun to use the goal of market “integrity” 
to justify administrative interventions that shield fossil fuel generators from 
market risk and immunize them from the eects of state clean energy 
policies.412 But if a market has procured sucient supply, one might think 
that it is “unjust” and “unreasonable” to force consumers to pay to retain 
supply they do not need.413 In ordinary markets, shareholders and creditors 
are aware that they bear the risk that regulations can change in the future. Yet 
in electricity markets, grid operators are insulating fossil fuel generators from 
those risks.  
At the very least, these interventions make it more dicult for states to 
determine which generators enter and exit the market. In addition, the 
Mystic bailout and other RMR contracts make it impossible for states to 
realize their generation preferences. Given these circumstances, it seems hard 
to see how this RMR agreement is consistent with Section 201(b) of the FPA. 
The problem, perhaps, is that state challenges to FERC interventions have 
focused on a specic FERC order that makes it more dicult for states to 
realize their resource preferences. Because FPA jurisdiction is often 
concurrent, so long as that individual intervention does not commandeer 
states’ authority over generation, it should be upheld. 
Altogether, though, these interventions threaten to swallow state 
jurisdiction whole. The Mystic bailout requires Massachusetts ratepayers to 
support a generator despite the fact that the state was not convinced that the 
unit was necessary for reliability. The fact that FERC failed to permit a large 
oshore wind facility to participate in the ISO-NE capacity auction will force 
New England ratepayers to pay hundreds of millions to retain resources 
without determining whether other approaches might have resolved the 
problem more eciently.414 In our view, a challenge to FERC’s general 
approach to reliability could show that FERC is interfering excessively with 
states’ authority over generation. 
 
412 See Calpine Corp., 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (June 29, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting), slip op. 
at 5-6 (observing that the majority order never denes market “integrity”); ISO New England Inc., 
162 FERC ¶ 61,205 (Mar. 9, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting in part and concurring in part), slip 
op. at 4-5 (questioning the aim of “investor condence”). 
413 See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018) (“Whenever the Commission . . . shall nd that any rate, 
charge, or classication . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, 
the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate.”). 
414 See Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC 61,267 (Dec. 20, 2018) (Glick, Comm’r, 
dissenting), slip op. at 2-3 (“I continue to believe that, had the Commission convened a process to 
examine fuel security in New England more holistically, the region might well have produced a 
solution that is more eective, less costly, and on far rmer legal footing.”). 
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VI. FINDING THE MISSING MONEY IN A HIGH-RENEWABLES GRID 
Rather than revive utility rate regulation, FERC should encourage payment 
systems that preserve competition, support reliability, and accommodate state 
preferences for renewables. This Part first outlines general principles that 
would advance these goals. It then proposes specific policy changes to maintain 
competitive electricity markets in a future electric power grid. 
A. Principles for Legal and Competitive Reserve Markets 
Regulatory interventions aimed at securing resource adequacy are 
problematic because they (1) undermine the Federal Power Act’s federalist 
structure, (2) rely on administrative judgment—not competitive processes—
to procure resource adequacy, and (3) counteract state renewable policies. The 
principles described in this Section would support efforts to procure sufficient 
reserves while respecting the FPA’s jurisdictional limits, retain competitive 
forces in electricity markets, and integrate state clean energy policies. 
1. Reserve Requirements Do Not Trump the Rest of the FPA 
While FERC and the grid operators should be able to create reserve 
requirements, they should not do so at the expense of other provisions of the 
FPA. Not only do states have authority over generation resources,415 but 
FERC is also statutorily required to ensure that rates are “just and 
reasonable” and not “unduly discriminatory.”416 FERC has to balance these 
numerous regulatory obligations. Reliability concerns do not give the 
Commission license to disregard these other statutory mandates. 
Yet FERC seems to be using its authority over reliability to approve 
regulations that discriminate against renewables and that prevent states from 
exercising control over their resource mix. As discussed in Part IV, capacity 
market reforms and RMR contracts counteract state renewable policies and 
are not needed to support grid reliability. Rather than prevent undue 
discrimination in wholesale electricity markets, FERC’s decision to favor 
incumbent fossil fuel generators suggests that the Commission is itself 
contributing to discriminatory pricing practices in violation of Section 206 of 
the FPA.417 Giving states and LSEs a role in determining how to comply with 
FERC’s reserve requirements would better accommodate the FPA’s dierent 
jurisdictional and regulatory ambitions. 
 
415 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2018). 
416 Id. §§ 824d(a)-824e(a). 
417 Cf. id. § 824e(a) (requiring FERC to adjust any “rate, charge, or classication” it determines 
is “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential”). 
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2. Competitive Processes—Not Bailouts—for Resource Procurement 
Similarly, FERC should not use its authority over reliability to force 
LSEs to procure reserves in any particular way or bail out specic 
generators.418 Renewables do increase the need for capacity payments, but a 
centrally administered capacity market operates at cross-purposes with states’ 
ability to determine their own resource mixes. Capacity markets wrongly 
assume that suciently large reserve margins will secure all of the services 
needed to maintain reliability. When they fail to support exible resources or 
other crucial generators, grid operators bail out the units deemed necessary 
for reliability. The result is a series of haphazard subsidies in which grid 
operators, with FERC’s blessing, prospectively identify critical resources and 
ensure that they operate. In this way, capacity markets increase the barriers 
to entry for renewables and counteract state clean energy policies. Rather 
than mandate the use of specic resources and impose barriers to entry and 
exit that protect incumbents even after they are no longer needed to support 
grid reliability, FERC and the grid operators should remove restraints on 
entry and exit. When a resource can provide the services consumers value, it 
should be able to compete to provide that service. 
This principle has implications for both technical capacity market rules 
and bailouts of specic generators. There is no need for grid operators and 
FERC to stipulate that only resources that currently provide a service can be 
compensated for doing so. FERC should instead make sure that there is a 
competitive process in all ISOs and RTOs to retain the services consumers 
demand from the power grid. For example, capacity markets should be 
seasonal to better accommodate seasonal and intermittent renewables, battery 
performance requirements should be shortened so that batteries can be 
compensated when they provide electricity at peak hours, and capacity 
payments for intermittent resources should be discounted based on actual 
performance.419 More importantly, they should be voluntary so that LSEs can 
procure some—or all—of their capacity bilaterally when doing so is necessary 
to comply with other regulatory requirements. 
The same principles apply to bailouts of fossil fuel generators perceived 
to be critical to grid reliability. Bailing out shareholders through RMR 
 
418 In addition to the recent Mystic bailout, FERC has required grid operators to create a 
process for designating RMR contracts with critical generators. These contracts entitle generators 
to recoup their costs and making a prot by charging ratepayers—not by entering energy or capacity 
markets. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 
Schedule 1: PJM Interchange Energy Market § 6.1 (Feb. 18, 2012), https://www.pjm.com/directory/
merged-taris/oa.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP89-EP42] (introducing the procedures that apply to 
“generation resource[s]” that have been designated necessary to run in order to “maintain the 
reliability of service in the PJM region”). 
419 See supra subsection IV.A.1. 
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agreements revives the problems that are traditionally associated with cost-
of-service regulation. Generators such as Mystic have an incentive to inate 
costs and overbuild capacity. Other resources cannot replace the incumbent 
even when it would provide superior services. 
A competitive auction is a more ecient and eective way to retain 
critical units. Once a generator declares that it needs to retire, an auction 
would give competitors an opportunity to take over the critical resource. 
Alternatively, rms could submit proposals about alternative strategies that 
would maintain reliability even if the plant retired. Such a process recently 
played out in California when a natural gas peaking plant petitioned for cost 
recovery. Instead of immediately granting the petition, the state solicited 
proposals.420 This process demonstrated that coupling new solar with 
batteries would actually deliver the same level of reliability at lower cost. 
This approach would have mitigated the problems that occurred when 
FERC bailed out the Mystic natural gas power plant. If Mystic determined 
that it genuinely needed additional revenues to continue to operate, an 
auction would have ensured that New England ratepayers received service 
from the entity that won the auction—whether that entity took over Mystic’s 
generators or submitted an alternative proposal that FERC and ISO-NE had 
not considered when they announced that Mystic had to be bailed out. 
3. Accommodate State Preferences 
Finally, FERC and the grid operators should integrate—not counteract—
state programs to support zero- and low-carbon resources. Decisions by states 
or consumers to pay for specic characteristics such as backup capacity or 
carbon-free electricity should be welcomed by FERC. So long as there is a 
market for capacity, state policies will not force needed fossil fuel generators 
to retire. That is because the price for units that provide capacity needed by 
the grid will rise to support critical generating units.For years, FERC and 
grid operators have accommodated state subsidies.421 If a state is willing to 
shoulder some of the costs of a generating unit, there is no need for FERC 
or a grid operator to prevent it from doing so. 
 
420 See Julian Spector, PG&E Must Solicit Energy Storage and DERs to Replace 3 Existing Gas 
Plants, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/pge-
must-solicit-energy-storage-ders-to-replace-three-existing-gas-plants#gs.xMhsj3bh [https://perma.cc/
B7P6-DB66] (discussing California’s “shakedown” process of awarding energy contracts which 
amounts to a choice between “giv[ing them] the lucrative deal or los[ing] the vital resources”). 
421 See Calpine Corp., 169 FERC ¶ 61,239, slip op. at 32-33 (Dec. 19, 2019) (expanding the 
denition of resources subject to the MOPR to include state-subsidized renewables). 
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B. A Three-Tranched Resource Procurement Requirement 
To advance the principles outlined above, this Article proposes resource 
adequacy requirements to LSEs.422 This would allow LSEs to balance the 
imperatives of procuring a low-cost, reliable, and clean energy electric power 
supply. FERC should set performance standards governing the tranches with 
reference to state policies and allow LSEs to determine for themselves the 
most efficient way to comply with various state and federal energy regulations. 
LSEs could “tranche” their portfolio. One tranche would consist of a clean 
energy tranche, another would be a exibility tranche, and another a capacity 
tranche. The clean energy tranche would be based on aggregated state 
renewables and zero-emission mandates that aect particular markets. For 
example, if California requires that sixty percent of electricity come from 
zero-carbon sources by 2030, the clean energy tranche for the California 
market would require sucient renewable capacity to meet the sixty-percent 
target. The exibility tranche requirement would be based on a region’s 
calculated need for exible resources, determined at least in part by the clean 
energy tranche requirement. Finally, the capacity tranche requirement would 
be set based on peak demand plus a reserve margin. The capacity tranche 
would resemble today’s capacity markets, but instead of a mandatory central 
auction, LSEs would have the option to participate in a central auction or to 
procure capacity for themselves. Furthermore, the capacity tranche would 
operate as a residual to the clean energy and exibility tranches, rather than 
as the core of the capacity market. 
LSEs would not be forced to buy a percentage of electricity from fossil 
fuel generators when doing so would prevent them from complying with state 
environmental laws. LSEs would be able to satisfy these requirements by 
building their own generators, contracting bilaterally, or transacting on a 
central market overseen by FERC or the grid operators. To ensure that LSEs 
do not secure excess capacity, regulators would allow the tranches to overlap. 
Since capacity refers to all of the reserves an LSE needs, the capacity tranche 
would actually encompass all of the electricity an LSE had procured, 
including electricity that the entity also used to satisfy the exibility and 
clean energy tranches. LSEs would use the capacity tranche to show FERC 
and its grid operator that it had procured enough electricity to comply with 
 
422 Parts of this proposal already exist in California, which allows generators to charge for 
being available to supply electricity without awarding a handout to incumbent suppliers that do not 
need to receive a subsidy every time the market needs to signal that new generators should enter 
the market. See CAL. ISO, FINAL FLEXIBLE CAPACITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR 2017, at 3-5 
(2016), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/FinalFlexibleCapacityNeedsAssessmentFor2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q2BU-36CL] (discussing California’s system of studying and allocating 
flexible capacity need). 
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its reserve requirement. An additional benet is that LSEs would be able to 
incorporate price signals sent by states and consumers willing to pay more for 
certain resources. Because LSEs would be able to contract directly with 
generators, potential suppliers would compete for contracts. In this way, our 
proposal would preserve competition in electricity markets. 
Another benet of this proposal is that it would make it easier to retire 
uneconomic generators. As discussed in Section IV.B, the length of capacity 
market commitment periods causes retention of inecient generators for 
years after they could retire. If LSEs procured capacity for themselves, they 
could pay inecient generators to retire when less expensive alternatives 
became available. Old generators struggling to survive might prefer to be paid 
to retire than be forced to operate with low margins. The LSE would be in a 
position to encourage new generators to enter the market when it is economic 
for them to do so. 
Optional capacity markets would resemble exchanges for long-term 
contracts and would thereby reduce the transaction costs associated with 
finding new load. Energy markets would become real-time flexibility 
markets used by grid operators and LSEs to balance load. Rather than 
compete for the favor of regulators, generators would compete to provide 
the services Americans expect from the power sector. There is no reason that 
all capacity should clear at the same rate when different generators provide 
different services depending on their ability to ramp up, curtail supply, ease 
transmission congestion, or support state renewable policies. Energy 
markets, in turn, would reward flexible generating units—the attribute that 
actually supports grid resilience. Rather than retain reliability through 
regulatory fiat, this structure would realize the goal of restructuring by 
relying on competitive processes to secure all of the services consumers 
demand from the power grid. It would do so, moreover, without bailing out 
fossil fuel generators. 
CONCLUSION 
It is somewhat ironic that FERC has resurrected utility rate regulation by 
claiming that aggressive regulatory interventions are needed to protect 
competition in the electric power industry. The Commission seems to be using 
the language of “investor confidence” and market “integrity” as a rhetorical 
device to justify a sweeping federal strategy to counteract state clean energy 
programs, prevent renewables from displacing traditional generators, and 
resurrect a system of administrative pricing in important wholesale markets. 
This Article provides a sobering analysis of the technical and regulatory 
obstacles to reducing carbon emissions in the electricity sector. Hidden 
regulatory interventions designed to shore up grid reliability are being used 
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to counteract ambitious decarbonization proposals. Although there is no 
reason for FERC to bail out fossil fuel generators, FERC has nevertheless 
used its authority over grid reliability to shield incumbent fossil fuel 
generators from competitive forces. From an economic standpoint, these 
interventions make little sense. They revive rate regulation of generation 
along with all of the ineciencies that plagued that system. From a legal 
standpoint, these interventions are inconsistent with the federalist vision 
embraced by the FPA. 
Rather than revive rate regulation, this Article has argued that FERC 
should simplify reserve requirements, stop counteracting state clean energy 
programs, and support the development of competitive markets for capacity. 
FERC could—and should—secure the services needed to operate a clean and 
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